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Numbers and analogue magnitude
In our modern society we are surrounded by numerical information every 
day – all day long. We start our day by staring at the digits of our digital alarm 
clock and we end it by counting the bills for paying the 3-course menu in the 
fancy restaurant around the corner. In between, we process several thousands of 
numbers (Butterworth, 1999). We remember and dial phone numbers, we receive, 
spend and transfer money, etc. Processing all these numerical information is an 
essential cognitive ability, and having deficits in this domain makes individuals 
less employable, significantly reduces lifetime earnings and is even a risk factor 
for depression (Butterworth, 2010). Understanding how our brain represents and 
processes numerical information is important for diagnostic and educational 
purposes alike.
When we want to investigate the cognitive and neural mechanisms of 
processing numerical information it is important to have a clear idea on what 
kind of information we are dealing with. In fact, numerical information, 
as we use it, is best considered as a composition of several components with 
different informational content that might well be represented mentally by 
distinct mechanisms (e.g. Dehaene & Cohen, 1995; Dehaene, 1993; Campbell 
& Clark, 1992; McCloskey, 1992). For instance, McCloskey (1992) proposed 
that numerical information is processed via three distinct and independent 
modules: a comprehension module transforms an initial notation-specific 
representation into an amodal abstract (i.e. notation-independent) format on 
which a calculation module performs all mental calculations, while a production 
module provides the opposite functionality of transforming the internal abstract 
representation back into a notation-specific output format. Campbell & Clark 
(1992) on the other hand suggested that number comprehension is mediated 
by an interconnected network of format-specific representations, rejecting the 
hypothesis of a central abstract number representation.
While both of the above mentioned models aim to explain the syntactic 
mechanisms of manipulating number notations, they unfortunately do not speak 
to the actual semantics of numerical information (e.g. what is the informational 
content of the different representations). The perhaps most influential model of 
how the human brain represents numerical information, the triple code model, 
addresses this question in more detail and differentiates between three kinds of 
interconnected cardinal number representations (Dehaene, 1993; Dehaene & 
Cohen, 1995):
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1. Symbolic representation
For as long as numbers have been part of human culture, numerical 
information is referred to by using some form of formal notation. While the 
earliest notations were simple, with a number of similar tokens referring to the 
set with this numerosity (e.g. I, II, III; see also Ifrah, 1981), they soon evolved 
into more complex systems with new symbols and special fundamental 
numbers, such as Roman digits (I, V, X, L, C, M) or Arabic digits (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 9). A symbolic representation of this visual number form is thought 
to be neurally realized in the occipito-temporal region of the brain, as part 
of the ventral visual pathway which is involved in visual object recognition 
(Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982).
2. Verbal representation
Just as we have symbols for numbers, we also have words for them. A verbal 
representation of spoken number words and their sequence allows us to count 
discrete items and to retrieve arithmetic facts from memory (e.g. 7 * 7 = 49). 
The system is assumed to be part of a left-lateralized network of language 
areas, which include the inferior frontal, superior and middle temporal gyri, 
as well as the angular gyrus.
3. Analogue magnitude representation
While we do formalize and verbalize them, at their very core, however, 
numbers are used to refer to quantities or magnitudes. A numerical magnitude 
representation allows us to deduce the actual size of a number and to compare 
it to the size of other numbers, to see if it is smaller or larger. The evolutionary 
significance of this capability is highlighted by the fact that basic sensitivity 
to quantity is not only present in early infancy (e.g. Feigenson, Dehaene, & 
Spelke, 2004), but also shared by non-human primates (e.g. Brannon, 2006) 
as well as other animals, such as rats (e.g. Mech and Church, 1983), parrots 
(e.g. Pepperberg & Gordon, 2005) and fish (e.g. Agrillo, Piffer, Bisazza, & 
Butterworth, 2012). Importantly, the mental representation of numerical size 
is hypothesized to be encoded in an analogue manner. That is, numerical size 
seems to be represented along a continuous domain, rather than in discrete 
steps, with the representation of one number co-activating the representations 
of the numbers that are semantically close with decreasing extent. Evidence 
for this analogue nature comes from the so-called ‘distance effect’, which 
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refers to the phenomenon that people are faster to compare two numbers, 
the further these numbers are away from each other (Moyer & Landauer, 
1967). Neurally, this seems to be realized by number-sensitive neurons with 
overlapping Gaussian-shaped tuning curves (Nieder & Miller, 2004a). For 
instance, activating the representation of number 5, will also co-activate 
the representations of numbers 4 and 6, as well as 3 and 7, etc. The further 
away the surrounding numbers are, the lesser they are activated (e.g. 3 and 
7 < 4 and 6 < 5 in the former example). Furthermore, this representational 
spread (i.e. how many surrounding numbers are co-activated) increases 
logarithmically with number size, resulting in a more precise representation 
of small numbers, compared to large numbers. Evidence for this property 
comes from the ‘size effect’, which shows that comparisons are in general 
(i.e. irrespective of semantic distance) faster for small numbers, compared 
to large numbers (Antell & Keating, 1983; Strauss & Curtis, 1981). The point 
at which the overlap between two representations is little enough to allow 
for a reliable discrimination between them is called the ‘Weber fraction’. The 
analogue magnitude representation is hypothesized to be implemented by 
brain areas in the posterior parietal cortex, such as the intraparietal sulcus.
This thesis focuses on the underlying mechanisms of an analogue 
magnitude representation, both on a behavioural as well as a neural level. In the 
following, I first review the current literature on this topic, followed by an outline 
of the thesis.
The implementation of analogue magnitude
Over the last decades, different ideas on an analogue magnitude 
representation have been proposed to explain how we mentally represent and 
understand numerical size.
The accumulator model
One of the historically first analogue models of numerical size representation 
is the accumulator model, which allows to map between the numerosity of a 
set and the mental representation of magnitude representing this numerosity 
(Meck & Church, 1983; Gallistel & Gelman, 1992). The model, which originally 
attempted to explain the (non-verbal) numerical abilities of animals, consists of 
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three components: the ‘pacemaker’ acts as source of a stream of impulses, the 
‘accumulator’ is the destination of the stream, and a ‘gate’ will control the flow 
of the stream of impulses into the accumulator. The idea is as follows: for each 
item in a set whose numerosity is to be represented, the gate briefly closes for a 
fixed amount of time, letting a fixed amount of pulses flow through which will 
incrementally fill the accumulator. The final state of the accumulator will then 
represent a continuous measure of the total amount of items in the set. 
Given that no system is perfectly accurate, neither the flow of impulses, nor 
the amount of time the gate is opened will be entirely constant. Hence, the amount 
of impulses entering the accumulator might vary slightly for each item, resulting 
in an approximate representation of numerical magnitude. The resulting increase 
in noise in the system can also explain the effect of a better discrimination of 
two small numbers, compared to two large numbers (i.e. the size effect; Antell & 
Keating, 1983; Strauss & Curtis, 1981). The accumulator model has furthermore 
been used successfully to explain empirical data on rats’ ability to discriminate 
between numerical as well as temporal quantities (Meck & Church, 1983).
Importantly, the accumulator model is of mathematical nature and as such 
does not speak to the actual neural realization of the suggested mechanism. The 
sequential accumulation of input items, however, seems to be in contrast to the 
finding of parallel numerosity detection in monkeys (e.g. Nieder & Miller, 2003). 
Dehaene and Changeux (1993), were able to model the process of accumulating 
perceived objects (visual and auditory) in parallel, using networks of simulated 
nerve cells. In their neural model, all inputs are first normalized to a size- and 
shape-independent format and then summed by a layer of ‘numerosity detectors’. 
Each detector responds preferably to one specific numerosity and less frequently 
to the surrounding numerosities, resulting in a Gaussian-shaped tuning curve. 
The precision of a detector’s tuning decreases logarithmically with increasing 
numerosity (i.e. a detector with a large preferred numerosity has a wider Gaussian 
tuning curve than a detector with a small preferred numerosity). This inherent 
imprecision introduced by the Gaussian tuning curves and their non-linear 
compression – which leads to an approximate representation of numerosity – is 
in line with observations of numerosity selective neurons in the monkey brain 
(e.g. Nieder & Miller, 2004a).
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The mental number line
The perhaps most influential idea on how numerical size is cognitively 
represented in humans is the so-called mental number line hypothesis. In essence, 
the theory states that we represent numerical size in spatial terms – as positions 
on a horizontally oriented mental line – with small numbers on one side and 
large numbers on the other (e.g. Moyer, 1973; Moyer & Landauer, 1967). The 
most important empirical evidence for the existence of a mental number line 
(MNL) comes from the finding of a Spatial-Numerical Association of Response 
Codes (SNARC; Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 1993). Dehaene and colleagues 
asked participants to judge the parity of single Arabic digits (i.e. whether a digit is 
even or odd) by pressing one of two buttons. Analysis of reaction times revealed 
an interference of numerical size with the execution of the spatial responses. On 
average, participants were faster when they responded to small numbers with 
a left button press compared to a right button press, and when they responded 
to large numbers with a right button press compared to a left button press. 
Importantly, these spatial preferences followed a linear trend, with reaction times 
of the left hand becoming increasingly faster the smaller the presented number 
and reaction times of the right hand becoming increasingly faster the larger 
the presented number, revealing the analogue nature of this representation. 
The SNARC effect is known as a very robust effect and has successfully been 
replicated various times over the last decades (for reviews see e.g. Wood, Nuerk, 
Willmes, & Fischer, 2008; Hubbard, Piazza, Pinel, & Dehaene, 2005). 
While the association of numbers with response space might be the best 
studied one, associations between numbers and other response-unrelated spatial 
aspects have been observed as well. For instance, Fischer, Castel, Dodd and 
Pratt (2003) have shown that the mere perception of a number symbol can shift 
covert attention towards either the right or left side, depending on numerical 
size. Participants were asked to visually detect a target that could appear either 
on the left or on the right side while ignoring a digit that was presented centrally 
in advance. When the delay between the digit and the target was longer than 300 
ms, participants were faster to detect the target on the left side when it followed 
a small number (digits 1 and 2) and the target on the right side when it followed 
a large number (digits 8 and 9). Further important evidence for the existence of 
a MNL comes from patients with brain damage. Zorzi, Priftis and Umiltà (2002) 
showed that individuals with hemispatial neglect – a phenomenon in which 
information in one half of the visual field is consistently neglected – misplaced 
the midpoint of a numerical interval. When asked to bisect a numerical interval 
(e.g. finding the exact midpoint between 2 and 8), left neglect patients showed 
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a consistent bias to overestimate the midpoint, suggesting a shift of their spatial 
representation of numbers towards the unimpaired side.
Interestingly, while it has been proposed that spatial-numerical associations 
arise from common parietal circuits involved in attending to both external space 
and internal number representations (Hubbard et al., 2005), direct neuroimaging 
evidence for the MNL hypothesis is sparse. However, in line with the findings from 
Fischer et al. (2003), Knops, Thirion, Hubbard, Michel and Dehaene (2009) were 
able to show that the same areas in the posterior parietal cortex that are involved 
in generating eye movements are also recruited during number processing. 
A multivariate classifier algorithm that was trained to classify between left and 
right eye movements was, without further training, also capable to classify the 
results of an arithmetic calculation. These results suggest a common neural 
representation of numbers and space in the posterior superior parietal lobe. More 
recently, Cutini, Scarpa, Scatturni, Dell’Acqua and Zorzi (2012) investigated the 
neural underpinnings of the association between numbers and spatial responses 
using functional near-infrared spectroscopy. Their results showed a neural 
signature of the SNARC effect in bilateral intraparietal suclus (IPS) and the left 
angular gyrus (AG) – two key areas for the processing of numerical information 
(see Arsalidou & Taylor, 2011 for a review, but also Dehaene, Piazza, Pinel, & 
Cohen, 2003; Rusconi, Walsh, & Butterworth, 2005; Göbel, Walsh, & Rushworth, 
2001).
While there seems to be compelling evidence for the MNL hypothesis, it 
also has to face several points of critique. For one, the mapping of numbers to 
space is not fixed but rather flexible. First, the orientation of the MNL seems 
to be highly dependent on cultural aspects such as reading habits (for a recent 
review see Göbel, Shaki, & Fischer, 2011). For instance, Shaki, Fischer and 
Petrusic (2009) investigated the SNARC effect in participants from three cultural 
groups: Canadians who read and write English text and Arabic numbers from 
left to right, Palestinians, who read and write Arabic text and Arabic-Indic 
numbers from right to left and Israelis, who read and write Hebrew text from 
right to left, but Arabic numbers from left to right. While a classical SNARC 
effect with an association of small numbers and left response space and large 
numbers and right response space could be observed in Canadian participants, 
Palestinian participants showed a reversed pattern (i.e. an association between 
small numbers and right response space and large numbers and left response 
space). Interestingly, Israeli participants who have been exposed to both reading 
directions (right to left for text and left to right for numbers), showed no SNARC 
effect. Second, Bächtold, Baumüller and Brugger (1998) demonstrated that the 
CHAPTER 1
16
spatial-numerical associations can even be rapidly changed by task instructions 
and task requirements (see also Lindemann, Abolafia, Pratt, & Bekkering, 2008). 
Participant were asked to make speeded responses towards numbers between 
1 and 11. When participants were instructed to conceive numbers as distances 
on a ruler, a classical SNARC effect was found. However, when they were asked 
to conceive numbers as hours on a clock face, a reversed SNARC effect was 
observed. Fischer, Mills and Shaki (2010) showed a similar effect by manipulating 
the number placement in a text. Fischer and colleagues investigated the SNARC 
effect in participants from an English and a Hewbrew group before and after they 
read cooking recipes in which numbers were placed either at the left or the right 
side of the lines, depending on their semantic size. Importantly, this placement 
could either be in SNARC congruency or not. After reading recipes with SNARC 
incongruent number placement (i.e. small numbers at the right side and large 
numbers at the left side), the SNARC effect was significantly reduced (English 
group) or even reversed (Hebrew group). Likewise, in addition to this, several 
studies have shown that numbers are also associated with vertical space (Shaki & 
Fischer, 2011; Gevers, Lammertyn, & Notebaert, 2006; Ito & Hatta, 2004; Schwarz 
& Keus, 2004; Wiemers, Bekkering, & Lindemann, in press). For instance, Ito 
and Hatta (2004) had participants judge the parity of a single digit by responding 
with one of two vertically arranged response keys. Under these conditions, a 
vertical SNARC effect could be observed, with faster bottom responses to small 
numbers, and faster top responses to large numbers. Taken together, these results 
question the interpretation of the MNL as a core representation of numerical 
size, as they suggest that the way numbers are associated with space seems to be 
mainly shaped by situational factors other than numerical size itself.
Other critique of the MNL hypothesis directly addresses the representational 
content of the MNL itself and suggests that the mapping of numbers to space 
is based on a number’s ordinal position rather than its cardinal size. Gevers, 
Rynvoet and Fias (2003) demonstrated that not only numbers, but also letters 
of the alphabet and months of the year will be associated with spatial responses, 
irrespective if order is relevant for the task. In a setting similar to the task used to 
obtain a SNARC effect, participants judged whether a letter is positioned before 
or after the letter O or if it is a vowel or a consonant, and whether a month is 
positioned before or after the month July or if it ends with the letter R. Importantly, 
while both letters and months can be ordered sequentially, neither of them 
carries magnitude-related information. Analysis of the reaction times resulted, 
in all cases, in an effect similar to a SNARC effect, with early letters/month being 
associated with left responses and later letters/months being associated with right 
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responses. In line with this, van Dijk and Fias (2011) showed that the SNARC 
effect depends on the ordinal position of numbers in working memory, rather 
than numerical size. Participants were asked to learn and remember random 
sequences of single digit numbers before the SNARC effect was measured. In 
this way, the effects of ordinal position and numerical magnitude could be 
dissociated from each other. The results revealed an association between space 
and the ordinal position of the numbers in the sequence the participants had to 
remember, but not between space and the actual numerical size of the numbers.
A generalized magnitude system
While the investigation of associations between numbers and spatial 
positions along a mental number line has been very prominent in the numerical 
cognition literature for the past decades, other associations have been reported 
as well. The most-studied among them is the association of numerical size with 
physical size as revealed by the numerical size-congruity effect (e.g. Henik & 
Tzelgov, 1982). Henik & Tzelgov (1982) presented two digits with different 
physical and numerical sizes on a display, and asked participants to either 
decide which of the two stimuli is physically larger or to decide which of them 
is numerically larger. Importantly, the numerical and physical size of the target 
stimulus could be either congruent (e.g. 3 7), or incongruent (e.g. 3 7). Analysis 
of the response times revealed faster responses for congruent trials in which the 
target was both physically and numerically larger than the other digit, compared 
to incongruent trials in which the target item differed in the task-irrelevant size 
dimension. This finding reflects an unintentional interference of task irrelevant 
numerical size when processing task relevant physical size and vice versa, and 
suggests that numerical size is also somehow related to non-positional spatial 
aspects. Moreover, interactions of the processing of quantity with the processing 
of entirely non-spatial domains have been reported, such as time (e.g. Meck & 
Church, 1983; Brown, 1997). For instance, the accumulator model by Meck and 
Church (1983; see also above) successfully explained empirical data on numerical 
and temporal processing in rats. Brown (1997) tested human participants in three 
dual-task conditions in which temporal sequence production was paired with 
either rotor tracking, visual search, or mental arithmetic. While all secondary 
tasks impaired the temporal one, temporal sequence production had only an 
interfering effect on mental arithmetic, suggesting a close link between the 
processing of temporal durations and numerical information. 
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Based on these observations, Walsh (2003) formulated a different 
hypothesis on how numerical size is represented in our brain, which assumes 
the existence of a shared generalized representation of analogue magnitude. 
A Theory Of Magnitude (ATOM; Walsh, 2003) states that all prothetic information 
(information about magnitude; i.e. all information that is experienced as “more 
than” or “less than”; see also Stevens, 1975) is processed according to a common 
metric for action, in order to coordinate behaviour and to predict its immediate 
sensorimotor consequences. Numerical size – being magnitude information – is 
thus thought to be processed by a generalized magnitude system (GMS) which 
simultaneously processes size-related information from other cognitive domains 
like, for instance, space and time. Evidence for this notion comes from several 
studies showing associations between numbers and other types of magnitude 
information in action and perception. Besides aforementioned interactions 
between numbers and physical size (Besner & Coltheart, 1979; Henik & Tzelgov, 
1982; Pansky & Algom, 1999; Schwarz & Ischebeck, 2003) and temporal duration 
(Oliveri, Vicario, Salerno, Koch, Turriziani, Mangano, Chillemi, & Caltagirone, 
2008; Roitman, Brannon, Andrews, & Platt, 2007; Alards-Tomalin, Leboe-
McGowan, Shaw, & Leboe-McGowan, 2014; Brown et al., 1997), numbers have 
also been shown to interact with visual luminance (Cohen Kadosh & Henik, 
2006), perceptual strength in binocular rivalry (Paffen, Plukaard, & Kani, 
2011), grip aperture (Lindemann, Abolafia, Girardi, & Bekkering, 2007), object 
graspability (Badets, Andres, Di Luca, & Pesenti, 2007) and response force 
(Vierck & Kiesel, 2010).
Bueti and Walsh (2009; see also Walsh, 2003) suggested that the posterior 
parietal cortex (PPC) should be the main neural locus of the GMS, since 
haemodynamic and electrophysiological recordings as well as brain stimulation 
data from human and non-human primates show that this cortical area is involved 
in spatial (Bjoertomt, Cowey, & Walsh, 2002; Stein, 1989), temporal (Walsh 
& Pasual-Leone, 2003; Leon & Shadlen, 2003; Onoe, Komori, Onoe, Takechi, 
Tsukada, Watanabe, 2001; Rao, Mayer, & Harrington, 2001; Schubotz, Friederici, 
& Von Cramon, 2000; Maquet, Lejeune, Pouthas, Bonnet, Casini, Macar, Timsit-
Berthier, Vidal, Ferrara, Degueldre, Quaglia, Delfiore, Luxen, Woods, Mazziotta, 
& Comar, 1996) and numerical processing (Sawamura, Shima, & Tanji, 2002; 
Göbel, et al., 2001). Lesions in the PPC can lead to deficits in temporal (Battelli, 
Walsh, Pascual-Leone, & Cavanagh, 2008; Battelli, Pascual-Leone, & Cavanagh, 
2007; Danckert, Ferber, Pun, Broderick, Striemer, Rock, & Stewart, 2007; Becchio 
& Bertone, 2006; Basso, Nichelli, Frassinetti, & di Pellegrino, 1996), spatial 
(Battelli et al., 2008; 2007; Danckert et al., 2007; Zamarian, Egger, & Delazer, 
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2007; Becchio, & Bertone, 2006; Battelli, Cavanagh, Martini, & Barton, 2003; 
Zorzi, Priftis, & Umiltà, 2002; Basso et al., 1996) and numerical (Zamarian et 
al., 2007; Zorzi et al., 2002; Cipolotti, Butterworth, & Denes, 1991) processing. 
Most importantly, the results of several studies comparing the neural correlates 
of magnitude processing in various domains suggest a cerebral overlap in IPS 
between the representations of numerical size and physical size (Kaufmann, 
Koppelstaetter, Delazer, Siedentopf, Rhomberg, Golaszewski, Felber, & Ischebeck, 
2005; Cohen Kadosh, Henik, Rubinstein, Mohr, Dori, van den Ven, Zorzi, 
Hendler, Goebel, Linden, 2005) as well as visual luminance (Cohen Kadosh et 
al., 2005). For instance, Cohen Kadosh et al. (2005) used functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) to compare brain activations evoked by numerical 
size, physical size and luminance comparisons. In different blocks, participants 
had to judge which of two stimuli was numerically or physically larger (e.g. 3 7 
or  7 7; size-congruity; Henik & Tzelgov, 1982), or brighter (e.g. 7 7). Their results 
revealed that, while the different magnitude comparisons all activated their own 
wide-spread cortical network, they also showed a common cortical activity in 
the left posterior IPS, suggesting a common representation of numerical size, 
physical size and visual luminance. However, others have failed to demonstrate 
such a cortical overlap (Pinel, Piazza, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 2004). Criticism 
on an abstract shared magnitude representation addresses mainly the neglect 
of the existence of a number-specific representation due to statistical issues 
(i.e. the absence of number specific effects is based on null-results; e.g. Cohen 
Kadosh, 2008; Shuman & Kanwisher, 2004), limitations of current neuroimaging 
techniques (i.e. similar brain activations might only reflect intermingled, but 
different neural populations; e.g. Ansari, 2008; Nieder, 2004) and dependence on 
task requirements (i.e. neural commonalities might be task-specific; e.g. Ansari, 
2007; Göbel, Johansen-Berg, Behrens, & Rushworth, 2004; for a review see also 
Cohen Kadosh & Walsh, 2009).
Embodied and grounded numerical cognition
An important consequence of the GMS hypothesis is that it suggests a 
key role of perception and action for the representation of numerical size. The 
functional relevance of representing numerical size together with action-related 
information becomes clearer when looking at other research domains in which 
a similar idea of directly coupling semantic concepts to lower-level action-
related concepts has been suggested. In modern psycholinguistic research, for 
instance, the notion of embodied cognition refers to such a coupling. While there 
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exist many different definitions and formulations of embodied cognition in the 
literature (see Wilson, 2002, for a review), what they all have in common is the 
central hypothesis that each semantic concept (e.g. a linguistic concept, such 
as the word “to kick”) is grounded in basic sensorimotor representations and is 
therefore closely linked to low-level perceptual and motor codes (for reviews, see 
Barsalou, 2008; Pecher & Zwaan, 2005; Fischer & Zwaan, 2008). To understand 
the purpose of this grounding mechanism, we have to look at the problem that it 
intends to solve. A classical view on cognition (e.g. representational/computational 
theory of mind; Putnam, 1961; Fodor 1975) assumes that conceptual knowledge 
is implemented by amodal symbolic representations which, once acquired, 
are entirely detached from the modal sensorimotor systems of our brain that 
interface with the external world (see also Barsalou, 2008). In such a system, 
cognitive processes can be thought of as entirely internalized rule-based formal 
manipulations of these abstract symbolic representations. A theoretical problem 
with this approach is, however, that the internally represented knowledge – while 
being detached from what connects us with the external world – eventually still 
relates to actual entities in the external world (Harnad, 1990). In other words, 
it remains unclear how this symbolic knowledge can be meaningful to us in 
any way, if it is isolated from what it is supposed to refer to. For instance, what 
remains of the meaning of a concept like “to kick”, if the representation of this 
concept is reduced to an abstract symbol and completely isolated from the 
external world where “kicking” actually takes place? It has thus been argued that, 
in order to be meaningful, conceptual knowledge cannot be entirely internalized, 
but needs to be somehow grounded in real-world events (cf. symbol grounding; 
Barsalou, 2008). To be more precise, embodied and grounded views on cognition 
do not assume that mental representations are detached from the sensorimotor 
systems, but, on the contrary, ascribe a key role in cognition to the perceptual and 
motor systems of the brain. The central claim is that we understand conceptual 
knowledge by directly linking it to our own sensorimotor experiences with 
entities in the external world.
Over the last years, there has been abundant empirical support for the 
idea of embodied/grounded cognition from behavioural and neuroimaging 
studies (see Pulvermüller, 2013 for a recent review). For instance, Glenberg & 
Kaschak (2002) have demonstrated that participants have difficulties to judge 
the sensibility of a sentence when the sentence implies a movement which is 
incongruent to the actual movement required for indicating the sensibility 
judgement (e.g. responding to “close the drawer” with a movement directed 
away from the body), and it has been shown that the brain networks activated 
INTRODUCTION
21
when reading action words (e.g. the word “to kick”) include the corresponding 
sensory and motor areas (e.g. leg and foot representations in primary motor and 
somatosensory cortices; Hauk & Pullvermüller, 2004; Pulvermüller, 2013).
Importantly, the hypothesis of embodied/grounded cognition can be (and 
has been) formulated for number cognition as well. In particular, the hypothesis 
constitutes that we understand abstract number concepts, such as numerical 
size, by relating them to bodily experienceable entities. In fact, recent research 
in this domain has made a strong point for numerical cognition being shaped 
by our body. In the following, I first give an overview of the current literature 
on embodied numerical cognition by briefly reviewing recent work on the 
role of finger counting and whole body motion for number representations. 
Afterwards, I discuss an additional idea on how numerical size can be grounded 
in sensorimotor experiences that has not yet received much attention in the 
literature.
Finger counting and finger-based number representations
In the numerical cognition literature, an embodied representation of 
numbers is often discussed in the context of the phenomenon of finger counting, 
which demonstrates a strong association between fingers and numbers in most 
adults (e.g. Bender & Beller, 2012; Lindemann, Alipour, & Fischer, 2011; Moeller, 
Fischer, Link, Wasner, Huber, Cress, & Nuerk, 2012). A very basic interaction 
between finger and number representations has, for instance, been shown by 
Di Luca, Grana, Semenza, Seron and Pesenti (2006). Di Luca and colleagues 
asked participants to identify Arabic digits by pressing one of 10 response keys 
with both hands (where each key was pressed by one of the ten fingers). The 
results revealed faster responses to numbers 1 to 5 with the fingers of the right 
hand, compared to the left hand, as well as faster responses to numbers 6 to 
10 with the fingers of the left hand, compared to the right hand. This mapping 
was congruent to the prototypical finger counting strategy of the participants 
(i.e. counting numbers 1 to 5 with the fingers on the right hand and numbers 6 
to 10 with the fingers on the left hand). Di Luca and Pesenti (2008) furthermore 
demonstrated that if participants have to judge if a number is smaller or larger than 
5, they are faster to do so when unconsciously primed with a visual presentation 
of a finger configuration compatible to the individual’s counting strategy. Most 
importantly, counting habits (i.e. individual finger-number associations and 
starting hand preferences) have also been shown to affect symbolic number 
processing, if the use of fingers is not required for the successful completion of 
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a task (Fischer, 2008; Domahs, Moeller, Huber, Willmes, & Nuerk, 2010). For 
instance, Fischer (2008) showed that the association between numbers and a 
spatial response (SNARC effect; Dehaene et al., 1993) was strongly affected by 
whether participants started to count on their right or left hand, with only a 
group of participants who started counting on their left hand showing a SNARC 
effect, but not a group of participants who started counting on their right hand. 
Domahs et al. (2010) investigated finger-based sub-base-five effects in an Arabic 
number comparison task in three different groups – German deaf signers, German 
hearing adults and Chinese hearing adults. Their results revealed that sub-base-
five effects were larger in the two German groups which use a sub-base-five 
finger counting system, compared to the Chinese group which uses a sub-base-
ten finger counting system. Eventually, there is also neurophysiological evidence 
that suggests an association between finger and number representations in the 
brain (Tschentscher, Hauk, Fischer, & Pulvermüller, 2012; Andres, Michaux, 
& Pesenti, 2012; Kaufmann, Vogel, Wood, Kremser, Schocke, & Zimmerhackl, 
2008; Rusconi, Walsh, & Butterworth, 2005). For instance, Tschentscher and 
colleagues (2012) demonstrated that brain areas classically associated with finger 
movements were also activated during passive viewing of Arabic digits and 
number words.
Taken together, there is compelling evidence for a coupling between finger 
representations and the processing of numerical size. However, the causal relation 
of this coupling remains largely unclear. While there is general agreement in the 
current literature that finger representations are mostly beneficial for learning 
arithmetic relations between numbers (for a review see Moeller & Nuerk, 
2012), it remains unknown at the moment whether finger representations are a 
necessity for the development of an understanding of analogue numerical size, 
as suggested by the grounding hypothesis (cf. symbol grounding; Barsolou, 2008). 
That is, without finger representations, would we still be able to understand the 
concept of numerical size? An alternative explanation for the benefit of a coupling 
between numerical size and finger representations that does not assume this 
necessity might be that finger representation support numerical processing by 
enabling an externalization of cognitive content (cf. symbolic offloading; Wilson, 
2002). In other words, using the fingers to store, retrieve and visualize numerical 
information could aid cognition in a way that might be compared to writing 
information down on a piece of paper to keep track of them (cf. Lindemann & 
Krause, 2012).
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Body motion and spatial number representations
An involvement of the body has also been suggested to play an important 
role for the coupling between numbers and space (Moeller et al., 2012). In 
line with this, it has been shown that head motion can affect random number 
generation (Loetscher, Schwarz, Schubiger and Brugger, 2008). Participants were 
asked to randomly name numbers between 1 and 30 while alternately turning 
their head to either the left or right while doing so. Interestingly, in accordance 
with the orientation of a mental number line, significantly more small numbers 
were generated when turning the head to the left, showing a direct effect of body 
motion on number processing. Furthermore, whole body movements along the 
(mental) number line can improve numerical training (Link, Moeller, Huber, 
Fischer, & Nuerk, 2013; Hartmann, Grabherr & Mast, 2012; Fischer et al., 2011). 
For instance, Fischer and colleagues (2011) trained kindergarten children on 
a magnitude comparison task. While one group gave full-body responses on a 
digital dance mat (stepping left and right), a control group responded merely 
via selecting the target with the finger on a tablet computer. The results revealed 
that the full-body movements training was more efficient than the training of 
the control group. In another study Link and colleagues (2013) trained first 
graders to estimate the position of a given number on a number line depicted on 
the floor, by walking towards the corresponding position. A control group was 
trained on the same estimation task, but indicated their responses by walking to 
a touchscreen which showed a number line on which the corresponding position 
had to be marked by pointing to it. In line with an embodied view, the training 
was more efficient in the group of children who were actually walking to the 
position on the number line, compared to those children who trained on the 
touchscreen.
The results of these training studies suggest that bodily experiences play a 
crucial role for the development of spatial associations with numbers. However, 
just as with the link between finger representations and numerical size, it remains 
unclear at this point in time whether spatial body cues are merely supportive of 
numerical processing or whether they are a necessity for our understanding of 
numerical size.
‘Groundedness’, ‘embodiedness’ and ‘situatedness’
Recently, a further classification of embodied number representations has 
been suggested to better understand the role of the body and the environment 
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for numerical cognition. Based on the strong association between numbers 
and space, Fischer (2012; but see also Fischer and Brugger, 2011) proposed a 
hierarchical distinction of body-related number representations into three 
categories. First, representations can be ‘grounded’. In opposition to the broader 
concept of grounding in the literature, Fischer uses the term exclusively to refer 
to representations which are based on universal properties in the physical world. 
One example for such a grounding is the relation between small numbers and 
lower space and large numbers and upper space (e.g. the vertical SNARC effect; 
Gevers et al., 2006; Ito & Hatta, 2004; Schwarz & Keus, 2004) which is believed 
to rely on the physical properties of piled up objects (Lakoff & Nunez, 2000). 
Since these representations are bound by external constraints of the world, their 
defining property is the assumption that they are of static nature and cannot 
be easily changed. That is, manifestations of these representations (such as the 
coupling between numbers and vertical space) should be universally present, 
irrespective of task-specific requirements or attempts to alter them via training. 
The characteristic of the second category, which Fischer calls ‘embodied’ 
representations, is their reliance on sensorimotor constraints of our own body. 
Finger-based number representations during finger counting (e.g. Bender & 
Beller, 2012; Lindemann et al., 2011; Moeller et al., 2012) are one example of 
such an embodied representation. Being based on bodily experiences, these 
representations are assumed to be more flexible than grounded representations 
and, for instance, subject to alteration via training. Finally, Fischer refers to 
representations as being ‘situated’ when they rely on current constraints of a 
specific task at hand and the available knowledge about the state of the body 
and the surrounding environment. Examples of situated representations include, 
for instance, the effects of head motion on a random number generation task 
(Loetscher et al., 2008). Being dependent on situational task requirements, this 
kind of representation is consequently assumed to be the most flexible one as 
it will adapt quickly to changes in the demands of the task. The observation of 
manifestations of these representations will thus mainly depend on the current 
setting.
Although this proposed hierarchy offers an important new framework 
to study the function of the body for numerical cognition, the strong focus on 
the role of space in number representations might limit its application, as it is 
not clear from the proposal if and how it generalizes to body-related number 
representations that are non-spatial. More importantly, however, the criterion 
which classifies the types of representation in the proposed hierarchy is 
exclusively defined as the persistence of the representation over time (i.e. how 
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flexibly can it be changed by training) and its dependency on requirements of 
the given task (i.e. how universal are manifestations of the representation). In 
other words, whether a representation is classified as ‘grounded’, ‘embodied’ or 
‘situated’ is determined by a quantification of a gradual measure. While such 
quantitative differences might indeed reflect an important difference, one might 
wonder whether embodied representations do also differ qualitatively. In the next 
section I discuss another embodied representation which, despite not having had 
a lot of attention in the literature yet, does differ qualitatively from the embodied 
representations introduced in this section.
Grounding numerical size in sensorimotor magnitudes?
While finger-based representations are undoubtedly body-related, it is also 
crucial to notice that, a priori (i.e. before being associated with numerical size), 
sensorimotor representations of the fingers themselves are not considered to be 
what Stevens (1975) calls prothetic. That is, information about the location and 
state of the fingers and their relation to each other is not considered to convey 
any magnitude information. To be more precise, it seems rather unusual (from a 
sensorimotor perspective) to say that, for instance, a sensation at the index finger 
is “more” than a sensation at the thumb, or that flexing or extending the pinky is 
“less” than flexing or extending the ring finger. It is only after we associate specific 
fingers with certain numbers that magnitude relationships between different 
fingers are present and statements like “the pinky is more than the thumb” can 
be meaningful in any way. The same holds true for positional space: A priori, an 
object in left visual space is not considered to be “less” perceived than an object in 
right visual space. Likewise, a right-lateralized action is not “more” of an action 
than is a left-lateralized one. Again, spatial positions and their relation to each 
other do themselves not convey any magnitude information and it is only after we 
associate them with numbers that any magnitude relationships between positions 
arise. Consequently, to ground numerical size in sensorimotor experiences with 
the fingers or with space, we first have to leave the magnitude domain and associate 
numerical size with magnitude-unrelated sensorimotor representations. The 
question arises, whether numerical size can also be grounded within the magnitude 
domain.
Recently, a different idea on a sensorimotor grounding of numerical size 
has been suggested. It has been speculated that information about numerical size 
becomes meaningful only when it can somehow be mapped to concrete bodily 
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experiences with size and magnitude in everyday life (Andres, Olivier, & Badets, 
2008; Lindemann, Rueschemeyer, & Bekkering, 2009). That is, the difference 
between a small number and a large number becomes meaningful to us by relating 
it to other magnitude differences we can experience with our sensorimotor system, 
such as, for instance, the difference between perceiving a small object and perceiving 
a large object, or the difference between applying weak muscle force and applying 
strong muscle force. A very similar proposal has been made by Lakoff and Nunez 
(2000) who introduced the notion of conceptual metaphors. Their central claim 
is that all abstract concepts, such as, for instance, numerical size and arithmetic 
operations, are inherently metaphorical, and that we use grounding metaphors to 
map those abstract concepts to concepts acquired via concrete bodily experiences 
(e.g. experiences with the manipulation of collections of objects are transferred to 
manipulating numerical magnitude and arithmetic operations).
Interestingly, the GMS hypothesis of Walsh (2003) is in line with these ideas 
and provides furthermore a suggestion on what the nature of this mapping could 
be – a shared representation. I started out the section on embodied numerical 
cognition with pointing out that one important consequence of the GMS hypothesis 
is that it suggests a key role of perception and action for the representation of 
numerical size. The seemingly abstract concept of numerical size is hypothesized 
to be represented by the same system that already deals with information about 
other magnitudes that are used in action (Walsh, 2003). In other words, numerical 
size can be hypothesized to directly share a representation with experienceable 
sensorimotor magnitudes. Hence, another consequence of the GMS hypothesis 
is that it provides a mechanism of grounding numerical size in sensorimotor 
magnitudes, without the need to build associations to magnitude-unrelated 
sensorimotor representations, but rather by staying within the magnitude domain.
In line with this view, numerical size has already been shown to interact 
with the sensorimotor magnitudes of physical size (Besner & Coltheart, 1979; 
Henik & Tzelgov, 1982; Pansky & Algom, 1999; Schwarz & Ischebeck, 2003), visual 
luminance (Cohen Kadosh & Henik, 2006), perceptual strength in binocular rivalry 
(Paffen et al., 2011), grip aperture (Lindemann et al., 2007), object graspability 
(Badets et al., 2007) and response force (Vierck & Kiesel, 2010). While these studies 
provide first important evidence for the notion of a grounding of numerical size 
in sensorimotor magnitudes, more research is needed to obtain a clearer picture 
of the underlying mechanism. Besides further empirical evidence for a shared 
representation between numerical size and perceptual and motor magnitudes, 
investigations into how such a shared magnitude representation relates to other 
(embodied) number representations are needed.
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Thesis outline
The aim of this thesis is to provide new insights into the behavioural and 
cerebral mechanisms supporting the processing and representation of analogue 
numerical magnitude. In particular, I explore the suggestion that numerical size 
is grounded in sensorimotor magnitudes by means of a shared representation 
of numerical size, perceptual magnitude and motor magnitude. In the next four 
chapters I discuss both behavioural and neuroimaging studies in which I investigated 
a shared magnitude representation and its relation to other representations of 
numerical size.
In the study reported in Chapter 2 I developed a new visual search paradigm 
to investigate the link between numerical and physical size in the absence of the 
response-related confounds that apply to classical size-congruity paradigms. In 
three experiments I argued that a shared representation between numerical and 
physical size would result in an early interaction between the processing of the two 
magnitudes and hypothesized numerical magnitude to affect visual attention in a 
feature search for a physically differently sized target. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the link between symbolic and tactile numerosities. 
In two experiments I investigated interactions between the processing of Arabic 
digits and tactile stimulation on the fingers. The main aim of the study concerned 
the identification of a common metric for symbolic and tactile magnitudes and 
its relation to a finger-based representation based on individual finger-counting 
preferences. 
Chapter 4 addresses the question whether a shared metric between 
perceptual and motor magnitudes exists already in early childhood. In a newly 
developed paradigm I had toddlers between 2.5 and 3 years of age operate a force-
sensitive response button to act on different amounts of objects on a computer 
screen, in order to investigate effects of perceptual magnitude on (task irrelevant) 
force production.
Eventually, in Chapter 5 I report my investigation of how individual 
differences in the representation of numerical size predict structural variance 
in the brain. By correlating grey matter volume with the size of two behavioural 
number-response interference effects, the main focus of this study was to identify 
anatomical dissociations between the disposition to associate numbers with space 
and the disposition to link numbers to nonspatial sensorimotor magnitude.

Chapter 2
A common magnitude metric in perception:
interference between numbers and size 
during visual search
based on
Krause, Bekkering, Pratt, & Lindemann (submitted)
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Abstract
The current study tests the involvement of a common magnitude metric in 
early visual processing. In a visual search task comprising single-digit numbers, 
participants had to identify a physically large (or small) target item amongst 
physically smaller (or larger) distractors. The relative numerical size of the digits 
was varied, such that the target item was either among the numerically large 
or small numbers in the search display and the relation between numerical 
and physical size was either congruent or incongruent. Perceptual differences 
of the stimuli were controlled in a additional experiment in which LCD-style 
numbers had to be searched. Our results revealed that identifying a physically 
large target item is significantly faster when the numerical size of the target item 
is large as well (congruent), compared to when it is small (incongruent). This 
finding suggests a convergence of physical and numerical size into a common 
representation of magnitude at an early perceptual processing stage. Theoretical 
consequences for theories on attention, magnitude representation, and their 
interactions are discussed.
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Introduction
It has been suggested that the representation of numbers shares common 
cognitive codes with size-related information from other domains (Walsh, 2003). 
Evidence supporting this idea of a generalized magnitude system can be found in 
a variety of behavioural studies showing that a magnitude comparison in one 
domain can be influenced by providing information about magnitude in another, 
task-irrelevant domain. For instance, interactions have been observed between 
the processing of numerical size and the processing of physical size (Besner & 
Coltheart, 1979; Henik & Tzelgov, 1982), luminance (Cohen Kadosh & Henik, 
2006), perceived affordances of objects (Badets, Andres, Di Luca, & Pesenti, 
2007), the amount of tactile perception (Krause, Bekkering, & Lindemann, 2013) 
and size-related information in motor control, such as the planning of the finger 
aperture while grasping (e.g. Lindemann, Abolafia, Girardi, & Bekkering, 2007; 
Moretto & di Pellegrino, 2008) or the required motor force (Vierck & Kiesel, 
2010). One of the first and most influential pieces of evidence for this notion of 
a shared representation of numerical size and magnitudes from other cognitive 
domains, however, is the size-congruity effect as shown by, for instance, Henik 
and Tzelgov (1982), which demonstrates an interaction between the processing 
of numerical size and physical size.
In a typical size-congruity paradigm, participants are presented with two 
digits that differ in numerical as well as physical size (e.g., 2 6), and are asked 
to indicate which one is physically larger by pressing one of two buttons. Under 
these conditions, reaction times are shorter if the physically larger item is also 
the numerically larger one (e.g., 2 6), as compared to the situation in which the 
physical and numerical size of the stimuli are incongruent (e.g. 6 2; Besner & 
Coltheart, 1979; Henik & Tzelgov, 1982; Pansky & Algom, 1999; see also Schwarz 
& Ischebeck, 2003).
Importantly, however, while the size-congruity effect has consistently 
been interpreted as reflecting an unintentional interference of task irrelevant 
numerical size when processing task relevant physical size, it is still very 
controversial whether this interference actually reflects a shared representation 
of both magnitudes, since the exact stage of processing on which the interference 
emerges is not known. Two different accounts have been suggested. One 
possible explanation for the emergence of a size-congruity effect is indeed that 
numerical and physical size interfere at an early processing stage at which both 
stimulus features are coded into a common analogue magnitude representation 
(Schwarz & Heinze, 1998). Reaction time differences between congruent and 
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incongruent configurations are thought to reflect a difference in the cognitive 
demand to create a common representation in the case that numerical and 
physical size are of equal magnitude, compared to when they convey opposing 
magnitudes. Empirical evidence for an interference at an early representational 
stage comes from electrophysiological data suggesting that the interferences in 
a size-congruity task arise quickly with onsets well before 250 ms (Schwarz & 
Heinze; 1998). However, an opposing hypothesis states that different sources 
of magnitude information from different domains are represented entirely 
separately and interfere only at later processing stages when the required motor 
response is selected and prepared (see e.g. Cohen Kadosh & Walsh, 2009; Santens 
& Verguts, 2011). As Santens and Verguts (2011) pointed out, the classical size-
congruity paradigm relies on a one-to-one mapping between the two choice 
alternatives (i.e. ‘left larger’, ‘right larger’) and the two motor responses (‘left’, 
‘right’). The authors proposed a dual-route model, assuming a parallel processing 
of task-relevant and task-irrelevant stimulus dimensions of the digits, that, 
after a certain time results in a co-activation of both visual and numerical size 
information. In congruent trials, both size-related stimulus features activate the 
same response code, while in incongruent trials, the two stimulus dimensions 
map onto different response codes, resulting in a conflict at the level of response 
selection. This conflict is accompanied by longer response times. Recent evidence 
for such an explanation of the size-congruity effect, which rejects the assumption 
of shared representations of numerical and physical size, is coming from ERP and 
fMRI studies that suggest the presence of interference during response selection 
(Cohen Kadosh, Cohen Kadosh, Linden, Gevers, Berger, & Henik, 2007; Cohen 
Kadosh, Cohen Kadosh, Henik, & Linden, 2008; Szűcs & Soltész 2007; Szűcs, 
Soltész, Jármi, & Csépe, 2007), as well as from a computational modelling study 
showing that a dual route model of processing does appropriately describe 
behavioural data from size-congruity studies (Santens & Verguts, 2011).
Consequently, the findings of the classical size-congruity effect (Henik & 
Tzelgov, 1982; Besner & Coltheart, 1979) do not provide unambiguous evidence 
for the hypothesis of a shared representation of numerical and physical size, 
and empirical evidence for an interference which originates at early stages of 
processing is still lacking. The aim of the current study was therefore to investigate 
the presence of a size-congruity effect in visual processing that is not driven by a 
response selection conflict at later processing stages, and which is therefore not 
the result of two independent processing routes of the magnitude information.
Interestingly, over the past decade, general evidence for an early impact 
of number meaning on visual attention and perception has been found. For 
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instance, Corbett, Oriet and Rensink (2006) demonstrated that the cognitive 
system is capable to rapidly extract and use numerical information from briefly 
presented visual displays such that the comparison of two sets of Arabic digits 
could be made more quickly and more accurately than the comparison of sets of 
letters or meaningless control stimuli. Effects of numerical information on visual 
attention have been demonstrated by Fischer, Castel, Dodd and Pratt (2003; but 
see also Ranzini, Dehaene, Piazza, & Hubbard, 2009; Bonato, Priftis, Marenzi, & 
Zorzi, 2009). The authors employed a simple visual detection task and showed 
that the mere presentation of digits has an impact on the likelihood to detect 
laterally presented visual targets by automatically shifting the attention to the left 
(digits 1,2) or right (digits 8,9) side of space, depending on the numerical size of 
the digit, as if the information automatically activates spatial positions along a 
hypothetical ‘mental number line’ (Dehaene, Bossini, & Geraux, 1993). Finally, 
Schwarz and Eiselt (2012) recently demonstrated that the magnitude information 
of different simultaneously presented single digits becomes automatically 
activated and affects the performance to find a target number among distractor 
digits. The authors employed a visual search paradigm and required their 
participants to find a target digit among distractor digits in displays in which the 
average numerical distance between the target and distractors was systematically 
varied. Interestingly, the analysis of the visual search performances revealed 
that the speed and accuracy under these conditions increased linearly with the 
numerical distance. Taken together, studies investigating the perception of arrays 
of Arabic digits suggest that the analogue magnitude representations associated 
with the digits in a display become activated and support the classification and 
comparison of these visual stimuli. However, as mentioned above, there is so far 
no direct empirical evidence that an early activation of magnitude information 
in one domain (e.g. numerical size) impacts the processing of size-related 
information in another domain (e.g. physical size), when confounding response-
related conflicts are absent.
In the current study we further investigated the impact of numerical 
magnitude information on visual perception and asked specifically whether the 
availability of numerical magnitude information does affect the processing of 
physical size in a visual feature search. To be precise, we presented a set of digits 
and asked participants to find the item that was physically either larger or smaller 
than the other items. The congruity between physical size and the task-irrelevant 
numerical size of the target item was systematically varied. Since the intention to 
search for an item of a particular physical size should lead to increased saliency 
of all objects with this feature (e.g. Proulx & Egeth, 2008; Kiss & Eimer, 2011), we 
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reasoned that if physical size and numerical size share a common representation, 
an interference between these two kinds of size information should affect early 
perceptual processes, such as visual attention. More specifically, we hypothesized 
to observe a size-congruity effect during visual search. Importantly, the new 
visual search paradigm effectively eliminates the one-to-one mapping between 
the choice alternatives and the responses (as in the classical size-congruity 
paradigm) and thus excludes the possibility of conflicts at a late response 
stage. The observation of a size-congruity effect in the current paradigm would 
therefore demonstrate an early interference between numerical size and physical 
size, which would provide important evidence for a shared representation of 
both magnitudes.
Experiment 1
The main aim of this experiment was to explore a possible interaction 
between the processing of numerical size and physical size in a visual search task. 
In a new paradigm we presented a set of 8 or 18 different digits, with the target 
digit deviating from the distractor digits in either physical size or colour (the 
latter serving as a control condition). We hypothesized to find a size-congruity 
effect during visual search. That is, the time it takes to identify a physically large 
target amongst physically smaller distractors should be faster when the task-
irrelevant numerical size of the target is large as well, compared to when it is 
small.
Method
Participants
20 students of the Radboud University Nijmegen (14 females) between 18 
and 28 years of age (mean = 21.35, SD = 3.17) participated in the study in return 
of credit points or 5 Euro.  All of them reported to have normal or corrected-to-
normal vision.
Setup and material
Participants were seated in front of a table with a built-in horizontally 
oriented touch-sensitive computer screen and a custom-made response button 
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(distance between response button and screen centre: 21 cm). The viewing 
distance was approximately 60 cm. Releasing the response button recorded 
the identification of a target. The experiment was controlled using the software 
Expyriment (Krause & Lindemann, 2014).
 All stimuli in the visual search task consisted of the Arabic digits ‘2’, ‘3’, ‘8’, 
and ‘9’ printed in grey colour (photometric luminance: 62.01 cd/m2) on a black 
background (photometric luminance: 0.75 cd/m2) using a sanserif font type (see 
Figure 1 for an illustration). Search sets comprised either 8 (small set size) or 
18 (large set size) items arranged randomly, but equally spaced, in a circle that 
sustained a visual angle of 38.58 degree. The distractor digits subtended a vertical 
visual angle of 1.15 degree and a horizontal visual angle of 0.76 degree. The target 
deviated from the distractors in either physical size (larger: vertical visual angle 
of 1.72 degree, horizontal visual angle of 1.15 degree; smaller: vertical visual 
angle of 0.57 degree, horizontal visual angle of 0.38 degree) or it was depicted 
in a light brown colour (photometric luminance: 54.82 cd/m2). Half of the items 
in each set were instances of one numerically small digit (‘2’ or ‘3’). The other 
items comprised instances of one numerically large digit (‘8’ or ‘9’). Each small 
digit was paired with each large digit, resulting in four different sets of digits 
(i.e., ‘2’-’8’, ‘2’-’9’, ‘3’-’9’, ‘3’-’8’).
Figure 1. Illustration of an incongruent trial in a search set with 18 items (large set size). Stimuli in 
the experiment were presented in grey colour on a black background.
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Procedure
The experiment comprised three different blocks in which the target 
item was either defined as being (1) physically smaller or (2) physically larger, 
compared to the distractors, or (3) depicted in a different colour. Participants 
received a verbal as well as written description of the experiment and were 
informed before each block about the next target type. 
Each trial started with the participants depressing the response button. 
After the presentation of a central fixation cross for 1000 ms, the circular search 
set was displayed. Participants were instructed to search for the target item. As 
soon as the target was identified, participants had to release the response button. 
In 20% of all trials (random selection) no target was present and participants had 
to keep the response button depressed.
Design
The order of blocks (Target Type: physically small, physically large, or 
coloured) was counterbalanced across subjects. Each block comprised 160 trials 
consisting of all possible combinations of the four different digit set types (‘2’-’8’, 
‘2’-’9’, ‘3’-’9’, ‘3’-’8’), the two set sizes (small: 7 distractors, large: 17 distractors) and 
the two relative numerical sizes of the target (small, large). For each participant, 
32 out of the 160 trials (i.e. 20%) were randomly replaced by a condition in which 
no target was present (catch trials). The order of trials was randomized. The total 
duration of the experiment was approximately 30 minutes.
Results
One participant was excluded from the analysis due to unusually frequent 
occurrences of errors (20.83%). All other participants made few errors and 
identified the target incorrectly or responded anticipatorily (i.e. search times less 
than than 200 ms) in 2.31% of the trials of all three target type conditions. In 
1.5% of all trials the target was not identified at all (i.e. search times greater than 
1500 ms). Incorrect and unidentified trials were removed from further response 
time analyses.
It is worth to notice that overall search times were descriptively shorter 
when the horizontal position of the target item was congruent to its numerical 
value (i.e. a numerically small target on the left side or a numerically large target 
on the right side; 567 ms), compared to when the position was incongruent to 
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the numerical size (i.e. a numerically large target on the left side or a numerically 
small target on the right side; 577 ms), reflecting the well-known association 
between numerical size and spatial positions (e.g. Dehaene et al., 1993). However, 
this marginal difference did not reach significance, t(18) = 1.87, p = 0.08, 
d = 0.43). Looking at lateral positions only (i.e. distance to center of the display 
larger than 50% of the radius of the circular search array) yielded comparable 
results, t(18) = 1.31, p = 0.21, d = 0.28).
 The average search times, defined as the median duration between search 
set onset and response button release, were calculated for each participant and 
condition and were submitted to a 3 × 2 × 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) with 
the within-subject factors Physical Target Size (small, large, same), Numerical 
Target Size (small, large) and Set Size (8 items, 18 items). Figure 2 depicts the 
mean search times as a function of the factors Physical Target Size and Numerical 
Target Size. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of Set Size, F(1, 18) = 117.54, 
p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.87, reflecting the classical phenomenon that targets are detected 
faster among less distractors (7 distractors: 551 ms; 17 distractors: 619 ms). There 
was furthermore a significant main effect of Physical Target Size, F(2, 36) = 6.202, 
p < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.26. Search times were slower for coloured targets of the same 
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Figure 2. Mean search times in Experiment 1 as a function of physical size and numerical size of 
the target item in milliseconds.
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size (631 ms) compared to both physically small targets (556 ms), 
t(18) = -3.82, p < 0.01, d = 0.88, and physically large targets (568 ms), t(18) 
= -2.25, p < 0.05, d = 0.52. Also, the effect of Numerical Target Size reached 
significance, F(1, 18) = 26.64, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.60, with numerically large targets 
(574 ms) being identified faster than numerically small targets (597 ms). The 
analysis yielded a significant interaction between Physical Target Size and Set Size, 
F(2, 36) = 4.87, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.21.  That is, the effect of Physical Target Size was 
only significant in search sets with 8 items, F(2, 36) = 11.00, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.38.
Most importantly in terms of our hypothesis there was a significant 
interaction between Physical Target Size and Numerical Target Size, 
F(1.40, 25.12) = 16.83, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.48 (Huynh-Feldt corrected). For 
physically large targets, search times were significantly shorter when the target 
was numerically large (530 ms) compared to when the target was numerically 
small (606 ms), t(18) = 6.93, p < 0.001, d = 1.59, reflecting a size-congruity 
effect. While the reversed pattern for physically small targets (faster search times 
when the target was numerically small as well) was descriptively observed, this 
difference did not reach significance (numerically small: 551 ms; numerically 
large: 562 ms), |t(18)| < 1. There was no effect of numerical size for coloured 
targets with unchanged physical size (numerically small: 633 ms; numerically 
large: 629 ms), |t(18)| < 1, indicating that the size-congruity effect is not due to 
generally faster search times for numerically large targets. Furthermore, there 
was a significant three-way interaction between Physical Target Size, Numerical 
Target Size and Set Size, F(2,36) = 5.88, p < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.25, indicating that the 
interaction between physical and numerical size of the target was larger in search 
sets with 18 items, F(2, 36) = 14.63, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.45, compared to search sets 
with 8 items, F(2, 36) = 12.31, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.41.
Discussion
Consistent with our hypothesis, we found a congruity effect between 
the physical and numerical size of the target. The time it took to identify a 
physically large target was shorter when the numerical size of the target was 
large as well, compared to when it was small. In the control condition where the 
target was differently coloured, but of equal physical size as the distractors, the 
target’s numerical value had no influence on search times. This is of particular 
importance, as it controls for general effects induced by perceptual differences 
between the stimuli, which were implicated by the significant main effect of 
numerical size. The visual search size-congruity effect was only present when 
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participants were searching for the physically larger item amongst physically 
small distractors. If the target digit was the physically smallest item in the search 
set, interference between numerical and physical magnitudes was not observed. 
The lack of an effect when searching for a physically small digit was examined 
further in a second experiment. 
Experiment 2
To better understand the findings of Experiment 1, we aimed to replicate 
the results with two modifications: (1) we asked participants to explicitly identify 
the target by pointing to its location after detection, to ensure that the observed 
effects are indeed related to the detection of the target stimulus and (2) we 
increased the sample size to ensure that the absence of a reversed effect when 
searching for a physically smaller target is not merely an issue of statistical power.
Method
Participants
30 students of the Radboud University Nijmegen (26 females) between 17 
and 27 years of age (mean = 19.83, SD = 2.44) participated in the study in return 
of credit points or 5 Euro.  All of them reported to have normal or corrected-to-
normal vision.
Setup and material
The stimuli and material used in this experiment were identical to the ones 
used in Experiment 1. In addition to the button-release responses used in the 
first experiment, pointing responses to the target locations were measured using 
a touch-sensitive computer screen.
Procedure and design
The procedure was identical to that in Experiment 1 with one addition: As 
soon as the target was identified, participants had to release the response button 
and point to the target location. To ensure that the target was found before 
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response initiation, all items in the search set were masked at the moment of 
response button release.
The design was identical to that in Experiment 1, except that no catch trials 
were present. Each block comprised 128 trials.
Results
Participants made few errors and identified the target incorrectly 
(i.e. pointed to the wrong target location) or responded anticipatory (i.e. search 
times less than 200 ms) in less than 1% of the trials of all three target type 
conditions, that is, when searching for the smaller, larger or differently coloured 
target. In 2.51% of all trials no target was identified (i.e. search times greater than 
1500 ms). Incorrect and unidentified trials were removed from further response 
time analyses. No congruency effect between the numerical size of the target and 
its horizontal position was observed in the overall search times (mean congruent 
= 635 ms; mean incongruent = 632 ms), t(29) = 0.53, p = 0.60, d = 0.10 (lateral 
positions only: t(29) = 0.44, p = 0.66, d = 0.08).
Average search times, defined as the median duration between search 
set onset and response button release, were calculated for each participant and 
condition and were submitted to a 3 × 2 × 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) with 
the within-subject factors Physical Target Size (small, large, same), Numerical 
Target Size (small, large) and Set Size (8 items, 18 items) . The ANOVA revealed 
a main effect of Set Size, F(1, 29) = 263.07, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.90, reflecting the 
classical phenomenon that targets are detected faster among less distractors 
(7 distractors: 606 ms; 17 distractors: 709 ms). There was also a significant main 
effect of Physical Target Size, F(2, 58) = 9.02, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.24. Search times 
were faster for physically small targets (621 ms) compared to both physically 
large targets (655 ms), t(29) = -2.66, p < 0.05, d = 0.49, and coloured targets 
of the same size (696 ms), t(29) = -3.90, p < 0.01, d = 0.71. Furthermore, the 
effect of Numerical Target Size reached significance, F(1, 29) = 57.96, p < 0.001, 
ηp2 = 0.67, with numerically large targets (640 ms) being identified faster than 
numerically small targets (674 ms). There was also a significant interaction 
between Numerical Target Size and Set Size, F(1, 29) = 13.00, p < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.31. 
That is, the effect of numerical size was stronger for search sets with 18 items, 
F(1, 29) = 47.03, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.62, compared to search sets with 8 items, 
F(1, 29) = 18.41, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.39.  
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Crucially, in line with our hypothesis, there was a significant interaction 
between Physical Target Size and Numerical Target Size, F(2, 58) = 40.06, p < 0.001, 
ηp2 = 0.58. For physically large targets, search times were significantly shorter, 
when the target was numerically large (608 ms), compared to when the target 
was numerically small (703 ms), t(29) = 10.75, p < 0.001, d = 1.96, reflecting a 
size-congruity effect. Once again, while the reversed pattern for physically small 
targets (faster search times when the target was numerically small as well), was 
descriptively observed, this difference was not statistically reliable (numerically 
small: 619 ms numerically large: 623 ms), |t(29)| < 1. There was no effect of 
numerical size for targets with unchanged physical size (numerically small: 
701 ms; numerically large: 690 ms), t(29) = 1.40, p = 0.17, indicating that the 
size-congruity effect is not due to generally faster search times for numerically 
large targets. As in the previous experiment, there was also a significant three-
way interaction between Physical Target Size, Numerical Target Size and Set 
Size, F(2,58) = 8.02, p < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.22, reflecting that the interaction between 
physical and numerical size of the target was larger in search sets with 18 items, 
F(2, 58) = 33.54, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.54, compared to search sets with 8 items, 
F(2, 58) = 18.08, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.38.
 To obtain a clearer picture of the non-significant size-congruity effect 
for the physically small target, we divided the congruent and incongruent trials 
of each participant into six equally sized bins, with the first bin containing the 
shortest and the last bin containing the slowest search times. We then performed 
a 6 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with the within-subject factors Time 
Bin (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) and Congruency (congruent, incongruent). Besides a main 
effect of Time Bin, F(1.233, 35.745) = 306.17, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.91, the ANOVA 
revealed a significant interaction effect between Time Bin and Congruency, 
F(2.068, 59.986) = 3.71, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.11, showing a difference in congruency 
effects across the time bins. A post-hoc paired-samples t-test (one-tailed) on 
congruency in the last time bin indicated a size-congruity effect, t(29) = 1.91, 
p < 0.05, d = 0.35. That is, for long search times, finding the physically small 
target was significantly faster when the target was numerically small as well.
Discussion
We replicated the results from Experiment 1. With a larger sample size and 
with the implementation of an explicit identification of the target item (pointing 
response), a congruity effect between the physical and numerical size of the target 
was only observed when searching for a physically large target. An explanation 
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for the lack of a size-congruity effect in the small target condition is speculative 
at this point. One might assume that this finding reflects an impaired automatic 
processing of the target's semantic meaning if the target digit is displayed in a 
small physical size. This weaker semantic activation of the number meaning 
could be due to the higher perceptual demands to process the detailed visual 
pattern of small symbols compared to large symbols. Alternatively, the impaired 
semantic processing of physically small targets might be driven by the fact that 
the feature search was performed significantly faster in this condition, compared 
to the colour and large target condition. Searching for the small target was 
thus perceptually easier and possibly more bottom-up driven by global visual 
stimulus features (e.g. total covered area or changes in luminance). In both cases, 
an impaired semantic processing would result in a delayed interaction between 
physical and numerical size. This is precisely what we found, since a size-
congruity effect could be found when looking only at the trials with the longest 
search times. Taken together, there are several potential reasons why semantic 
effects of number meaning are not present in the mean search times if the target 
is a small symbol among many large symbols.
Importantly, we replicated the finding of a size-congruity effect when 
searching for a physically larger target. However, while the colour condition 
successfully controlled for facilitated processing of numerically large targets, 
we wanted to further exclude the possibility that the observed effect is merely 
a result of some local perceptual properties of the stimuli '8' and '9' (see also 
Wong & Szűcs, 2013), whose relevance in a feature search might scale with the 
physical size the stimuli are presented in. Such a difference in local perceptual 
properties compared to the other stimuli could theoretically explain a facilitation 
of identifying the numerically large stimuli when searching for the physically 
large target, while not finding the same facilitation for those stimuli in the other 
two conditions. To control for this potential confound, we conducted a third 
experiment.
Experiment 3
To control for the possible confound that the size-congruity effect observed 
in Experiment 1 and 2 is merely a result of differences in local perceptual 
stimulus properties which get enhanced when the stimulus is enlarged, rather 
than an interference between the physical and numerical size of the target, we 
aimed to replicate the finding of a size-congruity effect in visual search using 
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two different sets of LCD-style digits (as known from digital alarm clocks and 
watches). Importantly, the stimulus sets were constructed in such a way that, 
while the semantic distance of the numerical values was systematically varied, 
they ensured minimal deviations of visual features between the physical symbols.
We made two predictions: First, we should replicate the size-congruity 
effect in visual search for LCD-style numbers. Second, since semantic distance 
between numbers is known to affect a numerical size comparison between them 
(Moyer & Landauer, 1967; Dehaene, Dupoux, & Mehler, 1990), a congruity 
effect between numerical and physical size should be modulated by the semantic 
distance of the two different numerical sizes in the search array. That is, a larger 
size-congruity effect should be observed for the stimulus set with the larger 
semantic distance between the two numerical sizes.
Method
Participants
20 students of the Radboud University Nijmegen (18 female) between 17 
and 25 years of age (mean = 20.45, SD = 2.14) participated in the study. All 
of them reported to have normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants 
received credit points or 5 Euro for their participation.
Setup and material
The experimental setup and material were identical to Experiment 2; merely 
the stimuli were modified. First, stimulus sets consisted of grey LCD digits (visual 
angle: horizontal = 0.57 or 0.86 degree, vertical = 1.15 or 1.72 degree; photometric 
luminance: 62.01 cd/m2). Second, the number stimuli were matched for maximal 
physical similarity, such that one set of numbers consisted of either a vertically 
mirrored or a 180 degree rotated version of the symbols from the other set: The 
semantically distant set consisted of digits '2' and '9' and the semantically close 
set consisted of digits  '5' and '6'.
Procedure and design
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 2 with the only task being to 
search for the physically larger item. 
CHAPTER 2
44
The experimental design consisted of one block, comprising 256 trials 
consisting of all possible combinations of the two different stimulus sets 
(semantically distant: '2'-'9', semantically close: '5'-'6'), the two set sizes (small: 
7 distractors, large: 17 distractors) and the two relative numerical sizes of the 
target (small, large). The order of trials was randomized. The total duration of the 
experiment was approximately 20 minutes.
Results
Participants made erroneous responses (identifying an incorrect item to 
be the target) or responded faster than 200 ms in less than 1% of all trials. No 
identification of the target (i.e. search times larger 1500 ms) occurred in 6.35%. 
Incorrect and unidentified trials were removed from further response time 
analyses. No congruency effect between the numerical size of the target and its 
horizontal position was observed in the overall search times (mean congruent 
= 680 ms; mean incongruent = 689 ms), t(29) = 1.06, p = 0.30, d = 0.24 (lateral 
positions only: t(19) = 0.77, p = 0.45, d = 0.17).
 We performed a 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA on the median search times with the 
within-subject factors Semantic Distance (distant, close), Numerical Target 
Size (small, large) and Set Size (8, 18 items). As in the first two experiments, 
the analysis revealed an effect of the factor Set Size, F(1, 19) = 83.88, p < 0.001, 
ηp2 = 0.82, with faster search times for small search sets with 8 items than for 
large search sets with 18 items (663 ms vs. 745 ms), as well as an effect of the 
factor Numerical Target Size, F(1, 19) = 51.43, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.73, reflecting that 
numerically large targets were identified faster than numerically small targets 
(673 ms vs. 735 ms). Furthermore, there was a significant main effect of Semantic 
Distance, F(1, 19) = 4.55, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.19, reflecting that participants were 
faster to identify the target when the digits in the stimulus set were semantically 
close (697 ms), compared to when they were semantically distant (712 ms).
Importantly, the effect of Numerical Target Size was modulated by the 
semantic distance, F(1, 19) = 7.43, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.28, as predicted by the 
notion that search time differences are driven by a semantic interference (see 
Figure 3). While numerically large targets were identified significantly faster 
than numerically small targets, this visual search size-congruity effect was larger 
when the target and the distractors were semantically distant (671 ms vs. 752 ms), 
t(19) = 8.49, p < 0.001, d = 1.90, compared to when they were semantically close 
(676 ms vs. 719 ms), t(19) = 3.46, p < 0.01, d = 0.77.
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Discussion
Experiment 3 replicated the size-congruity effect in visual search for LCD-
style numbers: participants were faster to identify the physically larger target when 
this target was one of the numerically large digits in the search display. Importantly, 
this visual search size-congruity effect was modulated by the semantic distance 
between the numerical sizes of the presented items. In other words, the effect 
was stronger when the numerical sizes of the target and the distractors were 
semantically more distant (cf. Pansky & Algom, 1999 for a similar modulation 
in the classical size-congruity paradigm). This modulation reassures us that the 
observed congruity effect is actually reflecting an interference of numerical size, 
rather than a facilitation of the physically enlarged target stimulus due to increased 
saliency.
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Figure 3. Mean search times in Experiment 3 as a function of numerical size of the target and 
semantic distance between all items in the search set in milliseconds. Significant effects in the post-
hoc analysis are indicated by *** = p < 0.001, ** = p < 0.01 and * = p < 0.05.
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General discussion
The present study provides the first direct empirical evidence for an 
interference between physical and numerical size during visual search. That 
is, targets with congruent physical and numerical size were identified faster 
compared to targets with an incongruent configuration. Perceptual differences 
of the stimuli (see also Wong & Szűcs, 2013) were controlled by (1) a condition 
in which the target item was defined by the colour and not by the size, showing 
no difference between the numerical stimuli (Experiments 1 and 2), and (2) by 
demonstrating a modulation of semantic distance on the interference effect, 
using different search sets with LCD-like stimuli that were perceptually matched 
by mirroring and rotation (Experiment 3).
The finding of a size-congruity effect during visual search provides important 
new evidence for a shared representation between numerical size and physical 
size. Evidence form the classical size-congruity paradigm has been criticized, 
as it has been suggested that the observed interaction between numerical and 
physical size has its origin in a much later, response-related cognitive processing 
stage (Schwarz & Heinze, 1998; Santens & Verguts, 2011). Importantly, this 
alternative explanation holds that numerical size-congruity effects are basically 
driven by a competition of two motor responses and consequently do not reflect 
an interference at the level of magnitude representation (Santens & Verguts, 
2011). Crucially, this alternative account is not applicable to interpret the 
finding of magnitude interference in the current visual search paradigm, due 
to the absence of a one-to-one mapping between the choice alternatives and 
responses. In contrast to a classical size-congruity paradigm, the visual search 
task comprised several simultaneously presented digits and a single motor 
response (releasing the start button) to mark identification. That is, it cannot 
be argued that the numerical and physical dimension of each digit preactivated 
different motor responses which might get into conflict. Notably, Experiment 2 
and 3 included an additional pointing response to the (masked) target position, 
and it can be argued that in those experiments participants prepared the pointing 
response not as a second step, but as part of the initial response of releasing the 
start button. An interpretation of the results in terms of a conflict of preactivated 
responses, however, would assume the rather unlikely parallel preactivation of 
8 (small search set) or even 18 (large search set) different responses. Furthermore, 
opposed to a classical size-congruity paradigm, the task-irrelevant information 
of numerical size would not preactivate one single response of these 8 or 18, 
but multiple ones (since half of the digits in the search display were of large 
numerical size and the other half was numerically small). The task-relevant 
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information of physical size, on the other hand, would preactivate exactly one 
response (since there was only one physically larger digit). This would lead to 
contradicting preactivations in both congruent and incongruent situations. 
Given these substantial differences between the current visual search task and 
the classical size-congruity paradigm, it can also not be argued that the classical 
size-congruity paradigm constitutes a visual search with only two items (a target 
and a distractor). Taken together, an explanation of the effect in terms of response 
selection proves to be difficult. The finding of a size-congruity effect during visual 
search is thus rather to be seen as evidence for an interaction between numerical 
and physical size on an earlier level than a response-related stage, supporting the 
notion of a shared representation between both magnitudes as suggested by a 
generalized magnitude system (Walsh, 2003).
Notably, an immediate common magnitude representation has also 
been questioned by several authors who argue that multiple representations 
of numbers coexist in the brain (e.g. Dehaene, 1992; Dehaene & Cohen, 1995; 
Dehaene, Piazza, & Pinel, 2003; Cohen Kadosh & Walsh, 2009). For instance, 
Cohen Kadosh and Walsh (2009) argue for a dual-code model of magnitude 
representation in which first, fast automatic representations are thought to be 
non-abstract and dependent on the notion or domain, while only later, slower 
intentional abstract representations might follow, depending on task and context. 
Importantly, the notion of dual magnitude codes does not predict an interference 
between physical and numerical size in early perception, since the automatic and 
unintentional representations of physical and numerical size are assumed to be 
initially independent. Our results, however, clearly speak against independent 
representations, since in our task the interference between numerical and physical 
size is both fast (affecting visual attention) and unintentional (task-irrelevant).
The interference between magnitude information from numerical and 
perceptual processing represents a substantial advancement of previous number 
processing research by demonstrating an impact of numerical size-congruity 
on early visual attentional processes. As known from several studies on visual 
perception, top-down guidance of attention towards a certain stimulus feature 
(e.g. physical size) enhances the visual saliency of objects containing this feature 
(e.g. Wolfe, 1994; Proulx & Egeth, 2008; Kiss & Eimer, 2011). Recent evidence 
for numerical information guiding visual search comes from Schwarz and Eiselt 
(2012), who demonstrated that the performance to find a target number among 
distractor digits is systematically influenced by the numerical distance between 
the target and the distractors. Here, we extend this finding by showing that a 
visual search for a target that is solely defined by its physical size is also affected 
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by task-irrelevant information about numerical size. That is, when attending to 
physical size, the saliency of the target is furthermore modulated by its numerical 
value. 
The present results are also in line with a recent proposal on the interaction 
between attention and magnitude processing (Risko, Maloney, & Fugelsang, 
2013). The authors demonstrate a contribution of attention to the classical 
size-congruity effect. According to the attentional account of the size-congruity 
effect, the setup used in classical size-congruity paradigms is subject to an 
attentional capture effect which leads to an asymmetry in the temporal order of 
processing the involved digits. Processing one digit before the other then results 
in a temporal congruity (rather than a size-congruity) effect (Schwarz & Stein, 
1998). Based on this observation, the authors further argue that also beyond this 
specific effect attention and magnitude should influence each other. While we 
know from former research that numerical size has an influence on attention 
(e.g. Fischer et al., 2003), the authors also predict an influence of attention on 
magnitude judgements. More specifically, they reason that if different types of 
magnitude share a common code (Walsh, 2003), then biasing attention to one 
magnitude could produce a bias to attend to a similar dimension of another 
type of magnitude. We here provide the first evidence for exactly this: Biasing 
attention to physical size during a visual search produces an unintentional bias 
to numerical size as well. Importantly, this was not the case when the visual 
search was guided by a stimulus feature that was not size-related (i.e. colour), 
emphasizing that the current finding represents an interference between two 
sources of magnitude information. Moreover, magnitude interference was 
enlarged when targets and distractors were numerically more distant, even if 
perceptual features were kept constant. Together, these findings are reassuring 
us that the search time differences observed in the two experiments are not the 
consequence of an advantage of numerically larger target digits in visual search 
(see also Wong & Szücs, 2013), but are indeed a result of an interference between 
number meaning and physical size, that is, a size-congruity effect in visual 
search. Crucially, such an early interference is only expected if numerical and 
physical size information converge into one common magnitude representation 
as soon as both types of information become available, but not if both sizes are 
represented separately. The current findings are therefore in line with our notion 
that numbers are represented within a generalized magnitude system (cf. Walsh, 
2003) which originally emerged to serve perception and action.
It should be mentioned that the present study has implications for research 
on visual search and attention, since the question of whether non-visual stimulus 
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features like semantic information can guide attention is still controversial 
(Wolfe & Horowitz, 2004). Our results show an interaction between task 
irrelevant numerical size and attention in a visual feature search and are thus 
in line with findings of an influence of semantic information on visual attention 
(Moores, Laiti, & Chelazzi, 2003; Belke, Humphreys, Watson, Meyer, & Telling, 
2008). Furthermore, in contrast to previous research, we here examined possible 
modulations of visual attention that are caused by nonspatial cognitive codes and 
aimed in particular at providing empirical evidence for a number-perception 
interference driven by a congruity between physical and numerical size of an 
item during visual search, irrespective of its location. Interestingly, however, in an 
additional analysis we could also not find any evidence for a congruency between 
the horizontal position of a target item and its numerical value. This finding is 
in line with recent (failed) attempts (Ranzini et al., 2009; Bonato et al., 2009) 
to replicate the formerly reported effect of numerical size on spatial attention 
(Fischer et al., 2003) and suggests that the association between numbers and 
spatial positions (e.g. Dehaene, 1993) does not affect early perceptual processes 
such as visual search.
Conclusion
The current study tested the involvement of a common magnitude metric 
in early perceptual processing – a direct prediction of the generalized magnitude 
system hypothesis (Walsh, 2003). Our results show an interference between 
numerical and physical size during a visual feature search that, unlike a classical 
size-congruity effect, cannot easily be explained by a mere conflict in a late response 
stage. This new finding provides strong evidence for a common magnitude metric 
for numerical and physicals size in early visual perception.
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Abstract
Evidence for an approximate analogue system of numbers has been 
provided by the finding that the comparison of two numerals takes longer and 
is more error prone if the semantic distance between the numbers becomes 
smaller (so-called numerical distance effect). Recent embodied theories suggest 
that analogue number representations are based on previous sensory experiences 
and constitute therefore a common magnitude metric shared by multiple 
domains. Here we demonstrate the existence of a cross-modal semantic distance 
effect between symbolic and tactile numerosities. Participants received tactile 
stimulations of different amounts of fingers while reading Arabic digits and 
indicated verbally whether the amount of stimulated fingers was different from 
the simultaneously presented digit or not. The larger the semantic distance was 
between the two numerosities, the faster and more accurate participants made 
their judgements. This cross-modal numerosity distance effect suggests a direct 
connection between tactile sensations and the concept of numerical magnitude. 
A second experiment replicated the interaction between symbolic and tactile 
numerosities and showed that this effect is not modulated by the participants’ 
finger counting habits. Taken together, our data provide novel evidence for a 
shared metric for symbolic and tactile numerosites as an instance of an embodied 
representation of numbers.
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Introduction
It has been argued that numbers are cognitively represented in an 
approximate and analogue manner (e.g. Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 1993). 
Main evidence for this notion comes from the so-called numerical distance 
effect (Moyer & Landauer, 1967). When participants are asked to perform 
a magnitude judgement (i.e. compare two numbers by their semantic size) 
responses are slower, when the semantic distance between the two numbers 
is small (e.g. 2 vs. 3), compared to when the semantic distance is large (e.g. 
1 vs. 4; Gallistel & Gelman, 1992). This effect of the numerical distance has been 
consistently explained by a representational overlap of neighbouring numbers on 
a hypothetical analogue mental continuum of numerical magnitudes (e.g., Restle, 
1970; Dehaene &  Changeux, 1993). That is, a particular number does not only 
activate the representation of exactly this number, but also the representation 
of the numbers next to it. Consequently, the further apart two numbers are, the 
less do they activate each other and the easier it is to discriminate between them. 
Support for this idea is also provided by studies on human and non-human 
cortical activations in response to numerosity information that demonstrated 
the existence of number-sensitive neurons with overlapping tuning curves in 
macaque (Nieder & Miller, 2003) as well as in the human parietal cortex (Piazza, 
Izzard, Pinel, Bihan, & Dehaene, 2004). Although the existence of an analogue 
representation in humans and animals is very established, the origin and nature of 
this specific semantic representation of magnitude information is controversially 
debated (see e.g. Cohen-Kadosh & Walsh, 2009). 
In modern psycholinguistic research, several authors emphasised the idea 
of embodied cognition (Wilson, 2002), which basically holds that each semantic 
representation is grounded in previous sensorimotor experiences and therefore 
closely linked to low-level perceptual and motor codes (Barsalou, 2008; Glenberg 
& Kaschak, 2002; Fischer & Zwaan, 2008). Interestingly, the role of embodied 
representations has also been recently discussed in the context of number 
processing. For instance, recent research has shown that the perception of abstract 
numerical stimuli has a direct influence on response selection (Daar & Pratt, 
2008) as well as movement generation (Vicario, 2012), demonstrating a close link 
between numerical concepts and action. It has been speculated that numerical 
magnitude information becomes meaningful only when it can be somehow 
mapped to concrete bodily experiences with size and magnitude in everyday 
life (Lindemann, Rueschemeyer, & Bekkering, 2009; Andres, Olivier, & Badets, 
2008). A similar important role of size-related sensorimotor representations for 
numbers has been suggested by a recent theory on magnitude representations 
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proposed by Walsh (2003), which assumes the existence of a shared generalized 
representation of magnitude. That is, numbers are thought to be processed by 
a single system which simultaneously codes for size-related information from 
other cognitive domains like, for instance, sensory and motor representations 
of physical size or temporal duration. Evidence for this notion comes from 
behavioural studies showing interferences between numbers and other types of 
magnitude information, such as the physical size of number symbols (Tzelgov 
& Henik, 1992), the perceived time (Oliveri,Vicario, Salerno, Koch, Turizziani, 
Mangano, Chillemi, & Caltagirone, 2008), the perceived size of an object (Badets, 
Andres, Di Luca, & Pesenti, 2007) and the aperture size while object grasping 
(Lindemann, Abolafia, Girardi, & Bekkering, 2007).
Another observation often interpreted as evidence for an embodied 
representation of numbers is the existence of a strong association between fingers 
and numbers in most adults. This association is probably resulting from the habit 
to use fingers while counting (Bender & Beller, 2012; Lindemann, Alipour, & 
Fischer, 2011; Moeller, Fischer, Link, Wasner, Huber, Cress, & Nuerk, 2012). For 
instance, in Italian adults this association has been demonstrated by a facilitation 
to respond to numbers 1 to 5 with the fingers of the right hand, and to numbers 
6 to 10 with the fingers of the left hand (a mapping congruent to the prototypical 
finger counting strategy of the participants; Di Luca, Grana, Semenza, Seron, & 
Pesenti, 2006), as well as by a facilitation to judge if a number is smaller or larger 
than 5 when primed with a finger configuration compatible to the individual’s 
counting strategy (Di Luca & Pesenti, 2008). In addition to this, we know that the 
preference to start counting with the left or with the right hand varies strongly 
between individuals and is independent of handedness (Lindemann et al., 
2011). Interestingly, manual counting habits, like the individual finger-number 
associations and starting preferences have been shown to affect symbolic number 
processing in adults, even if the use of fingers is not required (Fischer, 2008; 
Domahs, Moeller, Huber, Willmes, & Nuerk, 2010). For instance, Fischer (2008) 
showed that the association of numbers with a spatial response (SNARC effect; 
Dehaene et al., 1993) was strongly affected by whether participants started to 
count on their right or left hand. On average, only for participants who started 
counting on their left hand a SNARC effect could be observed. In another study 
Domahs et al. (2010) investigated finger-based sub-base-five effects in an Arabic 
number comparison task in three different groups – German deaf signers, 
German hearing adults and Chinese hearing adults. Their results revealed that 
sub-base-five effects were larger in the two German groups which use a sub-
base-five finger counting system, compared to the Chinese group which uses a 
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sub-base-ten finger counting system. Taken together, these studies speak for an 
important role of finger representations for the  processing of symbolic numerical 
information.
While an increasing amount of studies investigated the cognitive effects of 
the finger-number associations, until today only few studies have examined tactile 
or haptic numerosity processing as such. As we know from recent experiments 
on tactile and haptic perception (Riggs,  Ferrand, Lancelin, Fryziel, Dumur, & 
Simpson, 2006; Plaisier & Smeets, 2011; Plaisier, Bergmann Tiest, & Kappers, 
2009), tactile numerosity perception seems to be based on the same distinct 
cognitive processes as the enumeration of visual items (Atkinson, Campbell, 
& Francis, 1976). For instance, Riggs and colleagues (2006) stimulated the 
fingertips of their participants and asked them to name the number of stimulated 
fingers. The authors found that judgements were based on serial counting 
processes if more than three fingers were stimulated, since enumeration became 
more error-prone and slower with increasing set-size. In contrast, however, 
for small numerosities (i.e. less than four fingers) tactile enumeration was fast, 
effortless and highly accurate (Riggs et al., 2006; Plaisier & Smeets, 2011; but 
see also Gallace, Tan, & Spence, 2008) – a phenomenon well known from vision 
research and called ‘subitizing’ (Kaufman, Lord, Reese, & Volkmann, 1949). 
Recently, support for subitizing has also been demonstrated for active touch and 
the haptic exploration of the amount of objects in the hand (Plaisier & Smeets, 
2011; Plaisier et al., 2009). That is, there is increasing evidence that numerosity 
perception in the tactical and in the visual modality share the same processes. 
These findings suggest that all sensory numerosity information are represented 
by the same modality-independent magnitude system. 
Taking into account the embodied view on cognition (e.g. Barsalou, 2008; 
Wilson, 2002) and the idea of a single generalized metric for magnitudes (Walsh, 
2003), one might  speculate that tactile numerosity processing is based on the 
very same analogue magnitude representation that is activated when reading 
symbolic numbers or solving arithmetic problems. Surprisingly, however, very 
little is known about the relationship and the commonalities between tactile 
and symbolic numbers. We assumed that tactile numerosity judgements are 
based on the same analogue representations as involved in symbolic number 
processing, irrespective of differences in format and modality. To examine this 
hypothesis, we made use of the numerical distance effect (Moyer & Landauer, 
1967). We conducted two experiments, in which participants received tactile 
stimulations on their fingers of the left or right hand while reading an Arabic 
digit. The participants’ task was to indicate as fast as possible whether the 
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visually presented number matched the amount of stimulated fingers. If both 
tactile and symbolic numerosities are indeed mapped onto the same analogue 
magnitude metric, we expected to observe a cross-modal numerosity distance 
effect reflected by an inverse linear relation between the judgement latencies 
in the magnitude comparison task and the semantic distance between the to-
be compared numerosities. Crucially, we used a same-different task, and not 
a magnitude comparison task. That is, if alternatively, symbolic and tactile 
numerosities activate different analogue magnitude representations or same-
different comparisons find place on verbal codes, a modulation of the response 
latencies as a function of the semantic distance is not expected (cf. Defever, 
Sasanguie, Vandewaetere, & Reynvoet, 2012; Van Opstal & Verguts, 2011). 
Moreover, if the acquired associations between fingers and number 
modulate adults’ processing of symbolic numerosity information, one might 
expect that counting habits also affect the enumeration or perception of numbers 
in the subitizing range. We therefore aimed to explore additionally the influence 
of finger counting habits on the tactile perception of numerosities and their 
comparison with symbolic numbers. To do so, we used an adapted version of the 
finger counting questionnaire of Lindemann et al. (2011) to classify the starting 
preference of our participants and tested whether detection times or cross-modal 
numerosity distance effects are modulated by these habits.
Experiment 1
The aim of the first experiment was to investigate if tactile numerosities are 
mapped to the same analogue representation of numerical magnitude as symbolic 
numerosities, as expected by the notion of a generalized magnitude system (Walsh, 
2003). Participants had to verbally indicate if tactile presented numerosities were 
identical or different to visually presented Arabic digits. We expected to find a cross-
modal semantic distance effect in the numerosity judgements reflected by longer 
response times when comparing tactile and symbolic numerosities that are close in 
distance. Furthermore, if finger counting habits affect this analogue representation 
of numerical magnitude, both starting hand preferences as well as specific finger 
preferences should modulate a cross-modal numerosity distance effect.
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Method
Participants
24 students (5 male, 2 left-handed) between 17 and 33 years of age 
(mean = 21.33, SD = 3.61) participated in the study in return of 5 Euro or credit 
points. All of them reported to have normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Setup 
Participants were seated in front of a table with a computer screen (viewing 
distance approximately 60 cm) and two custom-made tactile stimulation devices 
(one for each hand; see also van Ede, Jensen, & Maris, 2010), each consisting of 
five piezoelectric Braille cells (Metec AG, Stuttgart, Germany). Each Braille cell 
had eight pins, arranged in two groups of four, which can be raised and lowered 
for about one millimetre. The tactile stimulation devices were each placed into a 
wooden, sound-shielded box on the table in front of the participant, such that he 
or she could neither see the hands being stimulated, nor hear mechanical noise 
from the stimulation. The orientation of the tactile stimulation devices within 
the boxes was such that participants could place their hands in a comfortable 
horizontally oriented resting position. A dynamic microphone and a custom-
made voice-key device were used to record voice-onsets. The experiment was 
controlled using custom-made software. The experimenter was seated out of the 
participants’ vision at a second table and used a keyboard to enter which verbal 
response was given.  
Material
Visual target stimuli comprised the digits “1”, “2”, “3” and “4” presented 
in a light grey colour in front of a dark background. Tactile target stimuli 
consisted of the simultaneous stimulation of one to four fingers of either the left 
or right hand. To examine the impact of the counting habits, always one to four 
suggestive fingers were stimulated starting with either the thumb or pinkie. That 
is, there were in total eight patterns of stimulation for each hand: four medial 
finger sets in which the number of stimulated fingers was started with the thumb 
(1 = [Thumb], 2 = [Thumb, Index Finger], 3 = [Thumb, Index Finger, Middle 
Finger], 4 = [Thumb, Index Finger, Middle Finger, Ring Finger]) and four lateral 
finger sets starting with the pinkie. (1 = [Pinkie], 2 = [Pinkie, Ring Finger], 
3 = [Pinkie, Ring Finger, Middle Finger], 4 = [Pinkie, Ring Finger, Middle Finger, 
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Index Finger]). Depending on the reported finger counting preferences each 
stimulation pattern could be classified as either finger counting compatible or 
incompatible. 
Individual finger counting habits and starting preference of each participant 
were determined by a finger counting questionnaire (Lindemann et al., 2011).
Procedure 
Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation cross for 500 ms, 
followed by the simultaneous onset of the visual and tactile target stimuli. 
Tactile stimulation consisted of a repeated switching between raised (20 ms) and 
lowered (30 ms) states of all pins. Participants were instructed to decide whether 
the amount of stimulated fingers was equal or different to the numerical size 
of the visually presented digit. Responses were given verbally by uttering “Tee” 
(when the numerosities were identical) or “Toh” (when the numerosities were 
different). Since voice onset times served as decision time measures, we decided 
to use verbal utterances for which the first transient is phonologically the same. 
The target stimuli (tactile and visual) disappeared as soon as a verbal response 
was given and a blank screen was presented for a variable time between 1000 ms 
and 1500 ms. No feedback was given for erroneous responses. The next trial 
started after the experimenter classified given responses.
 Design
The experiment consisted of 4 blocks. Each block contained 128 trials 
(2 repetitions of all possible combinations of 8 stimulation patterns on 2 hands 
and 4 visually presented digits). All trials were presented in randomized order. 
The duration of the experiment was approximately 30 minutes.
Results
Finger counting preferences 
The analysis of the finger counting questionnaire yielded that 58.3% of 
the participants preferred to start counting with their left and 41.7% with their 
right hand. 21 participants reported a typical unimanual counting pattern for 
Western subjects and to start counting with the thumb. One participant reported 
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a counting pattern that could not be classified according to existing categories 
of starting hand and preferred finger sequence (cf. Lindemann et al. 2011) and 
therefore had to be excluded from the analysis. The other 2 participants started 
counting with the pinkie and counted in successive order to the thumb. The 
reported finger counting pattern was used to classify the stimulated set of fingers 
into counting habit compatible and incompatible sets for all participants. That is, 
for 21 participants the medial fingers (thumb, index finger, middle finger and ring 
finger) were classified as counting habit compatible and the lateral fingers (pinkie, 
ring finger, middle finger and index finger) as counting habit incompatible, while 
for 2 participants the lateral fingers were classified as counting habit compatible 
and the medial fingers as counting habit incompatible.
Numerosity comparisons
Responses that deviated more than 3 standard deviations from the mean 
response time of each participant (anticipatory responses: 0.04%; slow responses: 
1.63%) were excluded from further analysis. Erroneous responses occurred in 
7.37% of all remaining trials and were excluded from the response time analysis.
 Median response times and errors were each entered in a separate repeated 
measures ANOVA with the within-subject factors Semantic Distance (0, 1, 2, 3), 
Set of Fingers (counting habit compatible, counting habit incompatible), Hand 
(left, right) and the between-subject factor Starting Hand (left, right). Reported 
degrees of freedom for the F statistics were Huynh-Feldt corrected, when 
necessary.
In line with our hypothesis, the reaction time analysis revealed a significant 
main effect of Semantic Distance, F(1.84, 38.73) = 25.03, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.54, 
showing an interaction of tactile and symbolic numerosities. Responses were 
faster for a numerical distance between tactile and symbolic numerosity of 3 
compared to a distance of 2, t(22) = -4.21, p < 0.001, as well as for a distance of 
2 compared to a distance of 1,  t(22) = -6.06, p < 0.001. There was no significant 
difference between a distance of 1 and a distance of 0 (same numerosity in 
both modalities), t(22) = 1.52, p = 0.14 (see Figure 1). There was a significant 
main effect of Set of Fingers,  F(1, 21) = 11.55, p < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.36, reflecting 
shorter reaction times when stimulating the counting habit compatible fingers 
(i.e., for most participants starting from thumb to pinkie; 1131 ms), compared 
to the counting habit incompatible fingers (i.e., for most participants starting 
from pinkie to thumb; 1185 ms). The main effect of Hand did not reach 
significance, F(1, 21) = 0.41, p = 0.53, ηp2 = 0.02. Interestingly, the factors
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Semantic Distance and Set of Fingers interacted significantly,  F(3, 63) = 8.80, 
p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.30. Post-hoc F-tests showed a stronger effect of Semantic Distance 
for the counting habit incompatible finger stimulations, F(2.20, 46.09) = 26.25, 
p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.56, than for the compatible stimulations, F(2.01, 42.17) = 15.09, 
p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.42. No significant effects were observed for the interactions 
Semantic Distance × Hand, F(2.41, 50.61) = 2.41, p = 0.09, ηp22 = 0.10, 
Semantic Distance × Starting Hand, F(3, 63) = 0.02, p = 1.0, ηp2 = 0.001, the 
Set of Fingers × Hand, F(1, 21) = 0.04, p = 0.84, ηp2 = 0.002, Set of Fingers × 
Starting Hand, F(3, 63) = 0.20, p = 0.66, ηp2 = 0.01, Hand × Starting Hand, 
F(1, 21) = 1.08, p = 0.31, ηp2 = 0.05, Semantic Distance × Set of Fingers × 
Hand, F(3, 63) = 0.61, p = 0.61, ηp2 = 0.03, Semantic Distance × Set of Fingers × 
Starting Hand, F(3, 63) = 0.32, p = 0.81, ηp2 = 0.02, Semantic Distance × Hand 
× Starting Hand, F(3, 63) = 1.90, p = 0.14, ηp2 = 0.08, Set of Fingers × Hand × 
Starting Hand, F(1, 21) = 0.06, p = 0.81, ηp2 = 0.003, and Semantic Distance × 
Set of Fingers × Hand × Starting Hand, F(3, 63) = 0.06, p = 0.98, ηp2 = 0.003.
The error analysis also revealed a significant main effect of Semantic 
Distance, F(2, 42) = 21.02, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.50. That is, participants made fewer 
errors for a numerical distance between tactile and symbolic numerosity of 3 
800
1000
1200
1400
0 1 2 3
Semantic Distance
Me
an
 R
T 
(m
s)
Figure 1. The cross-modal semantic distance effect between tactile and symbolic numerosities. The 
larger the semantic distance between both numerosities, the shorter the mean response time. Error 
bars represent 95% within-subject confidence intervals (cf. Loftus & Masson, 1994).
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compared to a distance of 1,  t(22) = -4.58, p < 0.001, as well as for a distance of 
2 compared to a distance of 1,  t(22) = -5.10, p < 0.001. There was no significant 
difference between a distance of 1 and a distance of 0,  t(22) = 0.76, p = 0.46. 
No main effects were observed for the factors Set of Fingers, F(1, 21) = 0.02, 
p = 0.89, ηp2 = 0.001, and Hand, F(1, 21) = 1.86, p = 0.19, ηp2 = 0.08. There 
were no significant effects for the interactions Semantic Distance × Set of 
Fingers, F(1.52, 32.14) = 0.39, p = 0.63, ηp2 = 0.02, Semantic Distance × Hand, 
F(2.27, 47.66) = 1.94, p = 0.15, ηp2 = 0.09, Semantic Distance × Starting Hand, 
F(3, 63) = 0.44, p = 0.73, ηp2 = 0.02, the Set of Fingers × Hand, F(1, 21) = 0.16, 
p = 0.69, ηp2 = 0.008, Set of Fingers × Starting Hand, F(1, 21) = 0.22, p = 0.65, 
ηp2 = 0.01, Hand × Starting Hand, F(1, 21) = 0.11, p = 0.74, ηp2 = 0.005, Semantic 
Distance × Set of Fingers × Hand, F(1.87, 39.32) = 0.28, p = 0.75, ηp2 = 0.01, 
Semantic Distance × Set of Fingers × Starting Hand, F(3, 63) = 0.42, p = 0.74, 
ηp2 = 0.02, Semantic Distance × Hand × Starting Hand, F(3, 63) = 1.71, p = 0.17, 
ηp2 = 0.08, Set of Fingers × Hand × Starting Hand, F(1, 21) = 3.70, p = 0.07, 
ηp2 = 0.15, and Semantic Distance × Set of Fingers × Hand × Starting Hand, 
F(3, 63) = 1.82, p = 0.15, ηp2 = 0.08.
Discussion
As hypothesised, we found a cross-modal numerosity distance effect in 
the magnitude comparison task when participants were instructed to compare 
tactile presented numerosities with symbolically presented numerosities. That 
is, participants became faster and made fewer errors to judge the difference 
between tactile and symbolic numerosities, when the semantic distance between 
both numerosities was increased. This finding  suggests that tactile numerosities 
are mapped to the same analogue representation of magnitude as symbolic 
numerosities.
While starting preferences did not modulate the cross-modal distance 
effect, it was modulated by the set of fingers stimulated. Interestingly, the effect 
was stronger for counting habit incompatible finger sets than for counting 
habit compatible finger sets. This appears counter-intuitive as one would have 
expected the exact opposite pattern if finger representations were connected to 
an analogue numerical magnitude representation, that is, a stronger effect for 
counting habit compatible finger sets. Furthermore, it has to be noticed that 
the vast majority of our subjects showed a prototypical Western finger counting 
habit (Lindemann et al., 2011) and started counting with the medial fingers 
from thumb to pinkie. Consequently, the dissociation between counting habit 
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compatible and incompatible finger sets goes in the present study along with 
the dissociation between medial (i.e. starting from thumb) and lateral fingers 
(i.e. starting from pinkie), which seems to be a problematic confound for the 
interpretation of our findings. Consequently, it remains unclear if the differences 
between the stimulated finger sets and the modulation of the numerosity distance 
effect were driven by differences in the finger counting preferences or whether 
they merely reflected differences in the hand physiology between the medial 
and lateral finger sets and resulting differences in touch acuity and cortical 
representation (cf. Elbert, Pantev, Wienbruch, Rockstroh, & Taub, 1995). To be 
more precise, a more developed cortical representation of the medial fingers 
could account for a faster and more precise detection of a tactile stimulation 
of these fingers, compared to the lateral fingers with a less developed cortical 
representation. To specifically investigate the influence of finger counting habits 
in our setting, independent of such physiological differences, we conducted a 
second experiment in which the same set of fingers was sequentially stimulated. 
Importantly, the type of sequence and direction of the tactile stimulations, not 
the set of fingers, defined the compatibility with finger counting habits.
Experiment 2
The second experiment tests a potential influence of finger counting habits 
for the detection and representation of tactile numerosities. Since it cannot be 
excluded that the effect of the set of fingers in Experiment 1 might be driven 
by physiological differences, Experiment 2 aimed to introduce finger counting 
compatible and incompatible tactile numerosities while keeping the set of 
stimulated fingers constant. This has been achieved by sequential stimulations in 
two different directions; either starting from the thumb or starting from the ring 
finger. If finger counting habits influence the analogue representation of numerical 
magnitude, participants that start counting with the thumb are expected to show 
a different cross-modal numerosity distance effect if the sequence of stimulation 
was not compatible to their direction of counting.
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Method
Participants
28 students (8 male, 1 left-handed) between 18 and 25 years of age 
(mean = 20.07, SD = 2.37) participated in the study in return of 5 Euro or credit 
points. None of them participated in Experiment 1. All of them reported to have 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Setup and material
The setup and material were identical to that of Experiment 1. The 
experiment was controlled using the software Expyriment (Krause & Lindemann, 
2012). Participants were asked to indicate starting preference and specific finger 
counting habits (cf.  Lindemann et al., 2011).
Procedure and design
The procedure and design were similar to Experiment 1, with two 
exceptions. First, tactile stimuli consisted of a stimulation of one to four fingers 
(1 = [Thumb] to 4 = [Thumb, Index Finger, Middle Finger, Ring Finger]). 
Crucially, all fingers were sequentially stimulated in two different directions: a 
forward direction, starting from the thumb, and a backward direction, starting 
from the last finger ending with the thumb. Second, the onset of a visual stimulus 
was equivalent to the offset of the tactile stimulation. This was done to ensure 
that response times were not confounded with differences in sequence length 
(e.g. when seeing the digit 1, a response could already be given after one finger 
is stimulated, while when seeing a 4, one would need to wait until all four finger 
have been stimulated). Tactile stimulation always started with the stimulation of 
a single finger. After each 100 ms the next finger in the sequence was added to the 
stimulation. When all fingers were added the stimulation continued on all fingers 
until a total stimulation time of 600 ms was reached.
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Results
Finger counting preferences
The analysis of finger counting habits yielded that 57.1% of the participants 
preferred to start counting with their left and 42.9% with their right hand. 
Crucially, all participants reported to start counting with the thumb. 
Numerosity comparisons
Erroneous responses (8.46%) as well as responses that deviated more than 
3 standard deviations from individual mean response times (only fast responses: 
0.22%) were excluded from the response time analysis of the numerosity 
comparisons. Since all investigated participants started counting with the thumb, 
tactile stimulations in forward direction could be considered as finger counting 
compatible and backward stimulations as finger counting incompatible. Errors 
and median response times were each entered into a separate repeated measures 
ANOVA with the within-subject factors Semantic Distance (0, 1, 2 ,3), Direction 
of Stimulation (finger counting compatible, finger counting incompatible), Hand 
(left, right) and the between-subject factor Starting Hand (left, right). Reported 
degrees of freedom for the F statistics were Huynh-Feldt corrected when necessary.
 As in Experiment 1, the response time analysis revealed a significant main 
effect of Semantic Distance, F(2.01, 52.21) = 8.09, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.24, confirming 
our main hypothesis of an interaction of tactile and symbolic numerosities. 
That is, responses were faster for a  numerical distance between a tactile and 
symbolic stimulus of 3 compared to a distance of 1,  t(27) = -4.73, p < 0.001, as 
well as for a distance of 2 compared to a distance of 1,  t(27) = -4.36, p < 0.001. 
There was no significant difference between a distance of 1 and a distance of 0 
(same numerosity in both modalities), t(27) = -0.29, p = 0.77 (see also Figure 2). 
There was only a trend for an effect of Direction of Stimulation,  F(1, 26) = 4.10, 
p = 0.053, ηp2 = 0.14, with descriptively slightly shorter reaction times for finger 
counting compatible stimulation sequences (732 ms) compared to incompatible 
stimulations (739 ms). That is, in contrast to Experiment 1, we did not observe a 
reliable advantage of finger counting compatible stimulations. No main effect of 
the factor Hand was observed, F(1, 26) = 0.15, p = 0.70, ηp2 = 0.01. Importantly, 
there was no interaction between the factors Semantic Distance and Direction 
of Stimulation, F(3, 78) = 0.12, p = 0.95, ηp2 = 0.01, showing that, unlike in
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Experiment 1, the numerical distance effect was not modulated by finger counting 
compatibility. No significant effects were observed for the interactions Semantic 
Distance × Hand, F(3, 78) = 1.23, p = 0.31, ηp2 = 0.05, Semantic Distance × Starting 
Hand, F(3, 78) = 0.75, p = 0.52, ηp2 = 0.03, Direction of Stimulation × Hand, 
F(1, 26) = 0.12, p = 0.73, ηp2 = 0.01, Direction of Stimulation × Starting Hand, 
F(1, 26) = 0.16, p = 0.69, ηp2 = 0.01, Hand × Starting Hand, F(1, 26) = 0.12, p = 0.73, 
ηp2 = 0.01, Semantic Distance × Direction of Stimulation × Hand, F(3, 78) = 0.83, 
p = 0.48, ηp2 = 0.03, Semantic Distance × Direction of Stimulation × Starting Hand, 
F(3, 78) = 1.07, p = 0.37, ηp2 = 0.04, Semantic Distance × Hand × Starting Hand, 
F(3, 78) = 0.85, p = 0.47, ηp2 = 0.03, Direction of Stimulation × Hand × Starting 
Hand, F(1, 26) = 3.35, p = 0.08, ηp2 = 0.11, and Semantic Distance × Direction 
of Stimulation × Hand × Starting Hand, F(3, 78) = 2.30, p = 0.08, ηp2 = 0.08.
The error analysis revealed a significant main effect of Semantic Distance, 
F(2.28, 59.17) = 30.45, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.54, with fewer errors for a distance of 
3 compared to a distance of 1, t(27) = -4.07, p < 0.001,  as well as a distance of 2 
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Figure 2. The cross-modal semantic distance effect between tactile and symbolic numerosities for 
sequential tactile stimulation. Mean response times are significantly shorter for a large semantic 
distance of 2 and 3 than for a small semantic distance of 1. Error bars represent 95% within-subject 
confidence intervals (cf. Loftus & Masson, 1994).
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compared to a distance of 1, t(27) = -4.27, p < 0.001. The difference between a 
distance of 1 and a distance of 0 was significant as well, t(27) = -2.93, p < 0.01. 
No significant main effects were observed for the factors Direction of Stimulation, 
F(1, 26) = 1.58, p = 0.22, ηp2 = 0.06, and Hand, F(1, 26) = 0.44, p = 0.51, ηp2 = 0.02. The 
4-way interaction Semantic Distance × Direction of Stimulation × Hand × Starting 
Hand was significant, F(3, 78) = 3.28, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.11. Since our hypotheses are 
independent from this observed 4-way interaction between all factors, we did not 
further analyse and interpret this complex effect. There were no significant effects for 
the interactions Semantic Distance × Direction of Stimulation, F(2.27, 59.07) = 1.39, 
p = 0.28, ηp2 = 0.05, Semantic Distance × Hand, F(2.26, 68.19) = 1.07, p = 0.36, 
ηp2 = 0.04, Semantic Distance × Starting Hand, F(3, 78) = 0.13, p = .94, ηp2 = 0.01, 
the Direction of Stimulation × Hand, F(1, 26) = 1.81, p = 0.19, ηp2 = 0.07, Direction 
of Stimulation × Starting Hand, F(1, 26) = 0.74, p = 0.40, ηp2 = 0.03, Hand × Starting 
Hand, F(1, 26) = 0.34, p = 0.56, ηp2 = 0.01, Semantic Distance × Direction of 
Stimulation × Hand, F(2.43, 63.12) = 2.09, p = 0.12, ηp2 = 0.07, Semantic Distance 
× Direction of Stimulation × Starting Hand, F(3, 78) = 0.62, p = 0.61, ηp2 = 0.02, 
Semantic Distance × Hand × Starting Hand, F(3, 78) = 0.07, p = 0.98, ηp2 = 0.003, 
and Direction of Stimulation × Hand × Starting Hand, F(1, 26) = 0.39, p = 0.54, 
ηp2 = 0.02.
Discussion
Experiment 2 confirmed the finding of  the cross-modal numerosity distance 
effect from Experiment 1. Again, the effect was present in both response times and 
error rates.  
However, the cross-modal numerosity distance effect was not modulated 
by any finger counting preferences (Starting Hand or Direction of Stimulation), as 
would have been expected, if counting habits influence the analogue representation 
of numerical magnitude. We interpret this as evidence that a common metric shared 
by the representation of tactile and symbolic numerosity information reflects a 
magnitude representation that is independent of finger representations and analogue 
numerosity representations acquired while learning to count with the fingers.
In contrast to Experiment 1, in which finger counting compatibility led to 
faster responses, but was confounded with hand physiology, neither the stimulation 
direction nor the starting preference significantly influenced the perception of the 
tactile stimulus. While there was a trend for a main effect of Direction of Stimulation, 
no main effect for Starting Hand could be observed. Thus, while counting habits do not 
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influence a shared magnitude representation, they might have a marginal influence on 
the perception of a tactile stimulus.
General discussion
The current study demonstrates an interference between fingers and numbers 
on the level of analogue numerical magnitude representations. In two experiments we 
investigated the relation between tactile and symbolic numerosities, and the influence 
of finger counting habits thereon. Our data provide first evidence for the existence 
of a cross-modal semantic distance effect in participants comparing tactile presented 
numerosities with symbolically presented numerosities. More specifically, responses 
were faster and less error-prone when judging two distant numerosities (e.g., 1 and 4) 
than when  judging two close-by numerosities (e.g., 1 and 2). 
Importantly, all numerosities used in the current study were within the range 
of subitizing and are thus assumed to be perceived directly and accurately without 
relying on a serial counting process (Riggs et al., 2006; Plaisier & Smeets, 2011). We 
can therefore assume that our results (at least in Experiment 1, where the stimulation 
was non-sequential) are not mediated by verbally counting the stimulated fingers. 
Rather, since the numerical distance effect has been consistently interpreted to reflect 
a representational overlap between neighbouring items on an analogue continuum 
(Moyer & Landauer, 1967; Restle, 1970), our results suggest that tactile presented 
numerosities were automatically mapped onto the same analogue representation as 
symbolic numerosities. This interpretation receives further support by the fact that 
participants made a same-different judgement (and not a magnitude judgement), 
as it has been shown that the numerical distance effect resulting from a same-
different judgement crucially depends on overlapping analogue representations 
(Van Opstal & Verguts, 2011). Thus, the fact that we find a numerical distance effect 
allows us to exclude the possibility that the comparison of the tactile and symbolic 
numerosities was done by merely comparing verbal codes (since this would not have 
led to a distance effect). It is also unlikely that the magnitude representation of both 
numerosities was not activated directly, but through a preceding verbal code, since it 
has been shown that already preschoolers use surface features of numerical stimuli 
instead of a magnitude representation to solve a same-different judgement, when 
available (Defever et al., 2012). This means that if a verbal code preceded a magnitude 
representation in our setting, judgements could have already been solved on this 
more direct verbal level, without the need for a more abstract representation of the 
numerical magnitude. Crucially, again, a same-different judgement on the basis of 
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such verbal codes would not have led to a numerical distance effect. Taken together, 
the current finding suggests that tactile and numerical numerosities share a common 
analogue representation of numerical magnitude. 
The finding of a cross-modal numerosity distance effect is in line with the 
notion of a generalized magnitude system (Walsh, 2003), which hypothesizes that 
the brain processes general magnitude information according to a shared metric, 
independent from the domain this magnitude information comes from. In our study, 
magnitude information from two different modalities (tactile, visual) and with two 
different notations (symbolic, non-symbolic) had to be processed and compared. 
The observation that the judgement latencies and accuracies depended on the cross-
modal numerosity distance suggests that both types of numerosity information 
were mapped onto the same analogue magnitude representation which were then 
utilized for the actual cognitive comparison. It has to be furthermore mentioned that 
the current study is focusing on the processing of small numerosities. It is therefore 
unclear whether visual and tactile numerosities share also cognitive codes for larger 
numbers. Taking into account the possibility that common representations are shaped 
while using the fingers to count, it is an important open question for further research 
whether these cross-domain associations are also present for numerosities larger 10.
The conclusion that processing of sensory and symbolic numerosity information 
leads to an activation of common analogue codes supports the idea of embodied 
numerosities. The embodied cognition view claims that abstract cognitive concepts 
are “grounded” in sensorimotor experiences (Barsalou, 2008). That is, the content of 
abstract concepts, like numbers, is assumed to become meaningful by being coupled 
to bodily representations (Lindemann et al., 2009). Here, the cross-modal semantic 
distance effect reveals a direct relationship between tactile and abstract numerosities 
and the presence of a magnitude metric shared by both modalities. Representations of 
sensory experiences about size and numerosity might this way provide a grounding 
for the meaning of symbolic numbers and might therefore play a crucial role in the 
development of number concepts. 
While we cannot entirely exclude that finger counting habits are responsible 
for the differences in the numerical distance effect between the sets of fingers found 
in Experiment 1, our data does also not provide any evidence for this. We observed a 
stronger numerical distance effect for the set fingers which are not used to represent 
the numerosities during counting. However, if finger representations were indeed 
connected to an analogue numerical magnitude representation, one would have 
expected the opposite, namely, a stronger numerical distance effect for those fingers 
compatible to this representation. Considering furthermore that no influence of finger 
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counting habits on the numerical judgements could be found when the same set of 
fingers was stimulated in different sequential orders (Experiment 2), it seems very 
likely that physiological differences between the medial and lateral sets of fingers were 
responsible for the observed differences in the judgement latencies of Experiment 1. 
In contrast to our study, some previous studies reported an influence of finger 
counting habits on the processing of symbolic numbers (e.g. Di Luca & Pesenti, 
2008; Di Luca et al., 2006). The question arises therefore, why finger counting 
habits did not affect the cross-modal numerosity comparison as investigated in the 
present paradigm. First, it is important to note that most of the existing literature 
demonstrated associations between finger patterns and numbers by means of a faster 
detection or stronger number activations for canonical finger patterns. These effects 
might be mediated by a perceptual familiarity of canonical finger patterns. While 
we observed a similar pattern of facilitation in Experiment 2 where stimulation 
sequences compatible with the participants’ finger counting pattern were detected 
slightly faster and processed more fluently, this effect was, however, not statistically 
significant. Second, the current study is one of the first to investigate the influence of 
finger counting habits on an analogue representation of numerical magnitude in the 
subitizing range. Following the literature on subitizing, this should have resulted in 
a very automatic and fast activation of the number concept (Kaufman et al., 1949). 
The absence of any influence of finger counting habits under these circumstances 
suggests that differently preferred patterns of fingers are not differently coupled to 
analogue representation of numerical magnitude. Typical finger counting patterns 
might instead constitute an additional independent numerical representation (see 
also Moeller et al. 2012 for a similar proposal) and represent verbally and perceptually 
mediated associations between postures and number meaning that are acquired while 
learning to count.   
While the presence of cross-modal numerical distance effects supports the view 
of an embodied representation of numerical magnitude, we argue that the fact that 
this phenomenon is independent of acquired finger counting preferences shows that 
finger counting postures serve as the function of motor symbols and reflect probably 
the individuals’ cognitive strategy to offload numerical information (Lindemann & 
Krause, 2012).
Taken together, the current study provides evidence for a shared metric for 
tactile and symbolic numerosities, as an instance of an embodied representation of 
numbers. Crucially, the underlying analogue representation of numerical magnitude 
information appeared to be independent from finger representations.

Chapter 4
A shared representation of perceptual and 
motor magnitudes in early childhood
based on
Krause, Meyer, Bekkering, Hunnius, & Lindemann (in preparation)
CHAPTER 4
72
Abstract
Recent research has suggested that any type of size-related information 
is represented by a generalized system that codes for domain-independent 
magnitudes which is acquired through everyday sensorimotor experiences 
with contingencies of size-related information in the real world. The aim of 
the present study was to investigate the development of this shared magnitude 
representation and its impact on the coupling of perception and motor control in 
early childhood. According to an embodied view on magnitude representation, an 
automatic perception-action coupling between perceived magnitude information 
and size-related motor features, such as applied motor force, should emerge as 
soon as motor control is sufficiently developed. This hypothesis was tested in 2.5- 
to 3-year-old toddlers by engaging them in a computer game in which they were 
required to move objects placed on a platform upwards by pressing a button. 
The amount of objects was varied systematically (small amount: 3; large amount: 
15) and the force children applied on the button while moving the objects 
was recorded. Importantly, the amount of applied force was not relevant for 
successfully playing the game. The analysis of the peak force revealed that motor 
responses were executed more forcefully in presence of a large amount of objects 
compared to a small amount. This effect of perceived magnitude information 
on the applied motor force confirms our notion that a shared representation of 
perceptual and motor magnitudes exists already in early childhood and provides 
new evidence for a sensorimotor grounding of magnitude concepts.
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Introduction
Dealing with magnitudes is an integral part of everyday life. How does our 
brain process this information? It has recently been speculated that, for instance, 
numerical magnitude information becomes meaningful only when it can be 
mapped to concrete bodily experiences with size in daily life (Andres, Olivier, 
& Badets, 2008; Lindemann, Rueschemeyer, & Bekkering, 2009). This notion of 
embodied cognition (Wilson, 2002) holds that each semantic concept is grounded 
in basic sensorimotor representations and is therefore closely linked to low-level 
perceptual and motor codes (Barsalou, 2008; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Fischer 
& Zwaan, 2008). In line with this view, it has been argued by several authors 
that the brain does not process magnitudes of different domains by separate 
specialized structures, but that different magnitudes are rather represented by 
shared common cognitive codes (Walsh, 2003; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, 
& Prinz; 2001). For instance, the model of analogue magnitude representations 
of Walsh (2003) assumes that all kinds of magnitude information are coded 
together within a shared system, often referred to as the generalized magnitude 
system. 
While research on the perception-action coupling has a rather long 
tradition and therefore provides a large body of evidence for the general existence 
of shared common codes between these two domains (for a recent review see for 
instance, Hommel, 2013), evidence that magnitude information, in particular, is 
coded within the same representational medium is, however, still rather limited. 
Behavioural support for shared magnitude codes is coming, for instance, from, 
behavioural studies in adults showing interferences between different perceived 
magnitudes, such as temporal durations and space (Xuan, Zhang, & Chen, 2007; 
De Long, 1981; Mitchel & Davis, 1987) or luminance (Xuan et al., 2007), the 
numerical and the physical size of number symbols (e.g. Tzelgov & Henik, 1992) 
and objects (Badets, Andres, Di Luca, & Pesenti, 2007), or the numerical size and 
the perceived amount or strength of tactile stimulation (Krause, Bekkering, & 
Lindemann, 2013). Interestingly, semantic numerical magnitude representations 
have also been shown to be linked to magnitude-related motor codes, as for 
example, reflected by the interference between numbers and the aperture size 
during object grasping (Lindemann, Abolafia, Girardi, & Bekkering, 2007; 
Andres, Ostry, Nicol, & Paus, 2008).
Further evidence for shared cognitive magnitude codes in semantic number 
processing and motor planning is coming from a recent study of Vierck and 
Kiesel (2010) on the production of response force during number classifications. 
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Adult participants had to indicate the parity of single Arabic digits between 2 
and 9 by producing either a weak or a forceful button press response using the 
index finger of their preferred hand. After analysis of the reaction times and error 
rates for each type of response towards all numbers, the authors observed a linear 
relation between response times or error rates and numerical size, with faster and 
more accurate weak responses for small numbers compared to large numbers 
and faster and more accurate forceful responses for large numbers compared to 
small numbers. These results have been interpreted as an indication for a link 
between numerical magnitude and motor magnitude (i.e. motor force) in adult 
participants. However, numerical size had no direct influence on the actually 
produced response force itself, as revealed by an additional analysis on the 
maximally applied response force (peak response force). That is, larger numbers 
did not induce stronger responses than smaller numbers. 
Similarly, a lack of influence of numerical size on response force has also 
been reported by Fischer and Miller (2008). Adult participants had to indicate 
the parity of a number by a left or right button press response. While the 
numerical size affected reaction times depending on the congruency between 
numerical size and the side of response – that is, faster left responses for small 
numbers and faster right responses for large numbers (so-called SNARC effect; 
Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux,1993) – peak response force was not modulated by 
numerical size. Interestingly, in contrast to symbolic magnitude information, 
non-symbolic perceptual magnitudes have been shown to affect the applied force 
of button press responses in adults. For instance, Jáskowski and Włodarczyk 
(2005; 2006) showed that the loudness of an auditory stimulus as well as the 
brightness of a visual stimulus have a direct influence on the peak response force, 
with louder and brighter stimuli leading to stronger responses. These results 
clearly demonstrate an impact of a generalized magnitude representation on the 
coupling of perception and motor control in adults.
Although, the coupling between perception and action has been central 
to the investigation of motor skill development in infancy and early childhood 
(see Adolph & Berger, 2006 for a review), showing a mutual dependence of 
especially manual motor behaviours such as reaching and grasping on the action-
perception coupling (von Hofsten, 2003), little is known about the relation 
between the perception of magnitude and size-related aspects in motor control 
in young children. The aim of the present study was therefore to investigate 
the development of shared magnitude representations and their impact on the 
coupling of perception and action.
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Here, we argue that an embodied view on shared magnitude representations 
implies that a concept of abstract domain-independent magnitudes is derived 
through early bodily experiences. If information about magnitude indeed 
becomes meaningful only when it can be mapped to concrete bodily experiences 
with size in daily life (c.f. Andres, et al., 2008; Lindemann et al., 2009), then the 
development of magnitude representations in early childhood should be based, 
to some extent, on action-relevant size information. Consequently a coupling 
between perceived magnitude and size-related motor features, such as response 
force, should be observable already from early on in life. Moreover, such a 
direct perception-action coupling in the magnitude domain should manifest 
itself not only indirectly when response force is relevant for the task (cf. Krause, 
Lindemann, Toni & Bekkering, 2014; Vierck & Kiesel, 2010). Instead, we predict 
that perceived magnitude information has a direct and automatic impact on 
the production of response force itself, irrespective of task-relevance. That is, 
if perceptual and motor magnitudes share a common representation, then the 
perception of a large amount compared to a small amount should lead to more 
forceful responses, even when the extent of applied response force is irrelevant 
for a given task.
The present study tested the hypothesis of a shared representation of 
perceptual and motor magnitudes in 2.5- to 3-year-old toddlers. It is around 
this age that the increasing integration of gross and fine motor skills allows the 
execution of more complex actions such as, for instance, throwing and catching 
a ball (Meisels, Marsden, Dombro, Weston, & Jewkes, 2003) or building a tower 
of building blocks (Bullock & Luetkenhaus, 1988). While infants during their 
first year of life significantly improve in regulating the force they apply (e.g. when 
banging with a toy hammer; Kahrs, Jung, & Lockman, 2012), it is only by the 
age of 2.5 to 3 years that young children show stereotypic (adult-like) kinematic 
motor patterns in goal-directed multi-joint coordination (Konczak & Dichgans, 
1997) and have developed a complex motivational system for mastering tasks 
(Jennings, 2004), allowing them to successfully perform goal-directed actions 
with respect to externally determined task demands (Bullock & Luetkenhaus, 
1988). Both, the regulation of force in manual goal-directed actions and the 
capacity to repetitively execute a task were crucial requirements for the current 
investigation.
To examine whether children exhibited a coupling between perceived 
magnitude and motor force, we engaged them in a computer-based play situation 
in which two different numbers of food objects (small: 3; large: 15) had to be 
moved to the top of the display by pressing a force-sensitive response button. 
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We hypothesized that – even though the extent of applied force was entirely 
irrelevant for the task – a large amount of objects would lead to stronger responses 
compared to a small amount of objects. We furthermore expected the effect of 
perceived magnitude on motor force production to be modulated by experience 
with force control. We therefore additionally examined the children’s general fine 
motor skills as well as their capability to voluntarily produce different degrees of 
force in our specific setting.
Method
Participants
A total of 30 young children (11 female) between 29 and 36 months of 
age (mean = 31.30,  SD = 2.58) were tested. All children were recruited from a 
database of families who volunteered to participate in developmental studies, 
and they were accompanied to the testing session by a parent who gave written 
consent for participation of his or her child in the experiment.
Setup
The toddlers were seated on the lap of the parent in front of a table with a 
computer display (viewing distance approximately 60 cm) and a custom-made 
response button (see Figure 1a), which recorded the applied motor force. The 
experimenter was seated next to the toddler. The force-sensitive response button 
measured forces up to 3304 Centi-Newtons (cN) with an approximate resolution 
of 13 cN each 16 ms. The experiment and the force recordings were controlled 
using the open-source software Expyriment: A Python library for cognitive and 
neuroscientific experiments (Krause & Lindemann, 2014). During the entire 
experiment, the toddlers’ performance was video recorded.
Material
Two computer game-like scenarios were developed. Stimuli were always 
presented in front of a light blue background. In the experimental task, the 
perceptual magnitude was manipulated by the number of presented objects. 
That is, visual stimuli consisted of coloured drawn pictures of 5 different food 
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objects (apples, croissants, donuts, popsicles, and pears) in sets of either 3 (small 
amount) or 15 items (large amount) of the same type and size (width = 0.91°, 
height = 0.91°), stacked into a pyramidal shape on top of a drawn horizontally 
oriented black platform (width = 15.94°, height = 0.48°; see Figure 1b). The size of 
the objects was kept constant, resulting in a visually larger pyramidal heap for 15 
items compared to 3 items. Since both numerical and physical sizes are conceived 
as instances of perceptual magnitudes, the study refrained from controlling the 
correlation between these two visual features to ensure a parsimonious design 
appropriate for few experimental trials. Auditory stimuli, which were included 
as a motivating feedback to keep children engaged in the task, comprised 10 
different animal sounds (donkey, sheep, cock, owl, frog, cat, cow, dog, bird, and 
horse).
In the test of force control, visual stimuli consisted of a drawn green frog 
(width = 2.86°, height = 2.86°) and two black horizontal bars (width = 2.96°, 
height = 0.29°; distance = 8.96°) at two different vertical positions (distance to 
bottom of display: low = 4.77°, high = 12.84°; see Figure 1c). A fanfare sound was 
used as auditory feedback.
Procedure
Each child was assigned to one of two task orders. At the beginning of 
each task, the experimenter gave an oral explanation as well as a practical 
demonstration of the game to the child.
In the experimental task, food objects placed on a horizontally oriented 
platform had to be moved upwards until they had disappeared from the upper 
edge of the display (travel distance = 21.61°) to an imaginary (i.e. not visible) 
animal, by pressing the response button. The platform moved upwards with a 
constant speed as long as the button was pressed with a certain minimum force 
(63 cN). Force was task-irrelevant and pressing the button more strongly did not 
affect the procedure. A new trial started when the response button was released. If 
the platform reached the top of the display (after 3000 ms) before button release, 
an animal sound was played to the toddlers as motivational feedback.
In the test of force control, the frog had to be moved vertically to a 
position marked by the two black horizontal bars on the screen. In contrast to 
the experimental phase, the extent of applied force was relevant to this task. 
The position of the frog could be controlled continuously by applying different 
amounts of pressure on the response button. That is, the harder the button was 
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pressed, the higher the frog moved on the screen. Children were instructed to 
control the pressure on the button in such a way that the frog would reach the 
marked position. A match between the marked position and the frog’s position 
was indicated by the two black bars changing their colour to green. When the 
child kept the requested force range (i.e. the frog stayed in the marked position) 
for more than 1500 ms, the trial ended successfully with an encouraging fanfare 
sound played to the child as feedback. If the frog did not reach the marked 
position after 90 seconds the attempt was rendered unsuccessful.
 At the end of the testing session, each child’s fine motor skills were assessed 
with 4 items from the Bayley Scales of Infant Development (Bayley, 1993; van 
der Meulen, Ruiter, Lutje Spelberg, & Smrkovsky, 2002): threading beads (88), 
grasping a pencil (90), drawing a circle (96) and (un)fastening a button (101).
Figure 1. a) The experimental setup. Children were sitting on their parent’s lap in front of a table 
with a computer display and a response button. The experimenter was seated next to the child. 
b) The experimental task. An example of a ‘large amount’ condition trial. Pressing the response 
button made the platform move to the top of the display with constant speed as long as the button 
was pressed. c) The test of force control. An example of a ‘high’ condition trial. The frog had to be 
positioned in between the two black bars by controlling the force applied to the response button.
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Design
Experimental task and test of force control were blocked and the order was 
counter-balanced over participants. 
The experimental block consisted of 20 trials in total with 10 ‘small amount’ 
condition trials and 10 ‘large amount’ condition trials. The 5 visual stimuli (food 
objects) and 10 auditory stimuli (animal sounds) were randomly paired with 
each trial. The presentation of the trials within the experimental block was 
randomized. 
In the test of force control children were given maximally 20 attempts, half 
with the horizontal bars at the low position and half at the high position. The 
presentation of low and high horizontal bars was randomized.
Results
Fine motor skills
  To quantify the fine motor development of the children, we aggregated 
the data from the 4 motor items (beads threading, button (un)fastening, pencil 
grasping and circle drawing) and calculated for those children who participated 
and co-operated in all 4 items (n = 20) the sum of successful items. The distribution 
of scores and the performance on the different items are summarized in Table 1 
and Table 2. The majority of children passed at least three of the four items.
Table 1. Overview of children’s overall performance on the fine motor skills items.
Total score
0 1 2 3 4
Children (%) 0 10 5 65 20
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Test of force control
On average, children attempted to move the frog to the low position 
2.47 times and 1.53 times to the high position. The test of force control was 
considered to be successful if a child was able to voluntarily move the frog to each 
of the two marked positions (low and high) at least once without help from the 
experimenter or the parent. Given that the frog had to be held at the position for 
1500 ms – a goal which could not be achieved by accident – the demonstration of 
one successful performance per level was a sufficient criterion. 18 children (60%) 
reached this criterion. The point biserial correlation coefficient between the test 
of force control (passed, not passed) and the summed fine motor scores was 
rpb = -0.04, suggesting that the test of force control measured a different aspect of 
motor development than items typically used to assess fine motor skills, and that 
it might be a more appropriate measure for the current study to asses children’s 
experience with force control.
Experimental task
All trials in which children pressed the response button for longer than 
200 ms were considered, which excluded anticipatory responses. Per trial only 
response force data within the first 3000 ms (i.e. until the food objects had moved 
completely out of the display) were analyzed. Furthermore, only trials were 
included during which the child was paying attention to the screen and operated 
the button without any help from the experimenter or parent (as obtained from 
the video recording). On average, children carried out 63.9% of all possible trials 
in the ‘small amount’ condition (12.78 trials; SD = 4.43) and 62.2% in the ‘large 
amount’ condition (12.44 trials; SD = 4.40).
Table 2. Overview of the success rate on the fine motor skills items.
Threading 
beads
(Un)
fastening 
button
Grasping 
pencil
Drawing 
circle
Success (%) 80 30 100 85
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Children released the response button before the platform reached the top 
of the screen in 29.99% of the trials in the ‘small amount’ condition (3.83 trials; 
SD = 3.04) and in 28.52% of the trials in the ‘large amount’ condition (3.67 trials; 
SD = 3.18). The average button press duration was 3380.10 ms in the ‘small 
amount’ condition (SD = 689.83) and 3358.20 ms in the ‘large amount’ condition 
(SD=793.68), showing that children released the button on average 369.15 ms 
after the food objects disappeared at the top of the screen. These differences in 
motor behaviour were not statistically significant, both |t(29)| < 1.
To test a possible general influence of the type of food object used as visual 
stimuli on the children’s response force, mean peak response force was calculated 
for each stimulus per participant and entered into a repeated measures ANOVA 
with the factor Food Object (apples, croissants, donuts, popsicles, pears). No 
main effect of Food Object could be observed, F(4, 116) < 1, suggesting that 
children responded to all food objects with comparable force.
Figure 2. The magnitude congruency effect. A large amount of food objects (15) led to a significantly 
higher peak response force compared to a small amount of food objects (3). The effect was not 
modulated by the performance in the test of force control.
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To test our hypothesis of a stronger force production when children were 
responding to a large amount (15) compared to a small amount of objects (3), we 
calculated the mean peak response force for each condition individually for all 
children, and performed a 2 × 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA with the within-
subject factor Amount of Objects (small, large) and the between-subject factors 
Task Order (test of force control first, experimental task first) and Test of Force 
Control Performance (passed, not passed). Most importantly, in accordance 
with our hypothesis, we observed a significant main effect of Amount of Objects, 
F(1, 26) = 4.35, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.14, with stronger responses in the ‘large amount’ 
condition (1931 cN, SD = 375), compared to the ‘small amount’ condition 
(1828 cN, SD = 359), showing a magnitude congruency (see Figure 2). The 
main effect of Task Order did not reach significance, F(1, 26) = 3.31, p = 0.081, 
ηp2 = 0.11, (‘test of force control first’: 2124 cN, SD = 373; ‘experimental task first’: 
1693 cN, SD = 285), nor did the main effect of Test of Force Control Performance, 
F(1, 26) < 1. There was also no significant interaction effect between the factors 
Amount of Objects and Task Order, F(1,26) = 0.02, p = 0.89, ηp2 = 0.001, suggesting 
that the position of the test of force control (before or after the experimental task) 
did not influence the magnitude congruency effect.
 In contrast to our expectations, the interaction between the factors Amount 
of Objects and Test of Force Control Performance did not reach significance, 
F(1, 26) < 1, suggesting that there were no differences in the magnitude congruency 
between toddlers who passed the test of force control and those who did not (see 
also Figure 2). However, there was furthermore a complex significant three-way 
interaction between the factors Amount of Objects, Task Order and Test of Force 
Control Performance, F(1,26) = 5.14, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.17. While the children 
who first participated in the test of force control did not show a main effect of 
the amount of objects, F(1, 11) = 1.59, p = 0.23, ηp2 = 0.13, those of them who 
passed the test of force control showed a descriptively (but non-significant) 
larger effect of the amount of objects (stronger responses in the ‘large amount’ 
condition than in the ‘small amount’ condition) compared to those who did not 
pass the test, F(1, 11) = 1.55, p = 0.24, ηp2 = 0.12. This pattern was reversed for 
children who first participated in the experimental task, for which those who did 
not pass the test of force control showed a marginally significant stronger effect 
of amount of objects (stronger responses in the ‘large amount’ condition than in 
the ‘small amount’ condition), t(6) = 2.00, p= 0.93, compared to those who did 
pass the test, |t(9)| < 1, F(1, 15) = 4.35, p = 0.05, ηp2 = 0.23; again in the absence 
of a main effect of the amount of objects, F(1, 15) = 3.02, p = 0.10, ηp2 = 0.17.
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Discussion
The current study provides evidence for a shared representation of 
perceptual and motor magnitudes in early childhood and its impact on the 
coupling between perception and action. We show that changes in the amount 
of presented objects influence the peak response force produced by 2.5- to 
3-year-old toddlers when pressing and holding a button during a computer 
game. We interpret our data as evidence for a magnitude congruency effect. In 
particular, the presence of 15 objects led to significantly stronger button press 
responses, compared to the presence of only 3 objects. This effect of perceptual 
magnitude on the motor force production emerged even though the amount of 
applied force was entirely irrelevant for the task. Interestingly, the effect was not 
modulated by differences in experience with force control, as determined by an 
additional test of force control.
The effect of perceptual amount on the production of motor force in 
toddlers is in line with the notion of shared representations between action and 
perception (Hommel et al., 2001) as well as with the notion of a generalized 
magnitude system, which suggests that different kinds of magnitude information 
from prothetic dimensions (Stevens, 1975) are represented together in the brain, 
irrespective of the domain or modality this information comes from (Walsh, 
2003). Walsh’s theory assumes that all magnitude information is processed by 
the same underlying mechanisms and consequently predicts an interaction 
of the processing of those magnitudes. The current study shows that visually 
presented magnitude information (i.e. amount of objects) has a direct impact on 
the intensity of a manual motor response (i.e. force). This interaction between 
perceptual and motor magnitudes strongly supports the hypothesis that both 
magnitudes share a common representation. While previous research already 
suggests a shared representation of perceived size information from different 
dimensions in young children (e.g. Lourenco & Longo, 2010; see also Piaget, 
1969; Piaget, 1965; Siegler & Richards, 1979; Levin, 1979; Levin, 1977), our 
findings extend this previous literature into the motor domain and show 
that, once children have developed the ability to successfully perform goal-
directed actions with respect to externally determined task demands (Bullock 
& Luetkenhaus, 1988), motor magnitudes seem to be immediately linked to 
magnitudes from other domains.
The present study is among the first to demonstrate a direct influence 
of perceptual magnitude information on force production in young children, 
when the amount of applied motor force is not relevant for the task. This finding 
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provides new empirical evidence from toddlers’ behaviour for the view of an 
embodied magnitude representation. The notion of embodied cognition states 
that abstract cognitive concepts, like magnitude, are grounded in sensorimotor 
experiences (Barsalou, 2008) and become meaningful by being coupled to bodily 
representations (Lindemann et al., 2009). Here we show that, already in early 
childhood, perceptual magnitude information is coupled with the concept of 
motor force. Our data might also be relevant for an ongoing debate in the field 
of numerical cognition, concerning the question of when a common magnitude 
representation develops. More specifically, there seems to be disagreement 
about whether domain-specific magnitude representations (such as numerical 
magnitude) develop first and only later become connected to similar specialized 
magnitude representations of other domains, or whether a common magnitude 
representation is in place first, and only later builds the basis for more domain-
specific magnitude representations (Cohen Kadosh, Lammertyn, & Izard, 
2008). Here, we show evidence for a shared representation of perceptual and 
motor magnitudes which is present already in 2.5- to 3-year toddlers. While 
the demonstration of such an early developed shared magnitude representation 
provides suggestive evidence for the hypothesis that this representation is in 
place first and might precede domain-specific magnitude representations, and 
is also in line with other findings showing that children base judgements about 
magnitude in one domain on magnitude in other irrelevant domains (Stavy 
& Tirosh, 2000; Piaget, 1969; Piaget, 1965; Levin, 1977; Levin, 1979; Siegler 
& Richards, 1979), future research on the interplay between the development 
of domain-specific and generalized magnitude representations is needed to 
provide a definite answer to this issue.
Notably, the magnitude congruency effect in our study was (against our 
expectation) not modulated by the performance in the test of force control, 
which was thought to classify children into those with and those without active 
experience with force control. We can think of two possible explanations for this 
result. It might indeed be the case that a coupling between perceptual and motor 
magnitudes is so fundamental that it is already present even before children have 
first active sensorimotor experiences with size (e.g. the processing of perceptual 
magnitudes and motor magnitudes might be hard-wired in the brain and hence 
present from birth on). An alternative explanation, however, might simply lie in 
the test of force control we used in the current study itself. To be more precise, it 
is very well possible that the test did not properly distinguish between children 
who could voluntarily control their force and those who could not. Since the 
passing criterion was a successful performance that entailed applying a certain 
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force for 1500 ms in two different conditions (a criterion that cannot be reached 
by chance alone), it can be assumed that the group of children who passed the 
test of force control is a rather homogeneous group. Importantly, however, this 
assumption cannot be made for the group of children that did not pass the test, 
since an unsuccessful performance could also reflect a lack of motivation or 
willingness of the child to perform the task. It might thus be the case that the 
group of children that did not pass the test of force control also entails children 
who in principle do have the necessary experience with force control and 
therefore actually do show an effect in the experimental task. Future research 
on the development of force control in children is needed to further investigate 
the effect of experience with force control in more detail.
It is important to notice that “amount” in our design is a possible 
composition of several  magnitudes, namely numerosity (i.e. 3 vs 15 objects), 
weight (i.e. 15 objects are heavier than 3 objects), and physical size (i.e. 15 objects 
will results in a bigger heap than 3 objects). Given the design of the current 
study it is not possible to attribute the magnitude congruity effect to any single 
one of those magnitudes alone. However, while it has been shown that young 
children rely predominantly on weight when solving balance scale problems by 
applying systematic hierarchical rules (Siegler 1976; 1981), it seems unlikely to 
us that the congruency effect we found in our paradigm was solely influenced 
by the magnitude of weight for two reasons: (1) The research of Siegler also 
demonstrated that children aged 3 years or under (as in the present study) 
rarely use rules (such as the rule to first use weight as judgement criterion) 
systematically when solving balance scale problems. (2) We did not observe 
effects of object identity on the production of response force, suggesting that 
pure differences in conceptual knowledge about weight, independent of other 
perceptual magnitudes (as the amount and size of the objects was the same), 
did not influence the response. Isolating numerosity from other perceptual 
magnitudes, such as physical size, in a study with toddlers that involves only 
a limited number of trials is also difficult. Other developmental studies have 
tried to solve this problem and have kept the overall size constant by either 
manipulating the space between the objects (e.g. Sasanguie, Göbel, Moll, Smets, 
& Reynvoet, 2013) or the size of the single objects (e.g. Cantlon, Brannon, 
Carter, & Pelphrey, 2006). This, however, does not provide a solution for the 
problem that numerosity manipulations across few trials always covary with 
other perceptual properties, since varying spacing or object size introduces 
two other visual magnitude features that systematically depend on numerosity, 
namely density and (again) size. Importantly, however, studies with animals 
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(Nieder & Miller, 2004b) and adults (Izard & Dehaene, 2008) that controlled 
for these confounding perceptual features across a vast amount of measurement 
points have shown that numerosity information is extracted and processed 
spontaneously from numerosity displays similar to the ones used in the current 
study. Unfortunately, it was not feasible to fully control for these factors within 
a single experiment with toddlers. In the present paradigm, we thus focused on 
the most natural configuration in which single object size and object density 
are kept constant. While our results might be interpreted in line of the idea of a 
shared representation of numerical and motor magnitudes, we think that future 
research on the magnitude congruency effect, using different types of visual 
displays, will have to provide further insights into the underlying mechanisms 
of the specific effect of numerosity information on motor execution in early 
childhood. Importantly, however, the fact that several perceptual magnitudes 
(or most likely a combination of them) contribute to the observed effect does 
not weaken the main finding of the current study, namely an interaction between 
perceptual magnitude and task-irrelevant response force.
The current finding has not only implications for our understanding of 
magnitude processing in perception and action but might, in addition, affect 
an ongoing debate about the developmental underpinnings of embodied 
representations of number meaning. While we cannot directly attribute 
the perceptual magnitude that was processed in our study to be exclusively 
numerosity, our data does provide evidence for an early developed generalized 
domain-independent representation of magnitude (Walsh, 2003) and its impact 
on the coupling between action and perception. As suggested by embodied 
theories of number representation, information about numerical size is 
represented within a magnitude system that phylogenetically evolved to process 
and represent magnitude information for the control of perception and action (cf. 
Walsh, 2003; Dehaene & Cohen; 2007; Lindemannet al., 2009). Importantly, the 
early developing automatic magnitude coupling in motor control, as observed in 
the current study, is in line with the notion that experiences with sensorimotor 
magnitudes provide the grounding for later developing representations of 
abstract number concepts. (Fischer, Moeller, Bientzle, Cress, & Nuerk, 2011).
In conclusion, the current study shows that magnitude representations 
and their direct coupling between perception and action can be investigated 
in toddlers by examining the force production in a game-like experimental 
setting. We demonstrate an influence of the perceived amount of objects on 
the intensity of motor responses in 2.5- to 3-year-olds. This finding suggests 
that a shared representation of perceptual and motor magnitudes exists already 
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in early childhood and provides new evidence for the idea of a sensorimotor 
grounding of magnitude concepts.

Chapter 5
Different brains process numbers differently:
structural bases of individual differences 
in spatial and nonspatial number 
representations
based on
Krause, Lindemann, Toni, & Bekkering (2014)
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 26(4), 768-776
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Abstract
A dominant hypothesis on how the brain processes numerical size 
proposes a spatial representation of numbers as positions on a ‘mental number 
line’. An alternative hypothesis considers numbers as elements of a generalized 
representation of sensorimotor-related magnitude which is not obligatorily 
spatial. Here we show that individuals’ relative use of spatial and nonspatial 
representations has a cerebral counterpart in the structural organization of the 
posterior parietal cortex. Inter-individual variability in the linkage between 
numbers and spatial responses (faster left responses to small numbers and 
right responses to large numbers; SNARC effect) correlated with variations in 
grey matter volume around the right precuneus. Conversely, differences in the 
disposition to link numbers to force production (faster soft responses to small 
numbers and hard responses to large numbers) were related to grey matter 
volume in the left angular gyrus. This finding suggests that numerical cognition 
relies on multiple mental representations of analogue magnitude using different 
neural implementations that are linked to individual traits.
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Introduction
Dealing with numerical information is an integral part of our modern 
society. Numbers occur throughout all aspects of every day life; they depict 
information about prices and values and allow us to count occurrences and 
entities. During a single day we probably process several thousand numbers 
(Butterworth, 1999). Yet, our ability to deal with them varies greatly across 
individuals (Butterworth, 2010; Adams, 2007). It is therefore important to 
understand how individuals represent numbers and how their brains process this 
information. The most influential model of number processing, the triple-code 
model, dissociates between three different numerical representations: An Arabic 
code for digit processing, a verbal code for retrieval of arithmetic facts and verbal 
counting, and an analogue magnitude code for the processing of numerical size 
(Dehaene, 1992). While the first two representations are notation- and modality-
dependent, an analogue magnitude representation is thought to be abstract in 
nature and is thus assumed to be independent of notation and modality (Cohen 
Kadosh & Walsh, 2009). The current study seeks to investigate two different 
manifestations of this analogue magnitude representation of numerical size.
Over the last decades, several studies on number cognition have provided 
abundant empirical support for the hypothesis that numerical size is spatially 
represented in the brain (Dehaene, 2009; de Havia, Vallar & Girelli, 2008; 
Hubbard, Piazza, Pinel, & Dehaene, 2005). This hypothesis assumes that we 
derive the size of a number from its position on an ordered ‘mental number line’ 
on which small numbers are represented on one side and large numbers on the 
other (Moyer & Landauer, 1967). For instance, the so-called effect of Spatial-
Numerical Association of Response Codes (SNARC) shows a linkage between 
numerical information and spatial responses (Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 
1993). When participants are asked to judge the parity of Arabic digits between 
1 and 9 by a left or right response, the numerical size of the digit interferes with 
the execution of the spatial responses, with faster left responses to small numbers 
and faster right responses to large numbers. This spatial number-response 
interference effect has been interpreted as evidence for a shared representation 
of spatial response codes and the ordinal position of the number representation 
in mental space. 
More recently, the assumption that spatial codes become obligatorily 
activated when processing numerical size has been questioned by several authors 
(e.g. Fischer, 2006; Santens & Gevers, 2008). It has been argued instead that 
information about numerical size is mapped onto representations of other size-
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related sensorimotor information, within a system that processes generalized 
analogue magnitude (Walsh, 2003). According to this hypothesis, number 
meaning is conceptualized by recruiting the same mechanisms that allow us 
to experience and control other behaviorally relevant magnitudes in daily life. 
Evidence for this notion comes from several studies showing associations between 
numbers and other types of magnitude information in action and perception, 
like physical size (Tzelgov & Henik, 1992), temporal duration (Oliveri, Vicario, 
Salerno, Koch, Turizziani, Mangano, Chillemi, & Caltagirone, 2008), grip aperture 
(Lindemann, Abolafia, Girardi, & Bekkering, 2007), object graspability (Badets, 
Andres, Di Luca, & Pesenti, 2007) and tactile sensation (Krause, Bekkering, & 
Lindeman, 2013). Crucially, the associated sensorimotor magnitudes can be 
entirely nonspatial in nature. For instance, a link between numerical information 
and force production has been reported (Vierck & Kiesel, 2010), which we will 
refer to as Force-Numerical Association of Response Codes (FoNARC). When 
participants are asked to judge the parity of Arabic digits between 1 and 9 by a soft 
or hard response on a single button, the numerical size of the digit interferes with 
the execution of force responses, with faster soft responses to small numbers and 
faster hard responses to large numbers. Importantly, the procedure to quantify a 
FoNARC effect is identical to the procedure to quantify a SNARC effect except 
that required motor responses for the latency measurement do not differ spatially. 
Due to  the homogeneity of all spatial response components, it can be excluded 
that the number-response interference effect observed under these conditions 
is driven by a spatial representation of numbers on a mental number line. The 
observation of a FoNARC effect consequently has to be interpreted as a within-
magnitude inference between numerical information and the control of motor 
force, which in turn suggests the existence of nonspatial sensorimotor-related 
representations of numbers.
With the apparent coexistence of both spatial and nonspatial 
representations of numerical size the question arises in which way the two 
representations contribute to numerical cognition. It has been suggested that 
multiple representations of the same numerical information rely on different 
neural implementations and that the weights of their contribution are simply 
determined by the requirements of the situation or task at hand (Dehaene, Piazza, 
Pinel, & Cohen, 2003). A numerical task with a spatial component would lead 
to a stronger activation of posterior superior parietal lobe. In contrast, a number 
task without any spatial component (e.g. force production) is expected to engage 
primarily inferior parietal regions (cf. Dehaene et al., 2003). 
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However, task demands might not be the only factor to determine how 
numerical information are processed. For instance, the general disposition to 
associate numbers with space has been shown to vary strongly between individuals 
(for a review see Wood, Nuerk, & Willmes, 2008) and might even depend on 
personal preferences to code numerical information (Fischer, 2006). The same 
might hold for linking numbers to nonspatial sensorimotor-related magnitude, 
as this disposition might be related to the individual’s bodily competence and 
experience of dealing with magnitudes and sizes in everyday life (Lindemann, 
Rueschemeyer, & Bekkering, 2009; see also Barsalou, 2008). Here we assess 
whether those inter-individual differences reflect stable individual traits, rather 
than stochastic noise or task demands.
This issue was addressed by combining a double dissociation approach 
with the method of Voxel-Based Morphometry (VBM; Ashburner and Friston, 
2000). The rationale of this approach is to isolate differential structural variances 
across two behavioural indexes of numerical cognition, intrinsically controlling 
for confounds correlated with both indexes. We tested whether inter-individual 
variation in anatomical brain structure explains individual differences in spatial 
(SNARC) and nonspatial (FoNARC) number-response interference effects – 
reflecting a spatial and nonspatial representation of numerical size, respectively. 
VBM was used to measure variability in local grey matter volume in the posterior 
parietal cortex, a site consistently associated with numerical representations (see 
Arsalidou & Taylor, 2011 for a review). Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
(fMRI) was used to map the spatial distribution of task-related activity across the 
posterior parietal cortex.
Methods
Participants
A total of 33 students (20 female) between 18 and 34 years of age 
(mean = 21.33, SD = 3.28) participated in the experiment in return of 20 Euro or 
course credits. All of them had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were 
of general health, with no known neurological or psychological disorders. The 
study was approved by the local ethics committee and participants gave their 
written consent prior to the experimental procedure.
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Setup
Stimuli consisted of the Arabic digits 1 to 9, except 5, depicted in white 
colour (visual angle: ~1.26 degrees vertical & ~0.53 degrees horizontal) 
centrally on a black background. Participants viewed the screen via a mirror 
attached to the Magnetic Resonance (MR) scanner’s receiver head-coil.
Responses were recorded using MR-compatible button boxes with either 
spatially arranged buttons that had to be pressed with the right index and right 
middle finger, or with a single isometric force-transducer button which had to 
be pressed with the right thumb. The force sensitive button box was a cylinder 
grasped between the thumb and the remaining fingers.
Procedure
The data collection was done in the context of a larger functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging study and was thus performed while subjects were lying 
inside the MR-scanner. Participants were engaged in two consecutive number 
parity judgement tasks in which the presented digits had to be classified as odd 
or even. Importantly, both tasks differed only in the required responses. In the 
spatial task, number parity had to be indicated by a right index finger (“left”) 
or middle finger (“right”) response. That is, each response involved the flexion 
and extension of either one of the two fingers. In the nonspatial task, responses 
were given with the right thumb and involved applying either a small force 
(> 500 N but < 2500 N, “soft” responses) or a large force (> 2500 N, “hard” 
responses). 
Each trial started with the presentation of a white fixation cross for 500 
ms, followed by the target stimulus. Participants had to respond within 1000 
ms after stimulus presentation. If it took them too long to respond, or their 
response was incorrect, an auditory error signal was played back to them 
via headphones. After the response was given, a dark grey fixation cross was 
presented for a variable time between 2000 and 4000 ms, before the next trial 
started.
Before the actual experiment, participants were given verbal instructions 
and practised the task for about 5 minutes outside the MR scanner. The response 
mapping to indicate the parity (i.e. left or right response for odd numbers 
and soft or hard response for odd numbers) was reversed in the middle of 
each task block. The order of mappings as well as the order of the spatial and 
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nonspatial task were balanced between participants. Eighteen participants 
performed 320 trials, 15 participants performed 288 trials. The order of trials 
was randomized.
MRI data acquisition
For each participant a high-resolution anatomical MR image was recorded 
using a T1-weighted MP-RAGE sequence with a GRAPPA acceleration factor 
of 2 (TR/TE = 2300/3.03 ms, voxel size = 1 × 1 × 1 mm). Anatomical images 
were recorded directly after both tasks were conducted. Due to technical 
problems, MR images of two participants were acquired 12 and 5 weeks after the 
behavioural test, respectively. For one participant, a 7 months older MR image 
was used. All images were recorded on the same 3 Tesla Siemens Magneton 
Trio MR scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) in combination with the same 
32-channel receiver head-coil.
Functional images were acquired using a multi-echo gradient echo 
planar T2*-weighted sequence sensitive to blood oxygen level-dependent 
contrast (TR = 2390 ms; TE = 9.4, 21.2, 33.0, 45.0 and 56.0 ms; FA = 90°; 
field of view = 224 × 224 mm; number of slices = 31; slice thickness = 3 mm; 
resolution = 3.5 × 3.5 × 3.0 mm).
Behavioural data analysis
The behavioural data of each participant were analyzed separately for the 
spatial and the nonspatial task, to estimate effect sizes for both, a SNARC effect 
in the spatial task, as well as a FoNARC effect in the nonspatial task. Only trials 
with correct parity judgments within 1000 ms were included in the analysis. 
Effect sizes were calculated as suggested by Fias, Brysbaert, Geypens, and 
Ydewalle (1996). First, the difference in the median reaction times between left 
and right responses (spatial task) and soft and hard responses (nonspatial task) 
was calculated for each presented digit. Then, individual linear regressions 
between these response time differences and the digits were calculated. The 
resulting regression coefficients were used to characterize the size of the 
SNARC or FoNARC effect in each participant.
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VBM analysis
MR image preprocessing and statistical testing was done using Statistical 
Parametric Mapping 8 (SPM8,  http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) and the 
integrated DARTEL toolbox (Ashburner, 2007).
Each anatomical image was segmented into grey and white matter 
images and resampled to 1.5 mm isotropic resolution. Afterwards, nonlinear 
deformations for warping all grey and white matter images to each other were 
determined by iterative template creation (7 steps; Ashburner, 2007). Modulated 
warped grey matter images were created by smoothing with a Gaussian kernel of 
10 mm and normalizing to the Montreal Neurology Institute (MNI) coordinate 
space.
An anatomical mask was created using the SPM8 Anatomy Toolbox 
(Eickhoff, 2005), including portions of the superior parietal cortex (areas 7A, 
7PC, 7M, 7P; Scheperjans, Hermann, Eickhoff, Amunts, Schleicher, & Zilles, 
2008a; Scheperjans, Eickhoff, Hömke, Mohlberg, Hermann, Amunts, & Zilles, 
2008b), the inferior parietal cortex (areas PFop, PFt, PF, PFm, PFcm, PGa, 
PGp; Caspers, Geyer, Schleicher, Mohlberg, Amunts, & Zilles, 2006; Caspers, 
Eickhoff, Geyer, Scheperjans, Mohlberg, Zilles, & Amunts, 2008), as well as the 
intraparietal sulcus (areas hIP1, hIP2, hIP3; Choi, Zilles, Mohlberg, Schleicher, 
Fink, Armstrong, & Amunts, 2006; Scheperjans et al., 2008a; Scheperjans et al., 
2008b).
This anatomical mask, based on regions previously shown to be involved 
in numerical cognition (Cohen Kadosh, Lammertyn, & Izard, 2008; Wu, Chang, 
Majid, Caspers, Eickhoff, & Menon, 2009), was combined with a functional 
mask including posterior parietal voxels activated during either one of the 
experimental tasks (see fMRI analysis below). 
The preprocessed images entered a multiple regression general linear 
model (GLM) with SNARC and FoNARC effect size estimates as regressors 
of interest. Two additional covariates were added to the GLM: median overall 
reaction times, aggregated over both tasks, to control for general performance 
differences between participants, and total intracranial volume, to control for 
general overall size differences of grey matter, white matter and cerebro spinal 
fluid (Good, Johnsrude, Ashburner, Henson, Friston, & Frackowiak, 2001). 
The statistical threshold was p < 0.05 at voxel level, corrected for multiple 
comparisons by means of the family-wise error (FWE).
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fMRI analysis
Functional image preprocessing and statistical testing was done using 
SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm).
For each volume, the five multi-echo images were combined into a 
T2*-weighted average image (Poser, Versluis, Hoogduin, & Norris, 2006). All 
weighted average images were spatially realigned to the first image and corrected 
for differences in slice-time acquisition. The T1-weighted anatomical image was 
co-registered with the mean functional image, segmented and normalized to the 
MNI standard space, and resampled to a 2 × 2 × 2 mm resolution. The resulting 
normalization parameters were applied to the functional images, which were 
subsequently spatially smoothed using a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm.
The preprocessed images entered a GLM with 4 sessions, describing two 
response mappings for each of the two experimental tasks. For each session, 
task effects were modeled using a combination of compatible and incompatible 
trials for four groups of numerical stimuli (1, 2; 3, 4; 6, 7; 8, 9), resulting in 
8 regressors, each describing the onset of the response to the stimulus. An 
additional regressor was used to model erroneous responses. All task-related 
regressors were convolved with a hemodynamic response function. Three 
translational and three rotational head motion parameters and their first and 
second derivative, resulting in 18 regressors, were added as covariates.
To capture posterior parietal voxels activated during the experimental 
tasks, the t-contrast of each task compared to implicit baseline was evaluated 
for the whole brain on the group level (thresholded at 0.05, uncorrected). The 
union of the results of both contrasts, restricted to the entire posterior parietal 
cortex (i.e. areas 5L, 5M, 5Ci, 7A, 7PC, 7M, 7P, PFop, PFt, PF, PFm, PFcm, PGa, 
PGp, hIP1, hIP2, hIP3), served as a functional mask (see VBM analysis above).
We also assessed whether the regions showing structural variations as a 
function of SNARC/FoNARC performance were also functionally engaged in 
performance of those tasks. That is, we tested whether the fMRI data showed 
increased BOLD signal (p < 0.01, Family-wise error corrected for search volume) 
within a search volume defined by two spherical VOIs centered on the two local 
maxima of the VBM analyses, with a radius matched to the FWHM of the VBM 
results (10 mm).
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Results
Behavioural results
On average, participants made 5% errors in the spatial task and 10% 
errors in the nonspatial task. The average reaction times were 539 ms 
(SD = 60) and 585 ms (SD = 62) for the spatial task and nonspatial task, 
respectively. SNARC effect sizes of all participants differed significantly 
from zero, t(32) = 6.70, p < 0.001, as did FoNARC effect sizes, t(32) = 8.61, 
p < 0.001. There was a weak, but non-significant positive correlation between 
the individual SNARC and FoNARC effect sizes , r = 0.31, p = 0.07. Median 
overall reaction times correlated with the size of the SNARC effect , r = 0.36, 
p < 0.05, and were therefore included as an additional covariate in the GLM 
for the VBM analysis (see Method). Importantly, there were no correlations 
between age and SNARC effect sizes, r = -0.10, p = 0.57, age and FoNARC effect 
sizes, r = 0.03, p = 0.88, or gender and SNARC effect sizes, r = 0.11, p = 0.55, 
and gender and FoNARC effect sizes, r = 0.16, p = 0.37. Therefore, and since 
any shared variance with age and gender is common to both regressors of 
interest in the GLM, age and gender were not added as explicit covariates into 
the VBM analysis.
VBM results
Figure 1 shows the main findings of the VBM analysis (thresholded 
at 0.001, uncorrected, for illustrative purposes). The multiple regression 
analysis on the posterior parietal cortex revealed that SNARC effect size 
predicted local relative grey matter volume in the right precuneus (area 5M; 
peak at MNI coordinates x = 7.5, y = -49.5, z = 52.5; t(28) = 4.97, Z = 4.17, 
pFWE < 0.05). The stronger the individual SNARC effect (i.e. the disposition 
to associate numbers with a spatial response), the more relative grey matter 
was present in this particular region. Furthermore, FoNARC effect size 
predicted local relative grey matter volume in the left angular gyrus (area PGa; 
peak at MNI coordinates x = -45, y = -57, z = 37.5 ), t(28) = 5.37, Z = 4.42, 
pFWE < 0.05). The stronger the FoNARC effect (i.e. the disposition to link 
numbers to force production), the more relative grey matter in this region of 
the individual’s brain. Figure 2 illustrates the differential correlations between 
grey matter volume in each of the regions and number-response interference 
effects, corrected for average reaction time and total intracranial volume.
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Importantly, grey matter volume in right precuneus correlated significantly 
more with the spatial than with the nonspatial number-response interference 
effect, Z = 3.55, p < 0.01, while grey matter volume in left angular gyrus 
correlated significantly less with the  spatial than with the nonspatial number-
response interference effect, Z = -3.89, p < 0.01, demonstrating a double-
dissociation between the behavioural and the structural cerebral effects.
Figure 1. Relative changes in grey matter volume in the posterior parietal cortex, related to spatial 
and nonspatial representations of numerical size. Individuals’ disposition to associate numbers 
with spatial responses predicts local grey matter volume in right precuneus (blue). The disposition 
to link numbers to force production predicts grey matter volume in left angular gyrus (red). 
Thresholded at p < 0.001, uncorrected, for illustrative purposes.
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fMRI results
SVC analysis on the regions identified in the VBM analysis revealed a 
significant activation of right precuneus during both the spatial task, t(32) = 5.31, 
Z = 4.47, pFWE < 0.01, and the nonspatial task,  t(32) = 4.57, Z = 3.98, pFWE < 0.01. 
Likewise, left angular gyrus was significantly activated during the spatial task, 
t(32) = 5.05, Z = 4.30, pFWE < 0.01, as well as during the nonspatial task,  t(32) = 6.97, 
Z = 5.40, pFWE < 0.01.
Figure 2. Correlations between grey matter volume and number-response interference effects, 
corrected for average reaction time and total intracranial volume, demonstrating a double-
dissociation between brain regions and representations of numerical size. Significant correlations 
(as revealed by the multiple regression analysis) are plotted with a continuous regression line. Grey 
matter and effect size are in arbitrary units.
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Discussion
The present study provides evidence for a contribution of both spatial and 
nonspatial representations of numerical size when processing Arabic digits and 
demonstrates that the weights of this contribution rely on stable individual traits. 
We show that inter-individual differences in the dispositions to link numbers 
to either space or nonspatial sensorimotor magnitude can be directly related to 
structural variance in two distinct regions in the superior and inferior posterior 
parietal lobes.
Structural bases of spatial and nonspatial representations of 
numerical size
There was a relation between the strength of the SNARC effect and the 
structure of a parietal region (area 5m) in the right precuneus. Increased grey 
matter in this region predicted stronger interference of numerical size with 
spatial responses, but not with the force of a response. Although little is known 
about the specific functionality of area 5m in humans, its cytoarchitecture 
suggests that it is comparable with area PE in the macaque brain (Scheperjans, 
Grefkes, Palomero-Gallagher, Schleicher, & Zilles, 2005). Macaque PE has been 
involved in somatosensory integration and in creating a spatial representation 
of limbs during movement (Bakola, Passarelli, Gamberini, Fattori, & Galletti, 
2013; Lacquaniti, Guigon, Bianchi, Ferraina, & Caminiti, 1995; Jones, Coulter, 
& Hendry, 1978; Mountcastle, Lynch, Georgopoulos, Sakata, & Acuna, 1975). 
In humans, the right precuneus has repeatedly been shown to be important for 
spatial processing, such as shifting attention in visual space or visual imagery (for 
a review see Cavanna & Trimble, 2006), but not in the processing of numerical 
magnitude information (for a review see Dehaene et al. 2003). In fact, the present 
findings indicate that this parietal region is involved in the spatial representation 
of numbers, suggesting that the association between numbers and space is closer 
to general cognitive-spatial processing than to numerical magnitude per se.
The strength of mapping numbers to motor force (FoNARC effect) correlated 
with the structure of the left angular gyrus. Increased grey matter in this region 
predicted stronger interference of numerical size with the force of a response, 
but not with the laterality of a response. In contrast to the precuneus, the angular 
gyrus – the left side in particular – has been consistently related to the processing 
of numerical information (Arsalidou & Taylor, 2011). For instance, a lesion in 
the left angular gyrus can lead to arithmetical deficits (Gerstman Syndrome; 
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Gerstmann, 1940). Dehaene et al. (2003) concluded that the left angular gyrus 
is involved in the retrieval of linguistic arithmetic facts from memory. Evidence 
for this notion comes, for instance, from neuroimaging studies showing that 
activity in this region is modulated by arithmetic training (Ischebeck, Zamarian, 
Siedentopf, Koppelstätter, Benke, Felber, & Delazer, 2006; Delazer, Domahs, 
Bartha, Brenneis, Lochy, Trieb, & Benke, 2003). Further support for memory-
based processes is provided by the observation that neuronal activity in angular 
gyrus is higher when arithmetic problems are solved by fact retrieval, compared 
to calculations (Grabner, Ansari, Koschutnig, Reishofer, Ebner, & Neuper, 2009). 
In contrast, it has been argued by several authors that the angular gyrus is involved 
in the processing of number symbols and their numerical magnitude information 
(Rusconi, Walsh, & Butterworth, 2005; Göbel, Walsh, & Rushworth, 2001). For 
instance, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over angular gyrus is known 
to disrupt parity as well as magnitude comparisons (Rusconi et al., 2005). An 
involvement of the left angular gyrus has been furthermore demonstrated while 
processing numerical symbols in the absence of any arithmetic demands (Price 
& Ansari, 2011; Holloway, Price, & Ansari, 2010). Ansari (2008) hypothesized 
therefore that the left angular gyrus mediates the mapping of numerical symbols 
onto magnitude representations. The present finding now adds further empirical 
evidence for this idea and demonstrates an involvement of the left angular gyrus 
in a non-linguistic and nonspatial analogue representation of numerical size. 
We therefore interpret our findings as support for the notion that this region is 
involved in the mapping of number symbols onto magnitude information.
Spatial and nonspatial number-response interference effects
The current findings shed new light on the nature of spatial and nonspatial 
number-response interferences effects and might also have practical implications 
for investigating numerical representations. The present study is one of the first 
to demonstrate a direct brain correlate of the well known association between 
numbers and spatial responses reflected by the SNARC effect. The results of a 
recent functional near-infrared spectroscopy study show a functional activation 
of bilateral intraparietal sulcus and left angular gyrus when participants are 
engaged in a spatial number-response interference task (Cutini, Scarpa, Scatturin, 
Dell’acqua, & Zorzi, 2012). The present study now extends these findings and 
shows that the existing individual preferences in the association between numbers 
and space (e.g. Fischer, 2006) relate to structural variance in right precuneus. 
Importantly, the precuneus is known to be involved in the processing of various 
types of spatial information in different domains and modalities, but the brain 
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region is typically not assumed to play any specific crucial role in the processing 
of numerical magnitude information.
Taking into account the current finding and the general function of the 
precuneus for spatial processing, one might question whether spatial number-
response interference effects are actually informing us about core mechanisms of 
number processing, rather than about the use of more general cognitive coding 
strategies. For instance, associations with space have also been observed for a 
variety of ordinal/sequential information like letters of the alphabet, months or 
days of the week (Gevers, Reynvoet, & Fias, 2003; 2004), suggesting that spatial 
associations are driven by any type of ordinal information and not specifically 
related to the representation of numerical magnitude. Our current data are in 
line with this view, as they suggest that the nature of the number-space mapping 
is not magnitude related, but related to a brain structure involved in general 
spatial processing. On the other hand, differences in the strength of the mapping 
between numbers and force production (FoNARC effect) were shown to be 
related to structural variance in a brain region known to be crucial for processing 
magnitude-related aspects of numbers. This emphasizes the importance of 
nonspatial magnitude representations and the suitability of using nonspatial 
magnitude-related number-response interference paradigms to investigate the 
mechanisms of numerical processing. 
Both behavioural and VBM results of the present study showed that the 
inter-individual differences in the size of a SNARC and FoNARC effect are 
uncorrelated and independent of each other, which strongly suggests that the 
two effects reflect different aspects of the cognitive processing and representation 
of numerical information. The dissociation between spatial and nonspatial 
representations of numerical size might have relevant implications for education. 
While a number line mapping seems to be a suitable tool for children to visualize 
numerical information (Fischer, Moeller, Bientzle, Cress, & Nuerk, 2011), the 
success of this method might vary tremendously from child to child. If numerical 
representations vary strongly between individuals, as the current results suggest, 
identifying and supporting these differences might be educationally beneficial. 
However, at this point in time, the relation between differences in number 
representation and differences in number competence remain largely unclear. 
While a relation between left angular gyrus activity and mathematical competence 
has recently been reported (Grabner, Ansari, Resihofer, Stern, Ebner, & Neuper, 
2007), future research with a strong focus on inter-individual differences in 
numerical skills will be needed to address this open question further.
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Interpretational limitations of the current study
The exact nature of the grey matter volumetric differences identified with 
VBM is still poorly understood, as they could be related to changes in neuropil, 
neuronal size, dendritic or axonal arborisation, as well as cortical folding 
(Michelli, Price, Friston, & Ashburner, 2005). This complicates the interpretation 
of any VBM study with respect to linking structural variability to its underlying 
functionality. In the current study, this interpretational issue is somehow reduced 
by the observation that the task-related structural variability occurs in parietal 
regions functionally engaged during performance of those tasks. Although it is 
generally assumed that larger grey matter volume reflects enhanced neuronal 
processing (Kanai, Feilden, Firth, & Rees, 2011; Mechelli, Crinion, Noppeney, 
O’Doherty, Ashburner, Frackowiak, & Price, 2004; Maguire, Gadian, Johnsrude, 
Good, Ashburner, Frackowiak, & Frith, 2000), future studies will need to detail 
the microstructural and computational mechanisms associated with the present 
findings. 
The structural findings emerged from an analysis focused on the parietal 
lobe. The rationale of this choice was to include in the analysis posterior parietal 
areas previously shown to be involved in number processing (Cohen Kadosh et 
al., 2008; Wu et al., 2009), and active during performance of the tasks used in 
the current study. However, the structural changes reported here could also be 
observed in a whole-brain analysis (right precuneus: Z = 4.40; left angular gyrus: 
Z = 4.42).
It is unclear in how far the brain regions identified in the current study are 
bound to specific demands of the numerical tasks used. This is especially important 
for understanding the role of left angular gyrus during number processing. Here, 
force production was used as an instance of nonspatial sensorimotor magnitude. 
It remains to be seen whether the current observations generalize from the 
domain of force production to other nonspatial sensorimotor magnitudes.
Conclusion
Taken together, the current findings suggest that numerical cognition relies 
on multiple mental representations of analogue magnitude using distinct neural 
implementations that are linked to individual traits. We showed that the way we 
represent numerical size is not only dependent on situational requirements of 
a given task, but also subject to inter-individual differences. Importantly, these 
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differences appear to be stable traits as they can be linked to distinct structural 
variance in the posterior parietal cortex. Our finding of individual traits stimulates 
new research to investigate whether these traits are innate (“nature”) or the result 
of external factors and emerge only later during development (“nurture”; see also 
Dehaene, 1997) – a question whose answer will have wide implications for math 
education.
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Summary of findings
In the current thesis I set out to investigate the underlying cognitive and 
neural mechanisms of the representation of analogue numerical magnitude. 
More specifically, I aimed to explore the suggestion that numerical size is 
grounded in sensorimotor magnitudes by means of a shared representation 
between numerical size, perceptual magnitude and motor magnitude. In the last 
four chapters I provided further empirical evidence for this notion. The main 
findings of the presented studies are:
1.  an early interaction between numerical and physical size in visual  
 perception (Chapter 2)
2.  a finger-representation-independent shared metric for tactile and  
 symbolic numerosities (Chapter 3)
3.  a shared representation of perceptual and motor magnitudes in early  
 childhood (Chapter 4)
4.  an anatomical dissociation between the dispositions to link numbers to  
 either space or sensorimotor magnitude (Chapter 5)
In the following section I discuss the implications of these findings and 
evaluate them under the light of a grounding of numerical size in sensorimotor 
magnitudes. In the sections thereafter, I reflect on how the current thesis 
contributes to the literature on the representation of analogue numerical size 
and I give an outlook for future research and applications.
Grounding numerical size in sensorimotor magnitudes!
In the beginning of this thesis I reviewed several ideas on analogue magnitude 
representation that have been suggested in the literature. After discussing the 
accumulator model (Meck & Church, 1983; Gallistel & Gelman, 1992) and the 
mental number line hypothesis (Moyer, 1973; Moyer & Landauer, 1967; Dehaene, 
Bossini, & Giraux, 1993), I introduced the notion of a generalized magnitude 
system – a theory stating that numerical size shares a common representation 
with magnitudes from other domains (Walsh, 2003). What is compelling about 
this hypothesis is that it proposes a simple reason for why different magnitudes 
are thought to be represented together: their common purpose to serve action 
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and perception. As I explained in the beginning of this thesis, this is a crucial 
aspect, since it provides a potential mechanism to relate seemingly abstract 
magnitudes (such as, for instance, numerical size) to something that is non-
abstract and bodily experienceable – an idea that is also central to another line of 
literature on embodied and grounded cognition where the central hypothesis states 
that each semantic concept is grounded in basic sensorimotor representations 
(e.g. Wilson, 2002; Barsalou, 2008; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Pecher & Zwaan, 
2005; Fischer & Zwaan, 2008). After reviewing previous literature on embodied 
numerical cognition, such as numerical finger representations (e.g. Bender & 
Beller, 2012; Lindemann, Alipour, & Fischer, 2011; Moeller, Fischer, Link, 
Wasner, Huber, Cress, & Nuerk, 2012) and the role of body motion for spatial 
representations of numbers (Moeller et al., 2012; Loetscher, Schwarz, Schubiger, 
& Brugger, 2008; Link, Moeller, Huber, Fischer, & Nuerk, 2013), I discussed a 
different idea on a sensorimotor grounding of numerical size, which speculates 
that information about numerical size becomes meaningful only when it can 
be mapped to concrete bodily experiences with size and magnitude in everyday 
life (Andres, Olivier, & Badets, 2008; Lindemann, Rueschemeyer, & Bekkering, 
2009). In other words, we might understand the difference between a small 
number and a large number by relating it to other magnitude differences we can 
experience with our sensorimotor system, such as, for instance, the difference 
between perceiving a small object and perceiving a large object, or the difference 
between applying weak muscle force and applying strong muscle force. Based 
on this speculation I suggested a mechanism of a sensorimotor grounding of 
numerical size that is in line with the generalized magnitude system hypothesis: 
numerical size is grounded in sensorimotor magnitudes by means of a shared 
representation between numerical size, perceptual magnitude and motor 
magnitude. Importantly, this mechanism differs qualitatively from former ideas 
on embodied number representations, such as finger representations or spatial 
body cues, since it allows for a grounding of numerical size without leaving the 
magnitude domain. In other words, the sensorimotor experiences in which 
numerical size is grounded are not just any action- or body-related experiences, 
but experiences with magnitude information in perception and action.
The results of the study described in Chapter 2 provide important 
evidence for such a grounding of numerical size in sensorimotor magnitudes 
by demonstrating a shared representation of numerical size and perceptual 
magnitude information. Although previous literature had already shown that the 
processing of numerical and physical size interact in terms of a size-congruity 
effect (Besner & Coltheart, 1979; Henik & Tzelgov, 1982; Pansky & Algom, 1999; 
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Schwarz & Ischebeck, 2003), the interpretation of these results as evidence for 
a common representation of numerical size and physical size has since been 
problematic. Several authors have argued that the origin of the interaction in 
a classical size-congruity paradigm might result from a conflict at the response 
stage, rather than from a common representation of physical and numerical size 
(Cohen Kadosh & Walsh, 2009; Santens & Verguts, 2011). In order to investigate 
numerical and physical size in a setting that is free of response-related confounds, 
I created a visual search paradigm in which participants had to identify a target 
digit that differed in its physical size compared to the other stimuli in a circular 
search display. Importantly, even under these circumstances I observed a size-
congruity effect. That is, participants were faster when the physically larger 
target item was also one of the numerically large items in the set, compared to 
when it was one of the numerically small items. This finding of a size-congruity 
effect in visual search extends previous literature by demonstrating an early 
interaction between numerical and physical size that cannot be explained by a 
conflict in response selection. Given the nature of the visual search paradigm in 
which a one-to-one relationship between responses and choice alternatives (see 
also Santens & Verguts, 2011) is absent, the finding of such an early interaction 
between numerical and physical size rather supports the hypothesis of a shared 
representation (Schwarz & Heinze, 1998; Walsh, 2003), and is in line with the 
suggestion of a grounding of numerical size in sensorimotor magnitudes.
With the study reported in Chapter 3 I was able to provide further evidence 
for a generalized representation of numerical and perceptual magnitudes. While 
previous literature on an embodied number representation had a strong focus 
on the association of numbers with fingers and its relation to finger counting 
(Bender & Beller, 2012; Lindemann et al., 2011; Moeller et al., 2012, Domahs, 
Moeller, Huber, Willmes, & Nuerk, 2010; Fischer, 2008; Di Luca & Pesenti, 2008; 
Di Luca, Grana, Semenza, Seron & Pesenti, 2006) only a few studies had examined 
tactile numersosity perception (Riggs,  Ferrand, Lancelin, Fryziel, Dumur, & 
Simpson, 2006; Plaisier & Smeets, 2011; Plaisier, Bergmann Tiest, & Kappers, 
2009) and surprisingly little was known about the relationship between tactile 
and symbolic numerosities. Hence, I set out to investigate this relationship and 
hypothesized that tactile numerosities share the same representation of analogue 
magnitude with symbolic numbers. The results confirmed this hypothesis and 
made the study the first to reveal a cross-modal distance effect between tactile 
and symbolic numerosities. That is, participants were faster and more accurate 
to decide if simultaneously presented tactile and symbolic numerosities are 
the same or different, when the distance between both numerosities was large, 
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compared to when it was small. Interestingly, I could not find any evidence for 
an influence of individual finger-counting preferences on this process. To be 
more precise, differently preferred finger patterns were not differently coupled to 
an analogue representation of magnitude. This is striking, as it suggests that an 
analogue generalized magnitude representation is independent of finger counting 
preferences and rather supports the view that finger representations constitute an 
additional numerical representation (Moeller et al. 2012). Importantly, this also 
supports my view that grounding numerical size in sensorimotor magnitudes is 
qualitatively different to previous suggested embodied number representations, 
such as, for instance, a finger-based representation of numbers. To be more 
precise, sensorimotor representations of individual fingers and their relation to 
each other do, in themselves, not contain any magnitude-related information. 
Hence, to ground numerical size in sensorimotor experiences with the fingers, 
numerical magnitude information has first to be associated with a magnitude-
unrelated representation of specific finger configurations, which, unlike 
numerical size, do not constitute an analogue continuum. Contrary to this, 
tactile numerosity was here defined as the amount of stimulated fingers (i.e. “how 
many fingers” instead of “which specific set of fingers”) and thus classifies as a 
perceptual magnitude. This means that, rather than first associating numerical 
size with a magnitude-unrelated sensorimotor representation, numerical size 
can also be directly grounded in experiences with the perceptual magnitude 
it shares an analogue representation with. The apparent independence of the 
shared magnitude representation from finger counting preferences, as our results 
suggest, support this qualitative dissociation between the two mechanisms.
The notion of grounding numerical size in sensorimotor magnitudes 
assumes the existence of a system in which both perceptual and motor 
magnitudes are represented together (see also Walsh, 2003). Chapter 4 is the 
report of a study that provides important evidence for the existence of such a 
system by demonstrating that an automatic coupling between perceptual and 
motor magnitudes is present already in early childhood. Previous research on the 
coupling between perception and action has a rather long tradition and therefore 
provides a large body of evidence for the general existence of shared common 
codes between these two domains (see Hommel, 2013 for a review). While this 
coupling had been central to the investigation of motor skill development in 
infancy and early childhood (see Adolph & Berger, 2006 for a review), little was 
known about the relation between the perception of magnitude and size-related 
aspects in motor control in young children. I thus engaged 2.5- to 3-year-old 
toddlers in a computer game in which a platform with different amounts of 
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objects had to be moved across the screen by pressing a force sensitive button. I 
hypothesized that, even though force is irrelevant to solve the task, the amount 
of objects will have a direct influence on the applied motor force. The results 
confirmed this hypothesis: Children pressed the button with a higher peak force 
when they had to act on 15 objects, compared to when they had to act on 3 
objects. Importantly, the study extends the current literature by demonstrating 
a direct influence of perceptual magnitude information on force production 
in young children, when the amount of applied motor force is not relevant 
for the task, suggesting an inherent coupling between perceptual and motor 
magnitudes. While the design of the study did not allow to isolate the individual 
couplings of the perceptual magnitudes that composite “amount of objects” 
(i.e. numerosity, density, overall size) with motor force, the finding of a general 
magnitude congruency effect in toddlers, however, does provide evidence for the 
more general hypothesis that a shared representation of perceptual and motor 
magnitudes is already present in early childhood.
I introduced the grounding of numerical size in sensorimotor magnitudes 
as an alternative (and qualitatively different) mechanism to formerly suggested 
embodied representations of numerical size which rely on associations with 
sensorimotor representations that are, a priori, not magnitude-related, such 
as spatial positions (e.g. Moeller et al., 2012). The study reported in Chapter 5 
provides compelling evidence for this dissociation. While the majority of the 
previous literature on the mental representation of numerical size had proposed a 
spatial representation of numbers as positions on a ‘mental number line’ (Moyer, 
1973; Moyer & Landauer, 1967; Dehaene et al., 1993), more recent research 
suggested numerical size to be represented together with other sensorimotor-
related magnitudes in a generalized magnitude system (Walsh, 2003). To 
disentangle these two representations, I estimated individuals’ dispositions to 
link numbers to either a spatial response (SNARC effect; e.g. Dehaene et al., 1993) 
or the nonspatial sensorimotor magnitude of response force (Vierck & Kiesel, 
2010) and hypothesized that inter-individual differences in these dispositions 
will have dissociable cerebral correlates. Voxel-based morphometry was used to 
investigate differences in local grey matter volume in the posterior parietal cortex. 
Differences in the linkage between numbers and spatial responses correlated 
with variations in grey matter volume around the right precuneus. Conversely, 
inter-individual variability in the disposition to link numbers to force production 
was related to grey matter volume in the left angular gyrus. These findings 
extend the current literature not only by being one of the first demonstrations 
of a brain correlate of the well known association between numbers and spatial 
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responses (SNARC effect; Dehaene et al., 1993), but also by further establishing 
the mapping of numerical size to force production (cf. Vierck & Kiesel, 2010). 
Most notably, however, they show that numerical cognition relies indeed on 
multiple mental representations of numerical size. Importantly, the fact that 
those mental representations have dissociable neural implementations that are 
linked to individual traits suggests that there is a qualitative difference between 
them. The distinct functional roles of the identified areas further supports this 
suggestion. While the right precuneus is generally not assumed to play a specific 
role for the representation of numerical magnitude information, but is rather 
known to play a central role in general visual-spatial processing (see Cavanna & 
Trimble, 2006 for a review), the left angular gyrus has repeatedly been reported 
as a key area for numerical cognition (see Arsalidou & Taylor, 2011 for a review; 
but also Dehaene, Piazza, Pinel, & Cohen, 2003; Rusconi, Walsh, & Butterworth, 
2005; Göbel, Walsh, & Rushworth, 2001). These results are in line with my 
notion of a qualitative difference between embodied numerical representations 
and emphasize the importance of a nonspatial sensorimotor-related magnitude 
representation of numerical size.
Taken together, the last four chapters support the notion of grounding 
numerical size in sensorimotor magnitudes by providing important new empirical 
evidence for a shared representation between numerical size and perceptual and 
motor magnitudes. The observed dissociations from finger-based and spatial 
number representations support my notion that this grounding mechanism is 
qualitatively different from formerly suggested embodied representations.
The representation of analogue numerical magnitude
Having evaluated the findings presented in this thesis under the light of 
a grounding of numerical size in sensorimotor magnitudes, I would now like 
to discuss their broader implications for research on numerical cognition. The 
starting point of this thesis was the question of how our brain represents analogue 
numerical magnitude information. The insights gained from the studies reported 
in the last four chapters extend the previous literature on this topic in at least 
three ways: 
1. New evidence for a generalized magnitude system
It has been suggested that our brain processes all analogue magnitude 
information in one common system, regardless of the cognitive domain this 
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information comes from (Walsh, 2003). In A Theory of Magnitude (ATOM) 
Walsh (2003) proposes that all magnitude information, such as, for instance, 
numerical size, temporal durations, or spatial extend share a cognitive and 
neural representation. The empirical results from the studies reported in this 
thesis are in line with this view. I found further evidence for a generalized 
magnitude system by demonstrating links between the processing of 
numerical size and physical size (Chapter 2), numerical size and the amount 
of tactile stimulation (Chapter 3), and perceptual size and response force 
(Chapter 4 and Chapter 5).
Importantly, in contrast to former research I found a link between numerical 
size and physical size during visual search. While previous literature has 
already shown such a link by means of a size-congruity effect, there has been 
a long lasting discussion about the origin of the effect, as it has been argued 
that it might not result from a common representation, but merely is the result 
of a decisional conflict at the response level (Cohen Kadosh & Walsh, 2009; 
Santens & Verguts, 2011). The fact that I found an interference between the 
two magnitudes in early visual processing and in the absence of any response 
competition, highly suggests the existence of a shared representation between 
numerical size and physical size.
I was also able to gather evidence for the notion that a generalized magnitude 
system is already present in early childhood (Walsh, 2003), since I observed 
a link between perceptual magnitudes and the motor magnitude of response 
force in 2.5- to 3-year-old toddlers. While previous research provided 
evidence for a generalized magnitude system in even younger children (e.g. 
Lourenco & Longo, 2010), our findings extend this previous literature into 
the motor domain and show that, once children have developed the ability 
to successfully perform goal-directed actions with respect to externally 
determined task demands (e.g. Bullock & Luetkenhaus, 1988), also motor 
magnitudes seem to be immediately linked to magnitudes from other 
domains.
2. New evidence for a role of the body in representing numerical knowledge
In line with the literature on embodied cognition (e.g. Barsalou, 2008; 
Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Pecher & Zwaan, 2005; Fischer & Zwaan, 2008), 
several authors have recently argued that the body plays an important 
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role for the representation of numerical concepts (e.g. Andres et al., 2008; 
Lindemann et al., 2009; Fischer, 2012; Fischer & Brugger, 2011; Moeller et 
al., 2012). In this thesis, I report studies in which I found further empirical 
evidence for this notion. I showed that the abstract concept of numerical size 
is closely linked to concrete sensorimotor experiences with size in perception 
and action which might mediate a grounding of numerical meaning. More 
specifically, I demonstrated an influence of numerical information on early 
visual perception (Chapter 2), a common processing of symbolic and sensory 
numerosity information (Chapter 3), an interaction between the processing 
of numerical size and response force (Chapter 5), and cerebral correlates of 
linking numerical size to spatial and nonspatial motor responses (Chapter 5).
Importantly, I also revealed a role for individual traits in (embodied) 
numerical cognition. Inter-individual differences in the disposition to link 
numerical size to either spatial or nonspatial motor aspects could be related 
to structural variance in distinct regions of the brain. While these individual 
traits could in principle be innate, they might also develop later during life 
and inter-individual differences in numerical representations could thus 
reflect the influence of different sensorimotor experiences.
3. New evidence for qualitative differences in embodied representations of 
numerical size
The empirical findings of this thesis support the suggestion of a grounding 
of numerical size in sensorimotor magnitudes by means of a shared 
representation of numerical size, perceptual magnitude and motor magnitude. 
I discussed empirical evidence for a grounding of numerical size in perceptual 
physical size (Chapter 2), perceptual tactile magnitude (Chapter 3) and the 
motor magnitude of response force (Chapter 5). Evidence for this notion 
is an important addition to the literature, since it suggests an alternative 
mechanism to ground numerical size in sensorimotor experiences that is 
qualitatively different to the previously proposed mechanisms. Previous 
literature in the field of embodied numerical cognition has mainly focused 
on finger-based number representations (Bender & Beller, 2012; Lindemann 
et al., 2011; Moeller et al., 2012, Domahs et al., 2010; Fischer, 2008; Di Luca 
& Pesenti, 2008; Di Luca et al., 2006) and the role of body motion for spatial 
representations of numbers (Moeller et al., 2012; Loetscher et al., 2008; Link et 
al., 2013). While both representations are clearly body-related, it is important 
to notice that their sensorimotor content is not necessarily magnitude-related. 
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What I mean with this is that sensorimotor representations of the fingers and 
of positions in space are themselves not experienced as “more than” or “less 
than” (i.e. along a prothetic dimension; cf. Stevens, 1975). It does, for instance, 
not make sense to say that the pinky is “more than” the thumb, or that an 
object in left visual space is “less than” an object in right visual space. Only 
after we associate specific fingers or spatial positions with certain numbers, 
statements like these contain any meaning. Hence, to ground numerical size in 
sensorimotor experiences with the fingers or positional space, an association 
between an analogue magnitude representation and magnitude-unrelated 
sensorimotor representations has to be made. A shared representation 
of numerical size, perceptual magnitude and motor magnitude, on the 
other hand, allows for a grounding of numerical size without leaving the 
magnitude domain since we have direct sensorimotor experiences with these 
perceptual and motor magnitudes. Importantly, compared to associating 
numerical size with magnitude-unrelated sensorimotor experiences, such as 
finger representations or positional space, a grounding within the magnitude 
domain via a shared representation with other magnitudes has the advantage 
that the sensorimotor experiences numerical size is to be grounded in are 
conceptually closer to the to be grounded content (i.e. numerical size). That 
is, the characteristics of numerical size (such as its analogue and endless 
nature) can be better captured by sensorimotor representations that share 
these characteristics. For instance, finger-based number representations are 
per definition not continuous, and sensorimotor experiences are limited to 
10 fingers.
Figure 1 gives a schematic overview of the different embodied number 
representations. Two different routes connect the abstract concept of 
numerical size (depicted in green) with sensorimotor experiences (depicted 
in yellow): a horizontal route based on associations and a vertical route 
based on a shared representation. The horizontal route illustrates the 
ideas suggested in previous literature on finger-based and spatial number 
representations. Numerical size is linked to representations of specific 
fingers as well as specific spatial positions (both depicted in blue) which we 
have sensorimotor experiences with. Since neither the fingers, nor spatial 
positions themselves carry any magnitude information, they are depicted 
independently, next to numerical size and the link between them manifests 
itself as an association. The vertical route illustrates the suggestion discussed 
in this thesis. Numerical size is linked to representations of other perceptual 
and motor magnitudes (depicted in red) with which we have sensorimotor
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experiences. Importantly, being magnitudes themselves, the perceptual and 
motor magnitudes are not just somehow associated with numerical size, but 
directly share a common magnitude representations with numerical size (as 
depicted by the overlap). This shared representation between numerical size 
and sensorimotor magnitudes allows for a direct grounding of numerical 
size in sensorimotor experiences, without leaving the magnitude domain, 
and thus constitutes a qualitatively different embodied  representation of 
numerical size.
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Figure 1. Schematic overview of two qualitatively different embodied representations of numerical 
size. (1) Analogue numerical size (green) is linked to sensorimotor experiences (yellow) by 
associations with magnitude-unrelated representations of specific fingers and spatial positions 
(blue). (2) Numerical size is directly grounded in sensorimotor experiences with other magnitudes 
through a shared representation with perceptual and motor magnitudes (red).
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Crucially, the unfolding schema differs from a previously suggested 
categorization of embodied number representations. Fischer (2012) and 
Fischer and Brugger (2011) suggested to dissociate between ‘grounded’, 
‘embodied’ and ‘situated’ representations of numerical size, based on whether 
a representation is bound by physical properties of the world, constraints 
of our body, or situational requirements of a given task, respectively. This 
hierarchical organization lays out important quantitative differences between 
embodied number representations. The schema depicted in Figure 1, on the 
other hand, focuses on the qualitative difference between linking numerical 
size to sensorimotor experiences by associating them with magnitude-
unrelated representations of the fingers and positional space, and a direct 
grounding of numerical size in sensorimotor experiences with magnitudes 
by means of a shared representation between numerical size and perceptual 
and motor magnitudes. That said, the two schemas should not be seen as 
opposing views, but rather as supplementary ones.
Future directions
Before I conclude this thesis, I would like to give a brief outlook for future 
research, since the results of the studies I presented here might have further 
implications and give rise to new important research questions.
The necessity of sensorimotor experiences for our understanding of 
numerical size
An important question that directly follows from the apparent existence 
of multiple qualitatively different embodied number representations is which (if 
any) sensorimotor experiences are actually necessary for our understanding of 
numerical size. While this is an open question for future research to address, I 
can make some predictions based on this thesis.
As I mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, the literature on finger 
counting and finger-based number representations provides compelling evidence 
for finger representations being largely beneficial for learning numerical 
concepts and arithmetic relations (see Moeller & Nuerk, 2012 for a review). 
Likewise, recent research on a spatial number representation has shown that 
gaining sensorimotor experiences with positional space can improve numerical 
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competence (e.g. Link, 2013; Fischer et al., 2011). However, the necessity of 
sensorimotor experiences with both the fingers and positional space for the 
concept of numerical size is unclear at the moment. I have recently argued that, for 
instance, finger representations might support numerical cognition by providing 
a mean to externalize cognitive content (Lindemann & Krause, 2011). Such a 
cognitive offloading mechanism (cf. Wilson, 2002) would explain the beneficial 
role of sensorimotor experiences with the fingers for processing numerical 
information, without implying that they are a necessity for understanding the 
concept of numerical size. The same argument can in principle be made for 
sensorimotor experiences with positional space, since spatial positions might 
also provide an offloading mechanism for cognitive content, such as numerical 
information. I therefore do not expect sensorimotor experiences with the fingers 
and positional space to be fundamental for our understanding of numerical size.
Unlike associating numerical size with sensorimotor representations of 
the fingers and spatial positions, a shared representation of numerical size with 
perceptual and motor magnitudes allows for a sensorimotor grounding within 
the magnitude domain. Grounding numerical size in sensorimotor experiences 
with perceptual and motor magnitude is thus qualitatively different from 
grounding numerical size by means of associations with magnitude-unrelated 
sensorimotor experiences. Since a shared representation between numerical size, 
perceptual magnitude and motor magnitude, unlike associations, constitutes an 
inherent dependency of numerical size on sensorimotor magnitudes, I would 
consequently expect that, contrary to sensorimotor experiences with the fingers 
and positional space, sensorimotor experiences with perceptual and motor 
magnitudes are fundamental for our understanding of numerical size.
The impact of individual differences on numerical abilities
Another important question resulting from the research presented in this 
thesis is how individual differences in sensorimotor experiences affect numerical 
abilities, such as arithmetic skills. While we have seen that, for instance, the 
strength of the dispositions to map numbers either to space or to nonspatial 
sensorimotor magnitude varies between individuals, it remains unclear if 
individual differences like these also translate to the large variances in people’s 
ability to deal with numerical information (Adams, 2007; Butterworth, 2010). In 
particular, it will be interesting to see in which ways and to what degree number 
specific disorders, such as dyscalculia, are affected by different embodied 
number representations. The schema depicted in Figure 1 might provide a 
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general framework for future research: one might speculate that a qualitative 
difference between sensorimotor experiences with magnitudes and sensorimotor 
experiences with the fingers and positional space goes along with a distinction in 
how individual differences affect numerical abilities. The issue seems somehow 
related to the necessity question raised above. To be more precise, if sensorimotor 
experiences with magnitudes are indeed fundamental for our understanding of 
numerical size (in contrast to sensorimotor experiences with the fingers and 
positional space), one might expect that individual differences in experiences 
with magnitudes in perception and action are also more indicative of individuals’ 
numerical skills than individual differences in experiences with fingers and 
positional space. In line with this speculation, previous research suggests that 
there is no relation between differences in the disposition to map numbers to 
spatial positions (estimated by a SNARC effect) and arithmetic skills (Cipora 
& Nuerk, 2013). It will be important for future research to detail the relation 
between individual differences in sensorimotor experiences with perceptual and 
motor magnitudes and numerical abilities.
Implications for education
Eventually, the research presented in this thesis might also have implications 
for how math and numerical competences are taught at schools. If future research 
will indeed show that individual differences in numerical representations do 
translate to variances in numerical and mathematical skills (see above), the 
existence of individual traits suggests that a single educational approach might 
not be equally beneficial for all children. While there is evidence that, on average, 
a number line mapping supports numerical training (e.g. Fischer et al. 2011; 
Link et al., 2013), the individual success of conveying numerical knowledge to 
a child with the help of a number line might indeed vary. The same might hold 
for finger mappings, which are also thought to be, on average, mainly supportive 
for the development of arithmetic skills (Moeller et al., 2012). While it remains 
unclear at the moment whether individual traits in numerical cognition are 
innate (“nature”) or whether they are shaped by external factors and emerge only 
later during development (“nurture”; see also Dehaene, 1997), education might 
benefit from detecting and supporting these traits.
Furthermore, the last four chapters of this thesis provided compelling 
evidence for an important role of sensorimotor experiences with perceptual and 
motor magnitudes for our concept of numerical size. Applying this knowledge to 
early mathematical education might be an important next step. A stronger focus 
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could be put on explaining numerical concepts and arithmetic principles, such as 
addition and subtraction, by relating them to actually experienceable perceptual 
and motor magnitudes (cf. Lakoff & Nunez, 2000), rather than merely visualizing 
them in terms of a positional number line or by coupling numbers to specific 
fingers. Future research will be needed to evaluate the potential benefits of such 
an approach.
Conclusions
In this thesis I set out to investigate the underlying cognitive and neural 
mechanisms of the representation of analogue numerical magnitude. In particular, 
I explored the embodied cognition hypothesis for numerical cognition and the 
related suggestion that the concept of numerical size is grounded in sensorimotor 
experiences with magnitude. Taken together, the research presented in the 
last four chapters supports this notion and provides new empirical evidence 
for an important role of the body in numerical cognition. Crucially, previous 
research in this area has mainly argued for embodied representations that rely 
on associating numerical size with magnitude-unrelated sensorimotor aspects, 
such as representations of the fingers or experiences with positional space. 
In addition, this thesis corroborates important evidence for an alternative 
and qualitatively different embodied representation that has not gained that 
much attention in the literature yet: a direct grounding of numerical size in 
sensorimotor magnitudes by means of a shared representation between numerical 
size, perceptual magnitude and motor magnitude. From a theoretical point of 
view, this qualitative difference is important, because it allows for a grounding 
of numerical magnitude information without leaving the magnitude domain. 
Compared to associated magnitude-unrelated experiences with the fingers or 
spatial positions, experiences with commonly represented perceptual and motor 
magnitudes are conceptually closer to the content that is to be grounded (i.e. 
numerical magnitude). In other words, (abstract numerical) magnitude can be 
grounded in (experienceable sensorimotor) magnitude.
In conclusion, the current research suggests that numerical cognition 
relies on multiple embodied representations of numerical size and, in particular, 
stresses the importance of sensorimotor experiences with size and magnitude 
in everyday life for our understanding of analogue numerical magnitude 
information.
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List of acronyms
ANOVA  Analysis of Variance
ATOM   A Theory of Magnitude
BOLD   Blood-Oxygen-Level Dependent
EEG    Electroencephalography
ERP   Event-Related Potentials
fMRI   functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
FoNARC  Force-Numerical Association of Response Codes
FWE   Family-Wise Error
FWHM Full Width at Half Maximum
GLM   General Linear Model
GMS   Generalized Magnitude System
GRAPPA  Generalized Autocalibrating Partially Parallel Acquisitions
IPS   Intraparietal Sulcus
LCD    Liquid-Crystal Display
MNI   Montreal Neurological Institute
MNL   Mental Number Line
MP-RAGE  Magnetization Prepared Rapid Gradient Echo
MR    Magnetic Resonance
MRI    Magnetic Resonance Imaging
PPC    Posterior Parietal Cortex
SD    Standard Deviation
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
SVC    Small Volume Correction
SNARC  Spatial-Numerical Association of Response Codes
TE    Echo Time
TMS   Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation
TR    Repetition Time
VBM   Voxel-Based Morphometry
VOI    Volume of Interest
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Nederlandse samenvatting
In onze moderne samenleving worden we dagelijks omringd door 
numerieke informatie - de hele dag door. We beginnen de dag met een blik op 
de nummers van onze digitale wekker en we eindigen de dag met het tellen van 
geld om de rekening van de drie-gangen maaltijd in het chique restaurant om 
de hoek te betalen. Daartussen verwerken wij duizenden getallen (Butterworth, 
1999). Het verwerken van al deze numerieke gegevens is een essentieel cognitief 
vermogen en  tekortkomingen op dit gebied maken mensen minder geschikt 
voor een baan, verlagen inkomsten en zijn een risicofactor voor depressie 
(Butterworth, 2010). Het is daarom van belang om te begrijpen hoe het brein 
numerieke informatie representeert en verwerkt,  zowel voor diagnostische als 
voor educatieve doeleinden.
Hoewel cijfers doorgaans gebruikt worden in verbale of symbolische 
vorm, hebben ze in essentie echter betrekking op hoeveelheden ofwel 
magnitudes. Een representatie van numerieke grootte stelt ons in staat om 
de werkelijke waarde van een getal af te leiden en te vergelijken met andere 
getallen. De evolutionaire betekenis van deze bekwaamheid wordt benadrukt 
door het feit dat de basisgevoeligheid voor hoeveelheden zowel al aanwezig is 
gedurende de vroege kinderjaren (bijvoorbeeld Feigenson, Dehaene & Spelke, 
2004), alsook in niet-humane primaten (o.a. Brannon, 2006), evenals in andere 
dieren zoals ratten (o.a. Mech & Church, 1983), papegaaien (o.a. Pepper & 
Gordon, 2005) en vissen (o.a. Agrillo, Piffer, Bisazza, & Butterworth, 2012). 
Een belangrijke hypothese is dat de mentale representatie van grootte op 
analoge wijze is gecodeerd. Het lijkt dat numerieke grootte, in plaats van in 
discrete stappen, langs een continu domein is vertegenwoordigd. Als gevolg 
hiervan, zal het activeren van een numerieke representatie ook aangrenzende 
semantisch-overeenkomende nummers met afnemende sterkte mee-activeren. 
Indicatie voor deze analoge natuur komt van het zogenaamde “Afstandseffect”, 
het verschijnsel dat het vergelijken van twee getallen sneller gaat wanneer ze 
semantisch verder van elkaar af liggen (Moyer & Landauer, 1967). Het huidige 
proefschrift richt zich op de onderliggende mechanismen van een analoge 
magnituderepresentatie, zowel op gedrags- als op neuronaal niveau. 
In de literatuur is, naast diverse andere ideeën over analoge 
magnituderepresentatie, het voorstel van een gegeneraliseerd magnitude systeem 
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te vinden - een hypothese die stelt dat numerieke grootte een gemeenschappelijke 
representatie deelt met sensomotorische groottes uit andere domeinen (Walsh, 
2003). Overtuigend van deze theorie is vooral dat het een eenvoudige verklaring 
geeft voor waarom verschillende groottes bij elkaar zijn gerepresenteerd - hun 
gemeenschappelijk doel om van dienst te zijn voor handelen en waarnemen. 
Dit is belangrijk omdat het een potentieel mechanisme biedt om schijnbaar 
abstracte groottes (bijvoorbeeld numerieke grootte) te relateren aan iets dat 
niet abstract, maar juist lichamelijk te ervaren is. Een idee dat ook centraal 
staat in literatuur over belichaamde cognitie, waar de centrale hypothese is 
dat elk semantisch concept geaard gaat met sensomotorische representaties 
(o.a. Wilson, 2002; Barsalou, 2008; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Pecher & 
Zwaan, 2005; Fischer & Zwaan, 2008). Terwijl voorgaande literatuur op het 
gebied van belichaamde numerieke cognitie zich richt op numerieke vinger-
representaties (o.a. Bender & Beller, 2012; Lindemann et al., 2011; Moeller et 
al., 2012) en op de rol van lichaamsbeweging voor spatiële representaties van 
getallen (Moeller et al., 2012; Loetscher et al., 2008; Link et al., 2013), volg 
ik hier een ander idee voor sensomotorische aarding van numerieke grootte, 
dat speculeert dat informatie over numerieke grootte alleen betekenisvol 
wordt als het gerelateerd kan worden aan concrete lichamelijke ervaringen 
met groottes in het dagelijks leven (Andres et al., 2008; Lindemann et al., 
2009). Dat betekent dat we mogelijk het verschil tussen een klein aantal en een 
groot aantal begrijpen door dit te relateren aan andere grootteverschillen die 
we kunnen ervaren met ons sensomotorisch systeem, zoals bijvoorbeeld het 
verschil tussen de perceptie van een klein voorwerp en de perceptie van een 
groot voorwerp of het verschil tussen het gebruik van zwakke spierkracht en 
het gebruik van sterke spierkracht. Uitgaande hiervan stel ik een mechanisme 
van sensomotorische aarding van numerieke grootte voor dat consistent is 
met het Gegeneraliseerde Magnitude Systeem: Numerieke grootte is geaard in 
sensomotorische grootte door middel van een gemeenschappelijke representatie 
van numerieke grootte, perceptuele grootte en motorische grootte. Van belang 
hierbij is dat dit mechanisme kwalitatief anders is dan voorgaande ideeën over 
belichaamde numerieke representaties zoals vinger-representaties of spatiële 
lichaamsrepresentaties, doordat het een aarding van numerieke grootte 
toestaat zonder het magnitudedomein te verlaten. Met andere woorden, de 
sensomotorische ervaringen, waarin numerieke grootte geaard is, zijn niet 
zomaar sensorische of motorische ervaringen, maar ervaringen met grootte-
informatie in waarneming en actie. 
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De resultaten van de studie die in hoofdstuk 2 wordt beschreven leveren 
belangrijke aanwijzingen voor een dergelijke aarding van numerieke grootte 
in sensomotorische groottes door het bewijs voor een gemeenschappelijke 
representatie van numerieke en perceptuele grootte. Hoewel eerdere literatuur 
reeds heeft aangetoond dat de verwerking van numerieke en fysieke grootte 
interacteert in de vorm van een “grootte-congruentie-effect” (Besner & 
Coltheart, 1979; Henik & Tzelgov, 1982; Pansky & Algom, 1999; Schwarz & 
Ischebeck, 2003), is de interpretatie van deze resultaten als bewijs voor een 
gemeenschappelijke representatie van numerieke en fysieke grootte nog 
steeds problematisch. Verschillende auteurs hebben beargumenteerd dat de 
oorsprong van de interactie in een klassiek grootte-congruentie paradigma in 
een reactieconflict op motorisch gebied ligt en niet in een gemeenschappelijke 
representatie van de fysieke en numerieke grootte (Cohen Kadosh & Walsh 
2009; Santens & Verguts, 2011). Om numerieke en fysieke grootte te bestuderen 
in een omgeving vrij van reactieconflicten, heb ik een visueel zoekparadigma 
ontwikkeld waarin deelnemers een doelcijfer moesten identificeren, die 
verschilde in fysieke grootte van de andere stimuli die in een cirkel op het 
scherm werden weergeven. Zelfs onder deze omstandigheden was een grootte-
congruentie-effect waar te nemen. Dat wil zeggen dat de deelnemers sneller 
waren wanneer het fysiek grotere doelcijfer ook behoorde tot de numeriek 
grotere cijfers op het scherm in vergelijking tot wanneer het behoorde tot 
de numeriek kleine cijfers op het scherm. De aanwezigheid van een grootte-
congruentie-effect in een visueel zoekparadigma breidt de huidige literatuur 
uit door een bewijs voor een vroege interactie tussen numerieke en fysieke 
grootte, die niet verklaard kan worden door een conflict in de besluitvorming 
over een reactie. Gezien de aard van het visuele zoekparadigma, waarbij een 
één-op-één relatie tussen de responsen en de keuzealternatieven (zie ook 
Santens & Verguts, 2011) niet aanwezig is, ondersteunt het vinden van een 
dergelijk vroege interactie tussen numerieke en fysieke grootte de hypothese 
van een gemeenschappelijke vertegenwoordiging (Schwarz & Heinze, 1998; 
Walsh, 2003) en is in overeenstemming met het voorstel van een aarding van 
numerieke grootte in sensomotorische groottes. 
In de studie  die in hoofdstuk 3 wordt gerapporteerd lever ik verder bewijs 
voor een gemeenschappelijke representatie van numerieke en perceptuele 
grootte. Terwijl voorgaande literatuur over belichaamde nummerrepresentaties 
een sterke focus had op de associatie van cijfers met vingers en de relatie 
met vingertellen (Bender & Beller, 2012; Lindemann et al., 2011; Moeller 
et al., 2012; Domahs et al., 2010; Fischer, 2008; Di Luca & Pesenti, 2008; Di 
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Luca et al., 2006), hebben slechts enkele studies de tactiele waarneming van 
aantallen onderzocht (Riggs et al., 2006; Plaisier & Smeets, 2011;. Plaisier et 
al., 2009), waardoor er verrassend weinig bekend was over de relatie tussen 
tactiele en symbolische aantallen. Daarom besloot ik om deze relatie te 
onderzoeken en heb ik de hypothese opgesteld dat tactiele aantallen dezelfde 
analoge grootterepresentatie delen met symbolische getallen. De resultaten 
bevestigen deze hypothese en maken dit de eerste studie die een cross-modaal 
afstandseffect tussen tactiele en symbolische aantallen laat zien. Dit betekent 
dat deelnemers sneller en accurater waren in het bepalen of een gelijktijdig 
gepresenteerd tactiel en symbolisch aantal hetzelfde of verschillend was 
wanneer de afstand tussen beide groot was, vergeleken met wanneer de afstand 
klein was. Interessant genoeg, kon ik geen bewijs vinden voor een invloed van 
vingertel-voorkeuren op dit proces: verschillende vingertel-patronen waren dus 
niet verschillend gekoppeld aan een analoge grootterepresentatie. Dit resultaat 
is van cruciaal belang omdat het suggereert dat een analoge gegeneraliseerde 
grootterepresentatie onafhankelijk is van vingertel-voorkeuren en eerder 
de opvatting steunt dat vinger-representaties een aanvullende numerieke 
weergave vormen (Moeller et al., 2012). Dit ondersteunt ook mijn opvatting 
dat de aarding van numerieke grootte in sensomotorische grootte kwalitatief 
verschilt van eerder voorgestelde belichaamde getallenrepresentaties, zoals 
een op vinger-gebaseerde representatie van getallen. Sensomotorische 
representaties van individuele vingers en hun onderlinge relatie bevatten 
zelf geen informatie over grootte. Dus om numerieke grootte te aarden in 
sensomotorische ervaringen met vingers moet de numerieke grootte-informatie 
eerst geassocieerd worden met een grootte-onafhankelijke representatie van 
specifieke vingerconfiguraties, die in tegenstelling tot numerieke grootte 
niet vertegenwoordigd is in een analoog continuüm. In contrast daarmee 
wordt het tactiele aantal hier gedefinieerd als de hoeveelheid gestimuleerde 
vingers (d.w.z., “hoeveel vingers” in plaats van “welke vingers”) en is dus te 
classificeren als perceptiegrootte. Dit betekent dat numerieke grootte ook 
direct geaard kan worden in ervaringen met perceptuele grootte, waarmee 
ze een gemeenschappelijke analoge representatie delen, in plaats van dat ze 
eerst geassocieerd wordt aan een grootte-onafhankelijke sensomotorische 
representatie. De schijnbare onafhankelijkheid van de gemeenschappelijke 
grootterepresentatie ten opzichte van vingertel-voorkeuren, zoals mijn 
resultaten suggereren, ondersteunt het kwalitatieve onderscheid tussen de twee 
mechanismen. 
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Het idee van aarding van numerieke grootte in sensomotorische groottes 
veronderstelt het bestaan van een systeem waarin zowel perceptuele alsook 
motorische groottes gezamenlijk worden gepresenteerd (zie Walsh, 2003). De 
resultaten van de studie in hoofdstuk 4 geven belangrijke aanwijzingen voor 
het bestaan van een dergelijk systeem, door aan te tonen dat een automatische 
koppeling tussen perceptuele en motorische groottes reeds aanwezig is in 
de vroege kinderjaren. Studies over de koppeling tussen perceptie en actie 
hebben een lange traditie en bieden veel bewijs voor het algemene bestaan van 
gemeenschappelijk codes tussen deze beide domeinen (zie Hommel, 2013 voor 
een overzicht). Hoewel deze koppeling centraal stond in onderzoek naar de 
motorische ontwikkeling in de kindertijd en de vroege jeugd (zie Adolph & 
Berger, 2006 voor een overzicht), was er weinig bekend over de relatie tussen de 
perceptie van grootte en grootte-gerelateerde aspecten van motoriek bij jonge 
kinderen. Daarom heb ik 2,5- tot 3-jarige peuters een computerspel laten spelen 
waarbij ze op een beeldscherm een platform met verschillende hoeveelheden 
objecten  over het scherm moesten verplaatsen  middels het indrukken van 
een krachtgevoelige knop. Ik verwachtte dat, hoewel kracht irrelevant was 
voor het oplossen van de taak, de hoeveelheid objecten een directe invloed 
zou hebben op de toegepaste motorkracht. De resultaten bevestigen deze 
hypothese: kinderen drukten op de knop met een hogere maximale kracht als 
er 15 objecten op het platform lagen vergeleken met als  er 3 objecten lagen. 
Deze resultaten verbreden vorige literatuur door de indicatie van een directe 
invloed van perceptuele grootte-informatie op de krachtproductie van jonge 
kinderen, ondanks het feit dat de hoeveelheid toegepaste kracht taak-irrelevant 
was. Een dergelijke inherente koppeling van perceptuele en motorische grootte 
levert duidelijke aanwijzingen dat een gemeenschappelijke representatie van 
perceptuele en motorische grootte al aanwezig is in de vroege kindertijd. 
Ik heb de aarding van numerieke grootte in sensomotorische groottes 
geïntroduceerd als een alternatief (en kwalitatief verschillend) mechanisme 
voor eerdere gesuggereerde belichaamde representaties van numerieke grootte 
die gebaseerd zijn op associaties met sensomotorische representaties die niet 
a priori grootte-gerelateerd zijn, zoals spatiële posities (bijv. Moeller et al., 
2012). De studie beschreven in hoofdstuk 5 geeft overtuigend bewijs voor deze 
dissociatie. Terwijl de meerderheid van voorgaande literatuur over de mentale 
representatie van numerieke grootte een spatiële representatie van getallen 
als posities op een “mentale getallenlijn” (Moyer & Landauer, 1967; Moyer, 
1973 Dehaene et al., 1993) veronderstelt, suggereert recent onderzoek dat 
numerieke grootte samen met andere sensomotorische groottes gepresenteerd 
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is in een gegeneraliseerd magnitude-systeem (Walsh, 2003). Om deze twee 
representaties uit elkaar te halen schatte ik de aanleg van individuen in om 
getallen te verbinden met óf een spatiële respons (SNARC effect, bijv. Dehaene 
et al., 1993) óf een sensomotorische maar niet spatiële krachtrespons (Vierck 
& Kiesel, 2010). Ik verwachtte dat individuele verschillen in dit gedrag ook te 
dissociëren zouden zijn in cerebrale correlaten. Voxel-gebaseerde morfometrie 
werd gebruikt om verschillen in het lokale volume van de grijze stof in de 
posterieure pariëtale cortex te onderzoeken. Verschillen in de koppeling van 
getallen aan spatiële responsen correleerden met variaties in het volume van 
de grijze stof rondom de rechter precuneus. Anderzijds waren individuele 
verschillen in de koppeling van getallen aan krachtresponsen geassocieerd met 
variatie in het volume van de grijze stof in de linker gyrus angularis. Deze 
resultaten verbreden de huidige literatuur niet alleen doordat het één van de 
eerste demonstraties is van een hersencorrelaat van de welbekende associatie 
tussen nummers en spatiële responsen (SNARC effect; Dehaene et al., 1993), 
maar ook door de verdere bekrachtiging van de koppeling van numerieke 
grootte met krachtproductie (zie Vierck & Kiesel, 2010). Belangrijker nog is 
dat de resultaten laten zien dat numerieke cognitie inderdaad gebaseerd is 
op meerdere mentale representaties van numerieke grootte. Het feit dat deze 
mentale representaties dissocieerbare neurale implementaties hebben die 
worden geassocieerd met individuele eigenschappen, suggereert dat er een 
kwalitatief verschil is tussen hen. Ook de verschillende functionele rollen 
van de geïdentificeerde gebieden ondersteunen deze suggestie. Terwijl aan 
de rechter precuneus meestal geen specifieke rol wordt toegeschreven voor 
de representatie van numerieke grootte-informatie en deze meer bekend is 
voor het spelen van een centrale rol in generieke visueel-spatiële verwerking 
(zie Cavanna & Trimble, 2006 voor een overzicht), werd de (linker) gyrus 
angularis herhaaldelijk genoemd als een belangrijk gebied voor numerieke 
cognitie (zie Arsalidou et al., 2011 voor een overzicht, maar ook Dehaene et al., 
2003; Rusconi et al., 2005; Göbel et al., 2001). Deze resultaten zijn consistent 
met mijn veronderstelling van een kwalitatief verschil tussen belichaamde 
numerieke representaties en benadrukken het belang van een niet-spatiële 
sensomotorische representatie van grootte. 
Tezamen ondersteunen de resultaten van de studies die in dit 
proefschrift zijn beschreven het concept van aarding van numerieke grootte in 
sensomotorische groottes door belangrijke nieuwe empirische bewijzen voor een 
gemeenschappelijke representatie van numerieke, perceptuele en motorische 
grootte. De waargenomen dissociatie van vinger-gebaseerde en spatiële 
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getalrepresentaties ondersteunen mijn hypothese dat dit aardingsmechanisme 
kwalitatief verschilt van eerder voorgestelde belichaamde representaties. 
Samenvattend suggereert mijn onderzoek dat numerieke cognitie gebaseerd is 
op meerdere belichaamde representaties van numerieke grootte en benadrukt 
dat met name sensomotorische ervaringen met grootte in ons dagelijkse leven 
belangrijk zijn voor ons begrip van analoge numerieke grootte-informatie.
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Deutsche Zusammenfassung
In unserer modernen Gesellschaft sind wir jeden Tag von numerischen 
Informationen umgeben – und das den ganzen Tag über. Wir beginnen den Tag 
mit dem Blick auf die Ziffern unseres digitalen Weckers und wir beenden ihn 
mit dem Abzählen des Geldes für die Rechnung des 3-Gänge-Menüs im schicken 
Restaurant um die Ecke. Dazwischen verarbeiten wir tausende von Zahlen 
(Butterworth, 1999). Die Verarbeitung all dieser numerischen Informationen stellt 
eine wesentliche kognitive Fähigkeit dar, und Defizite in diesem Bereich machen 
Menschen weniger erwerbsfähig, reduzieren deutlich das Lebenseinkommen 
und sind ein Risikofaktor für Depression (Butterworth, 2010). Zu verstehen, wie 
unser Gehirn numerische Informationen repräsentiert und verarbeitet ist für 
diagnostische und Bildungszwecke gleichermaßen wichtig.
Während wir sie in der Regel in verbaler oder symbolischer Form benutzen, 
beziehen sich Zahlen in ihrem Kern jedoch auf Größen oder Magnituden. Eine 
Repräsentation von numerischer Größe ermöglicht es uns, die tatsächlichen 
Wert einer Zahl abzuleiten und ihn mit dem anderer Zahlen zu vergleichen. Die 
evolutionäre Bedeutung dieser Fähigkeit wird durch die Tatsache hervorgehoben, 
dass die Grundempfindlichkeit für Mengen nicht nur schon in der frühen Kindheit 
vorhanden ist (z.B. Feigenson, Dehaene & Spelke, 2004), sondern sogar auch von 
nicht-menschlichen Primaten (z.B. Brannon, 2006), sowie anderen Tieren, wie 
etwa Ratten (z.B. Mech und Church, 1983), Papageien (z.B. Pepper & Gordon, 
2005) und Fischen (z.B. Agrillo, Piffer, Bisazza, & Butterworth, 2012) geteilt wird. 
Hervorzuheben ist, dass man davon ausgeht, dass die mentale Repräsentation von 
numerischer Größe in analoger Weise codiert ist. Dies bedeutet, dass numerische 
Größe anstatt in diskreten Schritten, entlang einer kontinuierlichen Domäne 
repräsentiert zu sein scheint, so dass die Aktivierung der Repräsentation einer 
Zahl benachbarte semantisch ähnliche Zahlen mit abnehmender Stärke mit 
aktiviert. Zuspruch für diese analoge Beschaffenheit kommt vom sogenannten 
„Distanz Effekt“, dem Phänomen, dass man zwei Zahlen schneller mitenander 
vergleichen kann, je weiter sie semantisch voneinander entfernt sind (Moyer 
& Landauer, 1967). Die hier vorliegende Doktorarbeit konzentriert sich auf die 
zugrundeliegenden Mechanismen einer analogen Größenrepräsentation, sowohl 
auf Verhaltens- als auch auf neuronaler Ebene.
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In der Literatur findet sich neben diversen anderen Ideen zur analogen 
Magnitudenrepräsentation der Vorschlag eines Verallgemeinerten Magnituden-
Systems - eine Hypothese, die besagt, dass Zahlengröße eine gemeinsame 
Repräsentation mit sensomotorischen Größen aus anderen Domänen teilt 
(Walsh, 2003). Überzeugend an dieser Theorie ist vor allem, dass sie eine simple 
Erklärung liefert, warum verschiedene Größen zusammen repräsentiert werden 
- das gemeinsame Ziel Handlung und Wahrnehmung zu dienen. Dies ist wichtig, 
da es einen potenziellen Mechanismus bietet, scheinbar abstrakte Größen (wie 
z. B. numerische Größe), mit etwas in Verbinden zu bringen, das nicht abstrakt, 
sondern körperlich erfahrbar ist. Eine Idee, die auch im Mittelpunkt einer 
anderen Linie der Literatur über Verkörperte Kognition steht, wo die zentrale 
Hypothese besagt, dass jedes semantische Konzept in sensomotorischen 
Repräsentationen geerdet ist (z.B. Wilson, 2002; Barsalou, 2008; Glenberg 
& Kaschak, 2002; Pecher & Zwaan, 2005; Fischer & Zwaan, 2008). Während 
frühere Literatur im Bereich der verkörperten numerischen Kognition sich auf 
numerische Fingerrepräsentationen (z.B. Bender & Beller, 2012; Lindemann et 
al., 2011; Moeller et al., 2012) und die Rolle von Körperbewegung für räumliche 
Repräsentationen von Zahlen konzentriert (Moeller et al., 2012; Loetscher et al., 
2008; Link et al., 2013), folge ich hier einer anderen Idee zur sensomotorischen 
Erdung numerischer Größe, die davon ausgeht, dass Informationen über 
Zahlengröße nur dann sinnvoll werden, wenn sie zu konkreten körperlichen 
Erfahrungen mit Größen im Alltag in Bezug gebracht werden kann (Andres et al., 
2008; Lindemann et al., 2009). Das heißt, wir verstehen den Unterschied zwischen 
einer kleinen und einer großen Zahl vielleicht, indem wir sie auf andere Größen 
nunterschiede beziehen, welche wir mit unserem sensomotorischen System 
erfahren können, wie zum Beispiel die Differenz zwischen der Wahrnehmung 
eines kleinen Objekts und der Wahrnehmung eines großen Objekts oder die 
Differenz zwischen der Anwendung schwacher Muskelkraft und der Anwendung 
starker Muskelkraft. Auf dieser Grundlage schlage ich einen Mechanismus der 
sensomotorischen Erdung von numerischer Größe vor, welcher im Einklang mit 
der Verallgemeinerten Magnituden-System Hypothese steht: Numerische Größe 
ist in sensomotorischen Erfahrungen geerdet, und zwar durch eine gemeinsame 
Repräsentation von numerischer Größe, sensorischer Größe und motorischer 
Größe. Hervorzuheben ist, dass dieser Mechanismus sich qualitativ von früheren 
Ideen der verkörperten Zahlenrepräsentationen, wie z.B. Fingerrepräsentationen 
oder räumlichen Körperrepräsentationen unterscheidet, da er eine Erdung der 
numerischen Größe erlaubt, ohne die Größendomäne zu verlassen. Mit anderen 
Worten, die sensomotorischen Erfahrungen, in denen numerische Größe geerdet 
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ist, sind nicht irgendwelche sensorischen oder motorischen Erfahrungen, sondern 
Erfahrungen mit Größeninformationen in Wahrnehmung und Handlung.
Die Ergebnisse der in Kapitel 2 beschriebenen Studie liefern wichtige 
Hinweise für eine solche Erdung der numerischen Größe in sensomotorischen 
Größen durch den Nachweis einer gemeinsamen Darstellung von numerischer 
Größe und perzeptueller Größe. Obwohl frühere Literatur bereits gezeigt 
hat, dass die Verarbeitung von numerischer und physikalischer Größe in 
Form eines „Größen-Kongruenz Effektes“ interagieren (Besner & Coltheart, 
1979; Henik & Tzelgov, 1982; Pansky & Algom, 1999; Schwarz & Ischebeck, 
2003), gestaltet sich die Interpretation dieser Ergebnisse als Beweis für eine 
gemeinsame Repräsentation von numerischer Größe und physikalische Größe 
seither problematisch. Mehrere Autoren haben argumentiert, dass der Ursprung 
der Interaktion in einem klassischen Größen-Kongruenz Paradigma in einem 
Reaktionskonflikt auf motorischer Ebene liegt, und nicht in einer gemeinsamen 
Repräsentation der physikalischen und numerischen Größe (Cohen Kadosh & 
Walsh 2009; Santens & Verguts, 2011). Um numerische und physikalische Größe 
in einer Umgebung, die frei von Reaktionskonflikten ist, zu untersuchen, habe 
ich ein visuelles Such-Paradigma entwickelt, in dem Teilnehmer eine Zielziffer 
identifizieren mussten, welche sich in ihrer physischen Größe von den anderen 
Stimuli in einer kreisförmigen Such-Anzeige unterscheidet. Wichtig ist, dass 
auch unter diesen Umständen ein Größen-Kongruenz Effekt zu beobachten war. 
Das heißt, die Teilnehmer waren schneller, wenn die physisch größere Zielziffer 
auch eine der numerisch großen Ziffern in der Such-Anzeige war, im Vergleich 
zu einer Situation, in der die Zielziffer Teil der numerisch kleinen Ziffern war. 
Die Anwesenheit eines Größen-Kongruenz Effektes in einer visuellen Suche 
erweitert die bisherige Literatur durch den Nachweis einer frühen Interaktion 
zwischen numerischer und physikalischer Größe, welche nicht von einem 
Konflikt in der Entscheidung über eine Reaktion erklärt werden kann. Angesichts 
der Beschaffenheit des visuellen Such-Paradigmas, in dem eine Eins-zu-eins-
Beziehung zwischen den Reaktionsmöglichkeiten und den Auswahlkriterien 
(siehe auch Santens & Verguts, 2011) nicht vorhanden ist,  unterstützt das 
Vorfinden einer so frühen Interaktion zwischen numerischer und physikalischer 
Größe die Hypothese einer gemeinsamen Repräsentation (Schwarz & Heinze, 
1998; Walsh, 2003) und steht im Einklang mit dem Vorschlag einer Erdung von 
numerischer Größe in sensomotorischen Größen. 
Mit der Studie, welche in Kapitel 3 dargestellt wird, lege ich weitere Beweise 
für eine gemeinsame Repräsentation von numerischer und perzeptueller Größe 
vor. Während frühere Literatur zu einer verkörperten Zahlenrepräsentation 
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einen starken Fokus auf die Verbindung von Zahlen mit den Fingern und der 
Beziehung zum Fingerzählen hatte (Bender & Beller, 2012; Lindemann et al., 
2011; Moeller et al., 2012; Domahs et al., 2010; Fischer, 2008; Di Luca & Pesenti, 
2008; Di Luca et al., 2006), haben nur wenige Studien taktile Wahrnehmung 
von Anzahl untersucht (Riggs et al., 2006; Plaisier & Smeets, 2011; Plaisier et 
al., 2009), weshalb überraschend wenig über die Beziehung zwischen taktiler 
und symbolischer Anzahl bekannt war. Daher beschloss ich diese Beziehung 
zu untersuchen, und stellte die Hypothese auf, dass taktile Anzahl die gleiche 
analoge Größenrepräsentation mit symbolischen Zahlen teilt. Die Ergebnisse 
bestätigen diese Hypothese und machen die Studie zur ersten, die einen 
modalitätsübergreifenden Distanzeffekt zwischen taktiler und symbolischer 
Anzahl aufzeigt. Das bedeutet, Teilnehmer konnten schneller und genauer 
entscheiden, ob gleichzeitig präsentierte taktile Anzahl und symbolische 
Anzahl gleich oder verschieden waren, wenn der Abstand zwischen den beiden 
Anzahlen groß war, gegenüber einem kleinen Abstand. Interessanterweise 
konnte ich keine Hinweise für einen Einfluss von Fingerzähl-Präferenzen 
auf diesen Prozess finden: Unterschiedlich bevorzugte Fingermuster waren 
demnach nicht unterschiedlich mit einer analogen Magnitudenrepräsentation 
verbunden. Dieses Ergebnis ist entscheidend, da es suggeriert, dass eine analoge 
verallgemeinerte Größenrepräsentation unabhängig von Fingerzähl-Präferenzen 
ist, und eher die Ansicht unterstützt, dass Fingerrepräsentation eine zusätzliche 
numerische Repräsentation darstellen (Moeller et al., 2012). Dies stützt auch 
meine Ansicht, dass die Erdung von numerischer Größe in sensomotorischen 
Größen einen qualitativen Unterschied zu früher vorgeschlagen verkörperten 
Zahlenrepräsentationen, wie zum Beispiel eine Finger-basierte Repräsentation 
von Zahlen, darstellt. Sensomotorische Repräsentationen der einzelnen Finger 
und ihre Beziehung zueinander enthalten in sich selbst keine Informationen 
über Größe. Daher, um numerische Größe in sensomotorischen Erfahrungen 
mit den Fingern zu erden, muss diese erst mit einer größenunabhängigen 
Repräsentation von speziellen Finger-Konfigurationen assoziiert werden, die, 
anders als numerische Größe, nicht auf einen analogen Kontinuum liegen. 
Im Gegensatz dazu wurde taktile Anzahl hier als die Menge von stimulierten 
Fingern definiert (d.h. “wie viele Finger” anstatt “welche Fingern”) und ist somit 
als Wahrnehmungsgröße zu klassifizieren. Dies bedeutet, numerische Größe 
kann auch direkt in Erfahrungen mit den perzeptuellen Größen, mit denen sie 
eine gemeinsame Repräsentation teilt, geerdet werden, anstatt zuerst mit einer 
größenunabhängigen sensomotorischen Repräsentation verknüpft zu werden. 
Die scheinbare Unabhängigkeit dieser gemeinsamen Größenrepräsentation 
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von Fingerzähl-Präferenzen, wie sie meine Daten nahelegen, unterstützen diese 
qualitative Trennung zwischen den beiden Mechanismen.
Die Idee der Erdung von numerischer Größe in sensomotorischen 
Größen nimmt die Existenz eines Systems an, in dem sowohl perzeptuelle als 
auch motorische Größen zusammen repräsentiert sind (siehe Walsh, 2003). Die 
Resultate der Studie aus Kapitel 4 bieten wichtige Hinweise auf die Existenz eines 
solchen Systems, durch den Nachweis, dass eine automatische Kopplung zwischen 
perzeptuellen und motorischen Größen bereits in der frühen Kindheit vorhanden 
ist. Untersuchungen zur Kopplung zwischen Wahrnehmung und Handlung 
haben eine lange Tradition und bieten somit eine große Zahl von Hinweisen für 
die allgemeine Existenz von gemeinsam genutzten Codes zwischen diesen beiden 
Domänen (siehe Hommel, 2013 für einen Überblick). Während diese Kopplung 
von zentraler Bedeutung für die Untersuchung der motorischen Entwicklung 
im Kindesalter und der frühen Kindheit war (siehe Adolph & Berger, 2006, für 
einen Überblick), ist wenig über die Beziehung zwischen der Wahrnehmung von 
Größe und größenbezogenen Aspekten der Motorik bei Kleinkindern bekannt. 
Daher ließ ich 2,5- bis 3-jährige Kleinkinder ein Computerspiel spielen, in dem 
eine auf einem Bildschrim dargestellte Plattform mit unterschiedlich vielen 
Objekten durch Drücken eines kraftempfindlichen Schalters verschoben werden 
musste. Ich erwartete, dass, obwohl Kraft irrelevant ist, um die Aufgabe zu lösen, 
die Menge der Objekte einen direkten Einfluss auf die aufgebrachte Motorkraft 
hat. Die Ergebnisse bestätigen diese Hypothese: Kinder drückten den Knopf 
mit einer höheren Maximalkraft, wenn 15 Objekte auf der Plattform lagen, im 
Vergleich zu 3. Diese Ergebnisse erweitern die bisherige Literatur durch den 
Nachweis eines direkten Einflusses von perzeptuellen Größeninformationen 
auf Kraftproduktion bei Kleinkindern, wenn die Menge der aufgebrachten Kraft 
nicht für die Aufgabe selbst relevant ist. Solch eine inhärente Kopplung von 
perzeptueller und motorischer Größe bietet deutliche Hinweise darauf, dass eine 
gemeinsame Repräsentation von perzeptueller  und motorischer Größe bereits 
in früher Kindheit vorhanden ist.
Ich habe die Erdung von numerischer Größe in sensomotorischen Größen 
als alternativen (und qualitativ unterschiedlichen) Mechanismus zu bisher in 
der Literatur diskutierten verkörperten Repräsentationen von Zahlengröße, 
welche auf Assoziationen mit sensomotorischen Repräsentationen, die a priori 
nicht größenbezogen sind, wie z.B. Raumpositionen (z.B. Moeller et al., 2012), 
vorgestellt. Die Studie, welche in Kapitel 5 beschrieben wird, liefert überzeugende 
Beweise für diese Dissoziation. Während die Mehrheit der vorherigen Literatur 
über die mentale Repräsentation von numerischer Größe eine räumliche 
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Darstellung von Zahlen als Positionen auf einem “mentalen Zahlenstrahl” (; 
Moyer & Landauer, 1967;. Moyer, 1973 Dehaene et al, 1993) annimmt, schlägt 
aktuelle Forschung vor, dass numerische Größe zusammen mit anderen 
sensomotorischen Größen in einem verallgemeinertem Magnituden-System 
representiert ist (Walsh, 2003). Um diese beiden Darstellungen zu trennen, 
schätzte ich die Dispositionen von Individuen ab, Zahlen entweder mit einer 
räumlichen Reaktion (SNARC Effekt., z.B. Dehaene et al., 1993) zu verbinden 
oder mit sensomotorischer aber nicht räumlicher Kraftreaktion (Vierck & 
Kiesel, 2010). Ich erwartete, dass individuelle Unterschiede in diesem Verhalten 
auch dissoziierbare zerebrale Korrelate haben. Voxel-basierte Morphometrie 
wurde verwendet, um Unterschiede in lokalem Volumen grauer Substanz im 
posterioralen parietalen Kortex zu untersuchen. Unterschiede in der Kopplung 
von Zahlen an räumliche Reaktionen korrelierten mit Variationen im Volumen 
der grauen Substanz im Unfeld des rechten Precuneus. Individuelle Unterschiede 
in der Kopplung von Zahlen zu Kraftreaktionen auf der anderen Seite, gingen 
mit Varianz im Volumen der grauen Substanz im linken Gyrus Angularis einher. 
Diese Ergebnisse erweitern die aktuelle Literatur nicht nur um eine der ersten 
Demonstrationen eines Gehirn-Korrelats des bekannten Zusammenhangs 
zwischen Zahlen und räumliche Reaktionen (SNARC Effekt; Dehaene et al., 1993), 
sondern auch durch die weitere Etablierung der Verbindung von Zahlengröße 
mit Kraftproduktion (vgl. Vierck & Kiesel, 2010). Vor allem aber zeigen sie, dass 
numerische Kognition in der Tat auf mehreren mentalen Repräsentationen der 
numerischen Größe beruht. Die Tatsache, dass diese mentalen Repräsentationen 
dissoziierbare neuronale Implementierungen haben, welche mit individuellen 
Eigenschaften in Verbindung stehen, suggeriert, dass es einen qualitativen 
Unterschied zwischen ihnen gibt. Auch die unterschiedlichen funktionalen 
Rollen der identifizierten Areale unterstützen diese Andeutung. Während dem 
rechten Precuneus in der Regel keine bestimmte Rolle für die Darstellung von 
numerischen Größeninformation zugeschrieben wird und er eher dafür bekannt 
ist, eine zentrale Rolle in der allgemeinen visuell-räumlichen Verarbeitung zu 
spielen (siehe Cavanna & Trimble, 2006, für einen Überblick), wurde der (linke) 
Gyrus Anularis wiederholt als Schlüsselareal für numerische Kognition berichtet 
(siehe Arsalidou et al., 2011, für einen Überblick, aber auch Dehaene et al., 2003;. 
Rusconi et al., 2005;. Göbel et al., 2001). Diese Ergebnisse sind im Einklang 
mit meiner Annahme eines qualitativen Unterschiedes zwischen verkörperten 
numerischen Repräsentationen und heben die Bedeutung einer nicht räumlichen 
sensomotorischen Repräsentation von numerischer Größe hervor. 
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Zusammengenommen unterstützen die Ergebnisse der in dieser 
Doktorarbeit aufgeführten Studien das Konzept der Erdung numerischer Größe 
in sensomotorischen Größen durch wichtige neue empirische Belege für eine 
gemeinsame Repräsentation von numerischer Größe und perzeptueller und 
motorischer Größe. Die beobachteten Dissoziationen von Finger-basierten 
und räumlichen Zahlenrepräsentationen unterstützen meine Hypothese, 
dass dieser Erdungsmechanismus sich qualitativ von früher vorgeschlagenen 
verkörperter Repräsentationen unterscheidet. Es lässt sich schlussfolgern, 
dass meine Forschung darauf hindeutet, dass numerische Kognition auf 
mehreren verkörperten Repräsentationen von Zahlengröße basiert und betont 
insbesondere die Bedeutung der sensomotorischen Erfahrungen mit Größe im 
Alltag für unser Verständnis von analogen numerischen Größeninformationen.
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